HuggyU2

These people really exist?

robthree

https://www.faa.gov/regulations_poli...mentID/1030486


flightsafety.org/files/flightpath/EPMG.pdf

XHooker

Didn't read the whole thing, but making FMA callouts only tells you part of the story... what mode is engaged. Suppose the automation isn't working as advertised? I worry we're training to "...well, the FMA had all of the correct annunciations on and the CVR had the correct callouts right before they plowed into the approach lights." I'm all for appropriate FMA callouts and as much cross fleet standardization as possible, but eventually flying planes is about physics and the actual energy state of the aircraft, not what mode is engaged. "Bro/Sis... you're slow" and/or Bro/Sis... you're low" and aggressive correction would have prevented any of the mishaps mentioned in the document.

Grumble

This.

I commute quite often in RJ jumpseats and this is horribly prevalent. I've seen some downright scary situations with furious knob turning and butting pushing to try and fly the airplane getting further and further behind the airplane, when looking out the window and handflying could've corrected everything in a matter of seconds.

cadetdrivr

Yup.

I saw this all the time flying (and instructing) the bus as the hardest thing to do on that bird is a visual approach with the AP on. Meanwhile with a couple clicks and some pilot stuff it's a piece of cake.

robthree

I'm certainly not saying that FMA callouts replace situational awareness and airmanship. But they do answer the question "what's it doing now?" and when the autopilot is on, that's where SA starts(not ends!) All that furious button pressing and knob turning should tell somebody they're operating at the wrong level of automation for the flight conditions.

As far as the FMAs having the correct annunciations, that's pretty much the whole point. The didn't have the correct annunciations and nobody noticed in all the accident and asap reports in the flightsafety report. The accident chain for UPS1354 started with a failure to recognize the FMAs were not in agreement with the crew's intent.


But I'm also on board with the idea that the VVM SOP is there to help us understand what the plane is doing, not to replace understanding of what the plane is doing, but that sometimes compliance does not lead to comprehension.

757Driver

So you're said toolbag.

Just kidding. My point R3 is that there's so much talking and pointing going on that radio calls and actually flying the aircraft are taking a back seat to VVM'ing. That, IMO, is less safe than it was before the January edict and as PIC, I'm using my authority by suspending it from takeoff until landing. Bulletin says I can do so, and I will.

How's about just looking at the FMA's like we've always done and if it's incorrect, do something about it? We're micromanaging every aspect up there and this ridiculous procedure isn't helping.

And yes, filed an FSAP explaining the missed calls and my dissatisfaction with said procedure.

oldmako

Buddy of mine told me a funny quip about this nonsense. He's Captain and pilot flying with the AP on. They're well away from the terminal area, but not at cruise.

ATC says, "turn right to XXX".
PNF F/O responds to ATC.
Captain stabs the HDG knob and spins it.
Plane turns.
Long pause.
F/O shouts and points..."you're in Heading".

CousinEddie

The 777-300 accident In Dubai last summer appears to have been caused by a lack of any go around power application until it was far too late. TOGA switches inhibited at touchdown, flap and gear retraction initiated while still at idle thrust. Was the pilot's "muscle memory" of actually pushing the thrust levers forward himself gone?

https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublicat...-%20A6-EMW.pdf

NFLUALNFL

I've seen the A/P turned on at 100 AGL in a Landings class. Just wow.