SLI Post Hearing Briefs
07-22-2013, 05:05 PM
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LCAL Table of Contents
A. Airline Economics
1. Continental Earned More Profits and Enjoyed Higher International Yields and Operating Margins
2. United Collapsed During the Decade of the Aughts
3. Continental Strengthened During the Decade of the Aughts, Especially in Its International Divisions
4. Continental's B757s Allowed It to Expand to More European Markets
5. Continental Pilots Were Paid More
6. Widebody Superiority Is a Myth
7. Continental Did Not Undergo an “Out-of-Court Restructuring” in 2004-05
B. History
1. The Early Days of Both Airlines
2. Recession and September 11th: United Collapsed While Continental Held Steady
3. United, Desperate to Merge, Continued to Shrink
C. Employment Data
1. Continental and United Pilot Hiring, Furlough, Age and Attrition Demographics Differ
2. Block Hours Drive Pilot Jobs and Block Hours Were Essentially Equivalent
3. United Was Overstaffed
4. Continental Pilots Earned More
D. Fleet
1. Continental's Fleet Was Superior to United's
2. The United Merger Committee's Case Regarding Fleet Was Non-Existent
E. Continental Was the Larger International Carrier
F. Career
1. Pilots Want to Be Captains
2. Continental First Officers Had Superior Prospects for Upgrading
3. The Continental Pilots' Pre-Merger Pay Exceeded That of United Pilots
4. The Continental Pilots Had Better Scope Protection and Job Security
5. Continental Was a Great Place to Work but United Was Not
6. Furloughees Were Recalled at Continental, but Pilots Faced Dim Prospects at United
G. The Continental Merger Committee's Proposed Integration
1. The 2009 ALPA Merger Policy Revisions
2. ALPA Merger Policy Timeline
3. The Rationale for the Continental Merger Committee's Proposal
ARGUMENT
I. The Continental Merger Committee's Proposal Is Fair
A. The Continental Merger Committee's Proposed List Appropriately Preserves the Pre-Merger Career Expectations of Both Pilot Groups
B. The United Pilots Are Already Realizing Significant Gains from the Merger
1. The United Pilots Are Receiving More of the Financial Gains from the Merger
2. The United Pilots Are Also Benefiting More from the Merger Than the Continental Pilots in Non-Monetary Areas, Such as Improved Job Security
3. The Approximately 1400 Furloughed United Pilots Gain the Most from This Merger
C. Only Active Pilots Who Bring Jobs to the Merger Should Be Placed Together on the Integrated Seniority List; Furloughed and Other Surplus United Pilots Should Not Be Intermixed with Active Continental Pilots
D. The Proposed Conditions and Restrictions of the Continental Merger Committee Are Necessary and Appropriate to Achieve a Fair and Equitable Merged List
1. Reciprocal Protection of Continental B787 Flying Matches the United B747/A350 Protection
2. “No Bump, No Flush” Protection of Positions Awarded Should Be Included
3. The Board Should Take Note of the Virtual Fence That United Overstaffing Creates
II. The United Merger Committee's Proposal Is Unfair
Proposed Hybrid Methodology Is Unprecedented and Unjustifiable
B. The United Merger Committee's Proposal to Reassign Pilots' Longevity to Other Pilots on Their Pre-Merger List Is Unprecedented and Unjustifiable
C. The United Merger Committee's Proposed Status and Category List Incorrectly Groups the Jobs Brought to the Merger
D. The United Merger Committee's Proposed Status and Category List Attributes Too Many Jobs to the United Pilot Group and Too Few to the Continental Pilots
E. The Board Should Not Apply the Constructive Notice Doctrine to Craig Watts and Jon Yost
1. Continental Earned More Profits and Enjoyed Higher International Yields and Operating Margins
2. United Collapsed During the Decade of the Aughts
3. Continental Strengthened During the Decade of the Aughts, Especially in Its International Divisions
4. Continental's B757s Allowed It to Expand to More European Markets
5. Continental Pilots Were Paid More
6. Widebody Superiority Is a Myth
7. Continental Did Not Undergo an “Out-of-Court Restructuring” in 2004-05
B. History
1. The Early Days of Both Airlines
2. Recession and September 11th: United Collapsed While Continental Held Steady
3. United, Desperate to Merge, Continued to Shrink
C. Employment Data
1. Continental and United Pilot Hiring, Furlough, Age and Attrition Demographics Differ
2. Block Hours Drive Pilot Jobs and Block Hours Were Essentially Equivalent
3. United Was Overstaffed
4. Continental Pilots Earned More
D. Fleet
1. Continental's Fleet Was Superior to United's
2. The United Merger Committee's Case Regarding Fleet Was Non-Existent
E. Continental Was the Larger International Carrier
F. Career
1. Pilots Want to Be Captains
2. Continental First Officers Had Superior Prospects for Upgrading
3. The Continental Pilots' Pre-Merger Pay Exceeded That of United Pilots
4. The Continental Pilots Had Better Scope Protection and Job Security
5. Continental Was a Great Place to Work but United Was Not
6. Furloughees Were Recalled at Continental, but Pilots Faced Dim Prospects at United
G. The Continental Merger Committee's Proposed Integration
1. The 2009 ALPA Merger Policy Revisions
2. ALPA Merger Policy Timeline
3. The Rationale for the Continental Merger Committee's Proposal
ARGUMENT
I. The Continental Merger Committee's Proposal Is Fair
A. The Continental Merger Committee's Proposed List Appropriately Preserves the Pre-Merger Career Expectations of Both Pilot Groups
B. The United Pilots Are Already Realizing Significant Gains from the Merger
1. The United Pilots Are Receiving More of the Financial Gains from the Merger
2. The United Pilots Are Also Benefiting More from the Merger Than the Continental Pilots in Non-Monetary Areas, Such as Improved Job Security
3. The Approximately 1400 Furloughed United Pilots Gain the Most from This Merger
C. Only Active Pilots Who Bring Jobs to the Merger Should Be Placed Together on the Integrated Seniority List; Furloughed and Other Surplus United Pilots Should Not Be Intermixed with Active Continental Pilots
D. The Proposed Conditions and Restrictions of the Continental Merger Committee Are Necessary and Appropriate to Achieve a Fair and Equitable Merged List
1. Reciprocal Protection of Continental B787 Flying Matches the United B747/A350 Protection
2. “No Bump, No Flush” Protection of Positions Awarded Should Be Included
3. The Board Should Take Note of the Virtual Fence That United Overstaffing Creates
II. The United Merger Committee's Proposal Is Unfair
Proposed Hybrid Methodology Is Unprecedented and Unjustifiable
B. The United Merger Committee's Proposal to Reassign Pilots' Longevity to Other Pilots on Their Pre-Merger List Is Unprecedented and Unjustifiable
C. The United Merger Committee's Proposed Status and Category List Incorrectly Groups the Jobs Brought to the Merger
D. The United Merger Committee's Proposed Status and Category List Attributes Too Many Jobs to the United Pilot Group and Too Few to the Continental Pilots
E. The Board Should Not Apply the Constructive Notice Doctrine to Craig Watts and Jon Yost
Last edited by APC225; 07-22-2013 at 05:45 PM.
07-22-2013, 05:08 PM
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LUAL Table of Contents
I. THE UNITED COMMITTEE'S HYBRID PROPOSAL PRODUCES A FAIR AND EQUITABLE LIST
A. The United Pilots' Proposal is Based on ALPA Merger Policy, Established and Uncontroversial Structural Underpinnings Derived from SLI Arbitral Precedent, and Common Sense
1. The Date the Merger Closed is the Only Appropriate Date to Use as a Snapshot Date
2. The United Proposal Appropriately Incorporates All of the Three Merger Policy Factors
a) The Record Demonstrates United Pilots' Significant Longevity Advantage in the Bottom Half of the List and the Continental Pilots' Modest Advantage in the Top Half of the List. These Advantages Must be Factored Into an ISL
b) The Status and Category Factor Requires That United's Massive Advantage on Jumbo Flying be Respected
B. The Structure of the United Proposed List and Methodology
1. The United Committee's Longevity “Stovepipe” Method Accurately Incorporates All Pilots' Longevity in Accordance with Merger Policy
2. The United Proposed Status & Category List is Fair and Keeps Pilots of Like Aircraft Together
C. The United Committee's Proposal Maintains to an Appropriate Degree, When Balanced with Longevity, the Continental and United Pilots' Pre- Merger Career Expectations
1. The United Proposal Treats Appropriately the United Pilots with the Greatest Longevity Advantage
2. The CAL Committee Failed to Show Any Actual Unfairness from the United Committee's Proposal
II. THE CONTINENTAL PROPOSED ISL IS NOT FAIR AND EQUITABLE, NOT REASONABLE, AND IS CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF ALPA MERGER POLICY
A. The Snapshot Date Cannot Be April 1, 2013
B. The Continental Committee's Proposal Flatly Disregards Merger Policy
1. The CAL Committee's ISL Proposal Disregards the Longevity Factor, Disadvantaging UAL Pilots
2. The CAL Committee's ISL Proposal Ignores Category Entirely and Ignores United's Advantages in Both Status and Category
3. The CAL Committee's Attempt to Justify its Proposal is Based on the Supposedly Superior Career Expectations of its Pilot Group, Particularly its Purported Advantage on Pay. But the Facts Demonstrate that UAL Pilots are at Least as Well Compensated as CAL Pilots and Furthermore Compensation Differences, or Other Minor Differences in Career Expectations, in No Way Justify the CAL Committee's Proposed List
a) Compensation
b) The JCBA
c) Aircraft Orders
C. The Continental Committee's Proposal Is Unreasonable, Not Fair, Not Equitable, and Harms All United Pilots
1. Bidding Power
2. Captain Years
3. Preferred Years
4. W-2 Wages
D. The Continental Committee Has Submitted a “Stalking Horse” Proposal and the Board Should Refuse to Order What It Actually Seeks
III. The Conditions and Restrictions
A. The 747 and 787 Fences
B. The “Training” Conditions and Restrictions
C. The CAL Committee's Application of the Constructive Notice Doctrine is Flawed
D. The Board Should Adopt the UAL Committee's Proposed Dispute Resolution Process Because it is Now “Tried and True,” Having Been Adopted in the Two Most Recent Large SLI Cases and Having Been Applied Successfully Without Complaint in One of Them
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A
To The Extent Economic And Operational Factors Put A Thumb On The Scale In One Direction Or Another, It Would Be To The Advantage Of The United Pilot Group, Not Continental's Pilots
1. During the Seven Quarters Prior to the Merger Closing Date, Which is the Appropriate Comparison Period, United's Financial Performance was Superior to that of Continental.
2. Pre-Merger, United Was Not Only In A Better Position Financially Than Continental, As Shown Above, But Its Core Strategic Advantages Far Outweighed Continental's
3. By 2010, Both Carriers Sought a Merger, But Continental Was In a Far Weaker and More Vulnerable Position and Its Pilots' Career Expectations Were at Risk
4. United's Decision to Await Replacement of its 737s Until After a Merger was Merely a Prudent Delay and Not a Sign of Financial or Operational Weakness
5. Dr. Campbell Sacrificed His Credibility as an Expert in this Case By Reversing his Opinions from the Delta-Northwest Case on Numerous Key Issues
APPENDIX B
The Continental “Flow-Through” Pilots' Mainline Dates of Hire and Accurate Furlough Periods, as Reflected in the Company-Supplied Zeus and “XJT” Furlough Data, Are the Appropriate Longevity Data to Use Under Merger Policy
1. The Zeus Dates are Wholly Appropriate to Use in Establishing the Starting Point for Calculating Length of Service for Those 770 CAL Pilots That “Flowed Up” from Continental Subsidiaries
2. The XJT Data are Wholly Appropriate to Use in Establishing the Flow-Down Periods Those CAL Pilots that Flowed Down in Lieu of Taking Furlough
3. Nothing in the Stack of Documents Dumped into the Record by the CAL Committee Changes what We Have Demonstrated
4. Nothing in Merger Policy Prevents the Board from Resolving this Dispute Over the Correct Longevity of the CAL Pilots
A. The United Pilots' Proposal is Based on ALPA Merger Policy, Established and Uncontroversial Structural Underpinnings Derived from SLI Arbitral Precedent, and Common Sense
1. The Date the Merger Closed is the Only Appropriate Date to Use as a Snapshot Date
2. The United Proposal Appropriately Incorporates All of the Three Merger Policy Factors
a) The Record Demonstrates United Pilots' Significant Longevity Advantage in the Bottom Half of the List and the Continental Pilots' Modest Advantage in the Top Half of the List. These Advantages Must be Factored Into an ISL
b) The Status and Category Factor Requires That United's Massive Advantage on Jumbo Flying be Respected
B. The Structure of the United Proposed List and Methodology
1. The United Committee's Longevity “Stovepipe” Method Accurately Incorporates All Pilots' Longevity in Accordance with Merger Policy
2. The United Proposed Status & Category List is Fair and Keeps Pilots of Like Aircraft Together
C. The United Committee's Proposal Maintains to an Appropriate Degree, When Balanced with Longevity, the Continental and United Pilots' Pre- Merger Career Expectations
1. The United Proposal Treats Appropriately the United Pilots with the Greatest Longevity Advantage
2. The CAL Committee Failed to Show Any Actual Unfairness from the United Committee's Proposal
II. THE CONTINENTAL PROPOSED ISL IS NOT FAIR AND EQUITABLE, NOT REASONABLE, AND IS CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF ALPA MERGER POLICY
A. The Snapshot Date Cannot Be April 1, 2013
B. The Continental Committee's Proposal Flatly Disregards Merger Policy
1. The CAL Committee's ISL Proposal Disregards the Longevity Factor, Disadvantaging UAL Pilots
2. The CAL Committee's ISL Proposal Ignores Category Entirely and Ignores United's Advantages in Both Status and Category
3. The CAL Committee's Attempt to Justify its Proposal is Based on the Supposedly Superior Career Expectations of its Pilot Group, Particularly its Purported Advantage on Pay. But the Facts Demonstrate that UAL Pilots are at Least as Well Compensated as CAL Pilots and Furthermore Compensation Differences, or Other Minor Differences in Career Expectations, in No Way Justify the CAL Committee's Proposed List
a) Compensation
b) The JCBA
c) Aircraft Orders
C. The Continental Committee's Proposal Is Unreasonable, Not Fair, Not Equitable, and Harms All United Pilots
1. Bidding Power
2. Captain Years
3. Preferred Years
4. W-2 Wages
D. The Continental Committee Has Submitted a “Stalking Horse” Proposal and the Board Should Refuse to Order What It Actually Seeks
III. The Conditions and Restrictions
A. The 747 and 787 Fences
B. The “Training” Conditions and Restrictions
C. The CAL Committee's Application of the Constructive Notice Doctrine is Flawed
D. The Board Should Adopt the UAL Committee's Proposed Dispute Resolution Process Because it is Now “Tried and True,” Having Been Adopted in the Two Most Recent Large SLI Cases and Having Been Applied Successfully Without Complaint in One of Them
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A
To The Extent Economic And Operational Factors Put A Thumb On The Scale In One Direction Or Another, It Would Be To The Advantage Of The United Pilot Group, Not Continental's Pilots
1. During the Seven Quarters Prior to the Merger Closing Date, Which is the Appropriate Comparison Period, United's Financial Performance was Superior to that of Continental.
2. Pre-Merger, United Was Not Only In A Better Position Financially Than Continental, As Shown Above, But Its Core Strategic Advantages Far Outweighed Continental's
3. By 2010, Both Carriers Sought a Merger, But Continental Was In a Far Weaker and More Vulnerable Position and Its Pilots' Career Expectations Were at Risk
4. United's Decision to Await Replacement of its 737s Until After a Merger was Merely a Prudent Delay and Not a Sign of Financial or Operational Weakness
5. Dr. Campbell Sacrificed His Credibility as an Expert in this Case By Reversing his Opinions from the Delta-Northwest Case on Numerous Key Issues
APPENDIX B
The Continental “Flow-Through” Pilots' Mainline Dates of Hire and Accurate Furlough Periods, as Reflected in the Company-Supplied Zeus and “XJT” Furlough Data, Are the Appropriate Longevity Data to Use Under Merger Policy
1. The Zeus Dates are Wholly Appropriate to Use in Establishing the Starting Point for Calculating Length of Service for Those 770 CAL Pilots That “Flowed Up” from Continental Subsidiaries
2. The XJT Data are Wholly Appropriate to Use in Establishing the Flow-Down Periods Those CAL Pilots that Flowed Down in Lieu of Taking Furlough
3. Nothing in the Stack of Documents Dumped into the Record by the CAL Committee Changes what We Have Demonstrated
4. Nothing in Merger Policy Prevents the Board from Resolving this Dispute Over the Correct Longevity of the CAL Pilots
Last edited by APC225; 07-22-2013 at 05:52 PM.
07-22-2013, 05:39 PM
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07-22-2013, 06:11 PM
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LUAL Supplemental Memo
Proposed Conditions & Restrictions
UX-5 (Ruark), at 57-60:
1. The Integrated Seniority List shall have only prospective effect. Specifically, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following conditions shall apply:
• There shall be no "system flush" whereby a Pilot may displace another Pilot from the latter’s position as a result of the implementation of the Integrated Seniority List or the implementation or expiration of any condition or restriction; and
• Pilots on furlough status at the time the Integrated Seniority List is implemented may not bump or displace pilots in active status at that time; and
• Pilots who, at the time of implementation of an integrated seniority list, are in the process of completing or who have completed qualification training for a new position (e.g., B-777 Captain or A-319 First Officer) may be assigned to the position for which they are being or have been trained, regardless of their relative standing on the Integrated Seniority List.
2. There shall be no requirement or obligation to compensate Pilots for work not actually performed or positions not actually held during the period for which compensation is sought, as a result of the Integrated Seniority List and its implementation.
3. Until the first vacancy bid 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, only pre- merger UAL pilots shall be eligible to bid for CAP and F/O vacancies on B-747s and A- 350s or their replacements.
4. Until the first vacancy bid 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, vacancies for B-787 CA positions and FO positions shall be allocated between premerger UAL and pre-merger CAL pilots as follows:
• All B-787 CA and FO vacancies in pre-merger CAL bases (IAH, CLE, EWR, GUM) shall be filled only by pre-merger CAL pilots. All B-787 CA and FO vacancies in pre-merger UAL bases (JFK, IAD, ORD, DEN, LAX, SFO, SEA) shall be filled only by pre-merger UAL pilots.
• All B-787 CA and FO vacancies in any newly established base shall be allocated on a ratio of 1 pre-merger UAL CAP to 1 pre-merger CAL CA and 1 pre-merger UAL FO to 1 pre-merger CAL FO. With respect to all such allocated B-787 positions, the obligation of the Company is to achieve the exact allocation of positions allocated in this Paragraph 4; provided, however, that pilots shall not be displaced from positions actually held solely to achieve the indicated balance. The Company shall assign all positions so as to drive towards the achievement of the indicated allocation and once balance is achieved, shall thereafter maintain the indicated balance until the expiration of the applicable restriction.
5. Should there be insufficient bidders from one pre-merger pilot group for any position in the allocated group of positions under paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the filling of the position will be governed by the ISL. A pilot thereby awarded a position will, for purposes of processing future displacements under the collective bargaining agreement, be considered as junior to all pilots from the pre-merger pilot group entitled to the position. Notwithstanding the awarding of positions pursuant to this insufficient bidders provision, the restrictions set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall continue to apply during the terms specified in paragraphs 3 and 4, until the insufficient bidders condition continues for six consecutive bid periods, at which point the applicable restriction shall expire.
6. Until the first bid period 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, premerger UAL pilots involuntarily furloughed as of Oct 1, 2010 shall be subject to furlough (in their reverse seniority order) prior to the furlough of any pre-merger CAL pilot.
7. All pilots hired by either CAL or UAL after May 3, 2010, other than pilots hired pursuant to Section 7-B of the TPA, shall be placed on the ISL after the last UAL and CAL pilot on their respective seniority lists of May 3, 2010.
8. Post-Award disputes over the application of the ISL shall be resolved pursuant to the attached Dispute Resolution Procedures [UX-5 (Ruark), at 61].
9. These Conditions and Restrictions shall be integral to and inseparable from the ISL.
UX-6 (Ruark), at 5-10:
Until the first vacancy bid 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, 777 CA and FO vacancies shall be filled as follows:
All B-777 CA vacancies shall be allocated on a ratio of 2 premerger UAL CA to 1 pre-merger CAL CA and 2 pre-merger UAL FO to 1 pre-merger CAL FO. With respect to all such allocated B-777 positions, the obligation of the Company is to achieve the exact allocation of positions allocated in this Paragraph; provided, however, that pilots shall not be displaced from positions actually held solely to achieve the indicated balance. The Company shall assign all positions so as to drive towards the achievement of the indicated allocation and once balance is achieved, shall thereafter maintain the indicated balance until the expiration of the applicable restriction.
UX-5 (Ruark), at 57-60:
1. The Integrated Seniority List shall have only prospective effect. Specifically, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following conditions shall apply:
• There shall be no "system flush" whereby a Pilot may displace another Pilot from the latter’s position as a result of the implementation of the Integrated Seniority List or the implementation or expiration of any condition or restriction; and
• Pilots on furlough status at the time the Integrated Seniority List is implemented may not bump or displace pilots in active status at that time; and
• Pilots who, at the time of implementation of an integrated seniority list, are in the process of completing or who have completed qualification training for a new position (e.g., B-777 Captain or A-319 First Officer) may be assigned to the position for which they are being or have been trained, regardless of their relative standing on the Integrated Seniority List.
2. There shall be no requirement or obligation to compensate Pilots for work not actually performed or positions not actually held during the period for which compensation is sought, as a result of the Integrated Seniority List and its implementation.
3. Until the first vacancy bid 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, only pre- merger UAL pilots shall be eligible to bid for CAP and F/O vacancies on B-747s and A- 350s or their replacements.
4. Until the first vacancy bid 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, vacancies for B-787 CA positions and FO positions shall be allocated between premerger UAL and pre-merger CAL pilots as follows:
• All B-787 CA and FO vacancies in pre-merger CAL bases (IAH, CLE, EWR, GUM) shall be filled only by pre-merger CAL pilots. All B-787 CA and FO vacancies in pre-merger UAL bases (JFK, IAD, ORD, DEN, LAX, SFO, SEA) shall be filled only by pre-merger UAL pilots.
• All B-787 CA and FO vacancies in any newly established base shall be allocated on a ratio of 1 pre-merger UAL CAP to 1 pre-merger CAL CA and 1 pre-merger UAL FO to 1 pre-merger CAL FO. With respect to all such allocated B-787 positions, the obligation of the Company is to achieve the exact allocation of positions allocated in this Paragraph 4; provided, however, that pilots shall not be displaced from positions actually held solely to achieve the indicated balance. The Company shall assign all positions so as to drive towards the achievement of the indicated allocation and once balance is achieved, shall thereafter maintain the indicated balance until the expiration of the applicable restriction.
5. Should there be insufficient bidders from one pre-merger pilot group for any position in the allocated group of positions under paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the filling of the position will be governed by the ISL. A pilot thereby awarded a position will, for purposes of processing future displacements under the collective bargaining agreement, be considered as junior to all pilots from the pre-merger pilot group entitled to the position. Notwithstanding the awarding of positions pursuant to this insufficient bidders provision, the restrictions set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall continue to apply during the terms specified in paragraphs 3 and 4, until the insufficient bidders condition continues for six consecutive bid periods, at which point the applicable restriction shall expire.
6. Until the first bid period 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, premerger UAL pilots involuntarily furloughed as of Oct 1, 2010 shall be subject to furlough (in their reverse seniority order) prior to the furlough of any pre-merger CAL pilot.
7. All pilots hired by either CAL or UAL after May 3, 2010, other than pilots hired pursuant to Section 7-B of the TPA, shall be placed on the ISL after the last UAL and CAL pilot on their respective seniority lists of May 3, 2010.
8. Post-Award disputes over the application of the ISL shall be resolved pursuant to the attached Dispute Resolution Procedures [UX-5 (Ruark), at 61].
9. These Conditions and Restrictions shall be integral to and inseparable from the ISL.
UX-6 (Ruark), at 5-10:
Until the first vacancy bid 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, 777 CA and FO vacancies shall be filled as follows:
All B-777 CA vacancies shall be allocated on a ratio of 2 premerger UAL CA to 1 pre-merger CAL CA and 2 pre-merger UAL FO to 1 pre-merger CAL FO. With respect to all such allocated B-777 positions, the obligation of the Company is to achieve the exact allocation of positions allocated in this Paragraph; provided, however, that pilots shall not be displaced from positions actually held solely to achieve the indicated balance. The Company shall assign all positions so as to drive towards the achievement of the indicated allocation and once balance is achieved, shall thereafter maintain the indicated balance until the expiration of the applicable restriction.
Last edited by APC225; 07-22-2013 at 06:29 PM.
07-22-2013, 06:27 PM
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LCAL Supplemental Memo
[too long to post, but this is the intro]
The Continental Merger Committee submits this supplemental memorandum to address the United Merger Committee's challenges to certain Continental pilots' dates of hire and furlough periods as certified by the Continental Merger Committee. The United Merger Committee contends that the Continental Merger Committee's Certified List contains incorrect information for pilots who began their Continental service at Continental Express. These types of disputes are nothing new. Disagreements over dates of hire and calculating lengths of service are some of the garden variety issues that have routinely arisen through the decades in seniority list integration (SLI) proceedings. See, e.g., Pinnacle-Colgan-Mesaba at 15 n.10 (2011) (Bloch, Arb.) (noting a discrepancy regarding DOH calculations but declining to resolve it and instead using a ratio methodology to “devitalize[] the impact of most potential [DOH] calculation discrepancies); Mackey-Eastern at 2-4 (1967) (Cole, Arb.) (addressing disagreements between the pilot groups about LOS calculations for certain pilots).
Contrary to the United Merger Committee's contention, the Continental Merger Committee went through an exhaustive verification and certification process, as required by ALPA Merger Policy and the Protocol Agreement, to ensure that it correctly certified the dates of hire and furlough periods for all Continental pilots. It is the United Merger Committee that has relied on Company-provided data known to be riddled with errors. The Continental Merger Committee submits that the Arbitration Board should avoid the quicksand on which the United pilots have built the foundation of their proposed list by adopting a ratio methodology for integrating the United and Continental pilot seniority lists.
The Continental Merger Committee submits this supplemental memorandum to address the United Merger Committee's challenges to certain Continental pilots' dates of hire and furlough periods as certified by the Continental Merger Committee. The United Merger Committee contends that the Continental Merger Committee's Certified List contains incorrect information for pilots who began their Continental service at Continental Express. These types of disputes are nothing new. Disagreements over dates of hire and calculating lengths of service are some of the garden variety issues that have routinely arisen through the decades in seniority list integration (SLI) proceedings. See, e.g., Pinnacle-Colgan-Mesaba at 15 n.10 (2011) (Bloch, Arb.) (noting a discrepancy regarding DOH calculations but declining to resolve it and instead using a ratio methodology to “devitalize[] the impact of most potential [DOH] calculation discrepancies); Mackey-Eastern at 2-4 (1967) (Cole, Arb.) (addressing disagreements between the pilot groups about LOS calculations for certain pilots).
Contrary to the United Merger Committee's contention, the Continental Merger Committee went through an exhaustive verification and certification process, as required by ALPA Merger Policy and the Protocol Agreement, to ensure that it correctly certified the dates of hire and furlough periods for all Continental pilots. It is the United Merger Committee that has relied on Company-provided data known to be riddled with errors. The Continental Merger Committee submits that the Arbitration Board should avoid the quicksand on which the United pilots have built the foundation of their proposed list by adopting a ratio methodology for integrating the United and Continental pilot seniority lists.
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