MAX7
01-30-2024, 04:37 PM
#81
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2022
Posts: 1,161
Do you really think the government standing over Boeing’s shoulder verifying that every nut has been torqued is really the answer? All that’s going to do is increase costly delays and make the entire industry less safe and less efficient. While they should be working on a 797, they’re busy spending half a decade trying to get a 737 certified.
The real answer would be to let the free market fix it. If Boeing is threatened with actually losing huge market share to Airbus or even Embraer, they would be motivated to fix everything themselves or go bankrupt. If an airline like Southwest even placed an order with Airbus…or better yet, Embraer, and turned the Duopoly into a Triopoly, it would be the best thing that ever happened to the aviation industry. More choice would mean more efficiency, cheaper prices, better quality, faster production, etc….
Government control is never the answer.
The real answer would be to let the free market fix it. If Boeing is threatened with actually losing huge market share to Airbus or even Embraer, they would be motivated to fix everything themselves or go bankrupt. If an airline like Southwest even placed an order with Airbus…or better yet, Embraer, and turned the Duopoly into a Triopoly, it would be the best thing that ever happened to the aviation industry. More choice would mean more efficiency, cheaper prices, better quality, faster production, etc….
Government control is never the answer.
01-30-2024, 05:46 PM
#82
Gets Weekend Reserve
Joined APC: Jul 2007
Posts: 3,764
Ahh, so you think we live in a fantasy land a 100% free market is possible. Even if that ideology is correct, it would require so many fundamental changes to society that it will never happen. Our version of a free market has failed. Boeing screwed up with MCAS, caused over 300 people to die, grounded the fleet for years, and cost investors and stakeholders billions of dollars. You would think that would be enough of a shock to the system to cause major changes within Boeing. Yet just a few years later, Boeing is more concerned about getting out of the financial hole the Max grounding caused and is focusing its energy on increasing production rates rather than ensuring quality. So yeah, right now an FAA inspector overlooking the assembly of every 737 would probably be a good thing.
There needs to be some major leadership change on Boeing at every level before they can be trusted again. We can't rely on the free market to force that change. Wall Street knows there are no other competitors in the world. If a company wants to switch its orders from Boeing to Airbus, it will take a decade. That's not a realist competitor. So there are no free market forces capable of improving the situation. If you actually want a more competitive aviation market, then you should be happy the FAA is getting involved. They are the only ones that can actually punish Boeing. That will make Boeing a less capable manufacturer. They will lose market share and allow room for other manufacturers to expand and maybe grow to a point where they can offer a realistic third option.
There needs to be some major leadership change on Boeing at every level before they can be trusted again. We can't rely on the free market to force that change. Wall Street knows there are no other competitors in the world. If a company wants to switch its orders from Boeing to Airbus, it will take a decade. That's not a realist competitor. So there are no free market forces capable of improving the situation. If you actually want a more competitive aviation market, then you should be happy the FAA is getting involved. They are the only ones that can actually punish Boeing. That will make Boeing a less capable manufacturer. They will lose market share and allow room for other manufacturers to expand and maybe grow to a point where they can offer a realistic third option.
Lion Air and Ethiopian and the whole MCAS system are two separate issues. On one side, there are/were weaknesses in the system that needed to get fixed, but an existing procedure covered the issue - runaway stab trim which in Lion Air's case was dealt with the day prior. At some point, you may have to do that pilot $hit. It's kinda hard to do when your training consists of excessive automation dependency.
Having spent a number of years flying overseas and having been exposed to their training and operational philosophy, these crashes did not surprise me at all.... not the 777, nor the MAX. Throughout my recurrent training while overseas, I was browbeaten into engaging autopilot at 400' AGL. In a V1 cut, the first action wasn't to handfly the plane to a 1,000 feet AAE, speed it up, clean it up, set LVL change and MCT, trim it out and then autopilot on. Oh, no sir... That would get you yelled at. The first action was AUTOPILOT ON. For whatever reason it's not coming on, press the damn button harder. Mash it, but get it on. OK, trim outta place? Well, whatever it takes, but you need to put the autopilot on first. V1 cuts were always entertaining.
The focus was on engaging the autopilot, not handflying the airplane. Hand-flying was dangerous and only encouraged once on an ILS at some point between CAT 1 mins and 50'. Oh, and pure visual approaches were practically emergency procedures. That's not getting into the whole principle that CRM as we know it in the US is name only over there. Look at the flight deck crew of that Asiana and the respect between the super senior check airman equivalent, their senior captain, and the schmo in the jumpseat. Do you think an FO would speak up to super senior captain and a super senior check airman? If you think so, then you don't know the culture of face-saving. Google it... your mind will be blown.
So after these accidents, yes Boeing bears a good chunk of the burden for the quality control... there are zero arguments against that. But what about training and quality of pilots, training standards and operational philosophies? Also, at what point do business and national politics become relevant and important factors?
The easiest thing in the world is to thrash Boeing. And then there's the "it's racist to question the pilot competence in these crashes" crap which is beyond ridiculous and absurd.
Get the accountants, politicians and fear porn peddlers out of this, and I'll have a lot more faith in the safety system.
01-30-2024, 06:06 PM
#83
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2010
Position: DOWNGRADE COMPLETE: Thanks Gary. Thanks SWAPA.
Posts: 6,783
I don't necessarily disagree with some of this, but at what point do you start holding pilots accountable? The answer from foreign governments and entities is NEVER. Case in point? Asiana. To this day, they maintain it's Boeing's fault they flew a perflectly good 777 into a seawall at SFO because GS was out and their pilots couldn't be trusted to monitor airspeed tape and its trend vector and act accordingly, or fly something other than a coupled ILS.
Lion Air and Ethiopian and the whole MCAS system are two separate issues. On one side, there are/were weaknesses in the system that needed to get fixed, but an existing procedure covered the issue - runaway stab trim which in Lion Air's case was dealt with the day prior. At some point, you may have to do that pilot $hit. It's kinda hard to do when your training consists of excessive automation dependency.
Having spent a number of years flying overseas and having been exposed to their training and operational philosophy, these crashes did not surprise me at all.... not the 777, nor the MAX. Throughout my recurrent training while overseas, I was browbeaten into engaging autopilot at 400' AGL. In a V1 cut, the first action wasn't to handfly the plane to a 1,000 feet AAE, speed it up, clean it up, set LVL change and MCT, trim it out and then autopilot on. Oh, no sir... That would get you yelled at. The first action was AUTOPILOT ON. For whatever reason it's not coming on, press the damn button harder. Mash it, but get it on. OK, trim outta place? Well, whatever it takes, but you need to put the autopilot on first. V1 cuts were always entertaining.
The focus was on engaging the autopilot, not handflying the airplane. Hand-flying was dangerous and only encouraged once on an ILS at some point between CAT 1 mins and 50'. Oh, and pure visual approaches were practically emergency procedures. That's not getting into the whole principle that CRM as we know it in the US is name only over there. Look at the flight deck crew of that Asiana and the respect between the super senior check airman equivalent, their senior captain, and the schmo in the jumpseat. Do you think an FO would speak up to super senior captain and a super senior check airman? If you think so, then you don't know the culture of face-saving. Google it... your mind will be blown.
So after these accidents, yes Boeing bears a good chunk of the burden for the quality control... there are zero arguments against that. But what about training and quality of pilots, training standards and operational philosophies? Also, at what point do business and national politics become relevant and important factors?
The easiest thing in the world is to thrash Boeing. And then there's the "it's racist to question the pilot competence in these crashes" crap which is beyond ridiculous and absurd.
Get the accountants, politicians and fear porn peddlers out of this, and I'll have a lot more faith in the safety system.
Lion Air and Ethiopian and the whole MCAS system are two separate issues. On one side, there are/were weaknesses in the system that needed to get fixed, but an existing procedure covered the issue - runaway stab trim which in Lion Air's case was dealt with the day prior. At some point, you may have to do that pilot $hit. It's kinda hard to do when your training consists of excessive automation dependency.
Having spent a number of years flying overseas and having been exposed to their training and operational philosophy, these crashes did not surprise me at all.... not the 777, nor the MAX. Throughout my recurrent training while overseas, I was browbeaten into engaging autopilot at 400' AGL. In a V1 cut, the first action wasn't to handfly the plane to a 1,000 feet AAE, speed it up, clean it up, set LVL change and MCT, trim it out and then autopilot on. Oh, no sir... That would get you yelled at. The first action was AUTOPILOT ON. For whatever reason it's not coming on, press the damn button harder. Mash it, but get it on. OK, trim outta place? Well, whatever it takes, but you need to put the autopilot on first. V1 cuts were always entertaining.
The focus was on engaging the autopilot, not handflying the airplane. Hand-flying was dangerous and only encouraged once on an ILS at some point between CAT 1 mins and 50'. Oh, and pure visual approaches were practically emergency procedures. That's not getting into the whole principle that CRM as we know it in the US is name only over there. Look at the flight deck crew of that Asiana and the respect between the super senior check airman equivalent, their senior captain, and the schmo in the jumpseat. Do you think an FO would speak up to super senior captain and a super senior check airman? If you think so, then you don't know the culture of face-saving. Google it... your mind will be blown.
So after these accidents, yes Boeing bears a good chunk of the burden for the quality control... there are zero arguments against that. But what about training and quality of pilots, training standards and operational philosophies? Also, at what point do business and national politics become relevant and important factors?
The easiest thing in the world is to thrash Boeing. And then there's the "it's racist to question the pilot competence in these crashes" crap which is beyond ridiculous and absurd.
Get the accountants, politicians and fear porn peddlers out of this, and I'll have a lot more faith in the safety system.
01-30-2024, 07:15 PM
#84
Furloughed Again?!
Joined APC: Aug 2007
Position: Boeing 737
Posts: 4,804
Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't the extension granted that would have otherwise required EICAS on the -7 only good until 12/31/24?
if the airplane isn't certified by then it would once again require EICAS. What are the chances ANOTHER extension is granted?
This might have been the final nail in the Max 7/10 coffin.
if the airplane isn't certified by then it would once again require EICAS. What are the chances ANOTHER extension is granted?
This might have been the final nail in the Max 7/10 coffin.
01-30-2024, 08:06 PM
#85
Gets Weekend Reserve
Joined APC: Jul 2007
Posts: 3,764
Don't get me wrong. I'm not letting them off the hook by any means. I'm merely against politicizing this issue and pro requiring pilots to be able to do that pilot sh!t. As FlightSafety says, the best safety device in any aircraft is a well-trained crew. Crapping all over Boeing while turning a blind eye to the rest of the problem is politicizing the problem and not actually fixing the problem.
01-31-2024, 03:01 AM
#86
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Mar 2017
Posts: 3,771
Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't the extension granted that would have otherwise required EICAS on the -7 only good until 12/31/24?
if the airplane isn't certified by then it would once again require EICAS. What are the chances ANOTHER extension is granted?
This might have been the final nail in the Max 7/10 coffin.
if the airplane isn't certified by then it would once again require EICAS. What are the chances ANOTHER extension is granted?
This might have been the final nail in the Max 7/10 coffin.
01-31-2024, 05:22 AM
#87
At your mom's house
Joined APC: Jun 2008
Position: cpt 737
Posts: 2,797
I don't necessarily disagree with some of this, but at what point do you start holding pilots accountable? The answer from foreign governments and entities is NEVER. Case in point? Asiana. To this day, they maintain it's Boeing's fault they flew a perflectly good 777 into a seawall at SFO because GS was out and their pilots couldn't be trusted to monitor airspeed tape and its trend vector and act accordingly, or fly something other than a coupled ILS.
Lion Air and Ethiopian and the whole MCAS system are two separate issues. On one side, there are/were weaknesses in the system that needed to get fixed, but an existing procedure covered the issue - runaway stab trim which in Lion Air's case was dealt with the day prior. At some point, you may have to do that pilot $hit. It's kinda hard to do when your training consists of excessive automation dependency.
Having spent a number of years flying overseas and having been exposed to their training and operational philosophy, these crashes did not surprise me at all.... not the 777, nor the MAX. Throughout my recurrent training while overseas, I was browbeaten into engaging autopilot at 400' AGL. In a V1 cut, the first action wasn't to handfly the plane to a 1,000 feet AAE, speed it up, clean it up, set LVL change and MCT, trim it out and then autopilot on. Oh, no sir... That would get you yelled at. The first action was AUTOPILOT ON. For whatever reason it's not coming on, press the damn button harder. Mash it, but get it on. OK, trim outta place? Well, whatever it takes, but you need to put the autopilot on first. V1 cuts were always entertaining.
The focus was on engaging the autopilot, not handflying the airplane. Hand-flying was dangerous and only encouraged once on an ILS at some point between CAT 1 mins and 50'. Oh, and pure visual approaches were practically emergency procedures. That's not getting into the whole principle that CRM as we know it in the US is name only over there. Look at the flight deck crew of that Asiana and the respect between the super senior check airman equivalent, their senior captain, and the schmo in the jumpseat. Do you think an FO would speak up to super senior captain and a super senior check airman? If you think so, then you don't know the culture of face-saving. Google it... your mind will be blown.
So after these accidents, yes Boeing bears a good chunk of the burden for the quality control... there are zero arguments against that. But what about training and quality of pilots, training standards and operational philosophies? Also, at what point do business and national politics become relevant and important factors?
The easiest thing in the world is to thrash Boeing. And then there's the "it's racist to question the pilot competence in these crashes" crap which is beyond ridiculous and absurd.
Get the accountants, politicians and fear porn peddlers out of this, and I'll have a lot more faith in the safety system.
Lion Air and Ethiopian and the whole MCAS system are two separate issues. On one side, there are/were weaknesses in the system that needed to get fixed, but an existing procedure covered the issue - runaway stab trim which in Lion Air's case was dealt with the day prior. At some point, you may have to do that pilot $hit. It's kinda hard to do when your training consists of excessive automation dependency.
Having spent a number of years flying overseas and having been exposed to their training and operational philosophy, these crashes did not surprise me at all.... not the 777, nor the MAX. Throughout my recurrent training while overseas, I was browbeaten into engaging autopilot at 400' AGL. In a V1 cut, the first action wasn't to handfly the plane to a 1,000 feet AAE, speed it up, clean it up, set LVL change and MCT, trim it out and then autopilot on. Oh, no sir... That would get you yelled at. The first action was AUTOPILOT ON. For whatever reason it's not coming on, press the damn button harder. Mash it, but get it on. OK, trim outta place? Well, whatever it takes, but you need to put the autopilot on first. V1 cuts were always entertaining.
The focus was on engaging the autopilot, not handflying the airplane. Hand-flying was dangerous and only encouraged once on an ILS at some point between CAT 1 mins and 50'. Oh, and pure visual approaches were practically emergency procedures. That's not getting into the whole principle that CRM as we know it in the US is name only over there. Look at the flight deck crew of that Asiana and the respect between the super senior check airman equivalent, their senior captain, and the schmo in the jumpseat. Do you think an FO would speak up to super senior captain and a super senior check airman? If you think so, then you don't know the culture of face-saving. Google it... your mind will be blown.
So after these accidents, yes Boeing bears a good chunk of the burden for the quality control... there are zero arguments against that. But what about training and quality of pilots, training standards and operational philosophies? Also, at what point do business and national politics become relevant and important factors?
The easiest thing in the world is to thrash Boeing. And then there's the "it's racist to question the pilot competence in these crashes" crap which is beyond ridiculous and absurd.
Get the accountants, politicians and fear porn peddlers out of this, and I'll have a lot more faith in the safety system.
hand fly an approach and you'll get called into CP office.
Also the authority gradient is crazy high there. Cpt is God. Period. There is no questioning him.
problem is Boeing built a more efficient plane than Airbus had at the time. So foreign countries who mainly fly Airbus at entry level got a Boeing they actually had to learn to fly and they crashed a couple.
if that problem would have happened in the states we wouldnt be in this predicament.
01-31-2024, 07:24 AM
#88
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2010
Posts: 2,339
No one intelligent is calling for the end of Boeing but we are calling for serious action to be taken. It should hurt the company and it should take years to fully recover from this. A major cultural change like that has to take years. The Air Force can't get Boeing to fix the KC-46 problems that have been going on for a decade, the first Max grounding didn't change anything at Boeing, what else should we do?
01-31-2024, 08:58 AM
#90
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2019
Posts: 341
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