SD3FR8DOG

Possible 787-8s? Probably get a good deal if compensation for the MAX fiasco is brought into the equation. Brings fleet diversity and a true transcon aircraft as well. With JB going to Europe, they could have a go at that too.

Sluggo_63

That is interesting. It wouldn’t surprise me if we’ve seen the last 737 variant produced.

APC225

MCAS was created to help make the 737 Max handle like its predecessors, part of Boeing’s strategy to get the plane done more quickly and cheaply. The system was initially designed to engage only in rare circumstances, namely high-speed maneuvers, in order to make the plane handle more smoothly and predictably for pilots used to flying older 737s, according to two former Boeing employees who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the open investigations. For those situations, MCAS was limited to moving the stabilizer — the part of the plane that changes the vertical direction of the jet — about 0.6 degrees in about 10 seconds. It was around that design stage that the F.A.A. reviewed the initial MCAS design. The planes hadn’t yet gone through their first test flights. After the test flights began in early 2016, Boeing pilots found that just before a stall at various speeds, the Max handled less predictably than they wanted. So they suggested using MCAS for those scenarios, too, according to one former employee with direct knowledge of the conversations. But the system needed more power to work in a broader range of situations. At higher speeds, flight controls are more sensitive and less movement is needed to steer the plane. Consider the effect of turning a car’s steering wheel at 70 miles an hour versus 30 miles an hour. To prevent stalls at lower speeds, Boeing engineers decided that MCAS needed to move the stabilizer faster and by a larger amount. So Boeing engineers quadrupled the amount it could move the stabilizer in one cycle, to 2.5 degrees in less than 10 seconds. “That’s a huge difference,” said Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the American Airlines pilots’ union who has flown 737s for a decade. “That’s the difference between controlled flight or not.” Speed was a defining characteristic for the F.A.A. The agency’s rules require an additional review only if the changes affect how the plane operates in riskier phases of flight: at high speeds and altitudes. Because the changes to the anti-stall system affected how it operated at lower speeds and altitudes, F.A.A. employees didn’t need to take a closer look at them. The overall system represented a major departure from Boeing’s design philosophy. Boeing has traditionally favored giving pilots control over their planes, rather than automated flight systems. “In creating MCAS, they violated a longstanding principle at Boeing to always have pilots ultimately in control of the aircraft,” said Chesley B. Sullenberger III, the retired pilot who landed a jet in the Hudson River. “In mitigating one risk, they created another, greater risk.” The missed risks, by the F.A.A. and Boeing, flowed to other decisions. A deep explanation of the system wasn’t included in the plane manual. The F.A.A. didn’t require training on it. Even Boeing test pilots weren’t fully briefed on MCAS. “Therein lies the issue with the design change: Those pitch rates were never articulated to us,” said one test pilot, Matthew Menza. Mr. Menza said he looked at documentation he still had and did not see mention of the rate of movement on MCAS. “So they certainly didn’t mention anything about pitch rates to us,” he said, “and I certainly would’ve loved to have known.” The system’s increased power was also compounded by its design: The software engaged repeatedly if the sensor suggested it was necessary to avoid a stall. In the Lion Air crash, data showed that the pilots, who weren’t aware of MCAS, fought for control of the plane, as it pushed the nose back down each time they pulled it up. Few truly understood just how powerful the system would prove. It wasn’t fully disclosed until after the Lion Air disaster, killing all 189 people on board. On the Ethiopian Airlines flight, the pilots struggled to regain control after MCAS engaged at least three times.

DashTrash

I hope that you are right!!! Time for a new design. The Guppy has run it’s course, and then some!!! The turd has been polished too much!!!

Airway

Job security. Keep pumping these things out!

rightside02

I do agree that if there ever was a chance to end the endless lifespan of the 737 , this could possibly be the time .. sure they will fix the issue and the max 8/9’s will be here for 30 more years . But makes me wonder if this could change course for the 10 . Which we have what a 100 on order ?

Larry in TN

I have heard that the new gear they've developed for the 737-10 may negate the need to position in the engines in the way that results in the handling characteristics that MCAS fixes.

So, maybe no MCAS on the 737-10.

The new gear should also result in lower Vref speeds, too.

Grumble

Just don’t take it to DEN

https://www.denverpost.com/2019/04/1...enver-airport/

Larry in TN

That article takes information out of context and draws some very strange conclusions.

All airplanes have lower range and weight-carrying capability from hot/high airports. The longer NGs have the same issue as compared to the shorter -700.

Itsajob

The flap 5 go around is an example of this. A heavy 900 can’t make the climb performance on a flap 15 go around, but it can at flaps 5. When this is all over you’ll see a max 9 parked right next to a 900ER on a summer day in Denver. I would have loved to see a clean sheet Boeing narrowbody but we got the max instead. My guess is that as the airbus fleet ages that they will be replaced with the max. Even if they don’t, the 737 will cover the vast majority of the narrowbody flying.