Haneda airport accident
01-05-2024, 10:00 AM
#32
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2017
Posts: 3,774
01-05-2024, 03:51 PM
#34
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,254
Yes, I mean the one part of the airplane not full of fuel, and the only part full of people. That big empty space that took eighteen minutes to clear.
The big triangle parts full of kerosine didnt burn. Go figure.
The big triangle parts full of kerosine didnt burn. Go figure.
01-06-2024, 02:23 AM
#35
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,254
CNN is running an article presently addressing the evacuation, pointing to a congressional mandate to review evacuation standards. The mandate was issued in 2018, with an FAA report in 2022 indicating that “Currently flying seat pitches using seats of similar size or smaller than those used in this project can accommodate and not impede egress for 99% of the American population.” The FAA's statement, defending its own standard, is self-serving, and the inspector general did not find the same. In fact, the Dept of Transportation Inspector General's report is titled "FAA's Process for Updating Aircraft Evacuation Standards Lacks Data Collection and Analysis on Current Evacuation Risks."
The CNN article points to the unrealistic demographic of certification evacuees:
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/06/u...rns/index.html
https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/defaul...2009-16-20.pdf
The IG report notes that the FAAs last data points for evacuation standards were updated in 1991, with substantial changes in passenger density, demographics, cabin interiors, etc, since that time. Current standards are based on a 1965 crash in Salt Lake City that resulted in 43 fatalities. Four updates have been made to those standards: in 1978 in response to a Los Angeles runway overrun with 2 fatalities; in 1983 to a cabin fire on landing that resulted in 23 fatalities; in 1985 in response to a mishap in Manchester, England that resulted in 55 fatalitis; and a 1991 landing mishap in Los Angeles that resulted in 22 fatalities. Since that last update, no changes have been made in response to load factors, cabin baggage, seat pitch and increased passenger values, cabin pets, wheelchair pasengers, and so on. Moreover, the IG notes that evacuation certification isn't necessarily conducted by evacuating a fully configured cabin filled with passengers, but can be done using an analysis of a secton at a time and estimated by projecting the analysis onto each exit, and extrapolated: in other words, the airplane doesn't actually need to be evacuated to meet the current 90-second standard.
It's worth noting that the final update to evacuation standards, in response to the 1991 mishap didn't actually take place until 2004. The FAA has not updated it's current standards since that time "because of high rates of accident survivability." Perhaps it's time that changed.
In 2011, a DoT review by the IG questioned the FAA's updating of it's evaucation standards. The FAA responded that it had updated standards each time it reviewed them in response to a specific aircraft mishap (the five noted above), and that it reviews its standards every ten years. The IG observed that a review every ten years is not sufficient, nor is it SMS compliant. Ultimately, the IG's 2020 report made two recommendations, with which the FAA agreed. in 2016, the NTSB recommended that the FAA conduct research on passenger attempts to evacuate with baggage. The FAA agreed, but did nothing. The IG noted that out of 40 mishaps reviewed, 12 cited passenger baggage use as factors. The FAA declined to address this, citing a concern that "the problem is known and conducting research could result in a risk of injury to volunteers."
The FAA hasn't altered it's mixture of age and gender in the certification demographic, since 1993.
The IG report also notes that the FAA does not maintain or collect certification data or use it or review it to not trouble area. The FAA also allows analysis, instead of a full demonstration, in certification. While comments have been made here in this thread about the use of a 90 second demonstration, that demo isn't actually performed in many cases, or utilized; alternate means of analysis are used, one section at a time, and that data is compiled by the manufacturer and retained by the manufacturer. The FAA hasn't retained or used any of it in assessing or updating evacuation standards. Furthermore, the actual demonstration for most models was done in much older models of the same line of aircraft. For example, the 737 standard was demonstrated with certification of the 737-300 and -400. The 737-900 wasn't demonstrated: it was done by analysis, relying on the original demonstration on the 737-300. Likewise, the A320 was demonstrated 28 years prior, with subsequent evaluations of models up through the A321 made using analysis, or mathematical projections using the original data, and old standards.
The IG found that where the analysis is done for newer models, using old data, the old data is insufficient, and that using more recent data would not permit the evacuation in the necessary time (emphasis is mine):
The IG points to increasing reliance on analysis, instead of demonstration. For those who think their aircraft has been shown to be capable of being evacuated in the 90 second time frame, in most cases, this is NOT true (emphasis mine):
The IG went on to note that the FAA certifies aircraft even when the analysis differs from actual demonstration results:
The FAA's response to the IG report was that the IG overstates the importance of the 90-second demonstration. Go figure.
The CNN article points to the unrealistic demographic of certification evacuees:
But the report revealed the agency’s latest tests looked nothing like today’s aircraft cabins. Only 60 occupants – rather than more than 100 who typically file into a narrow-body jet – and no children, seniors, nor travelers requiring a service animal or wheelchair. When the agency asked for public feedback on the issue, it received 26,000 comments.
https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/defaul...2009-16-20.pdf
The IG report notes that the FAAs last data points for evacuation standards were updated in 1991, with substantial changes in passenger density, demographics, cabin interiors, etc, since that time. Current standards are based on a 1965 crash in Salt Lake City that resulted in 43 fatalities. Four updates have been made to those standards: in 1978 in response to a Los Angeles runway overrun with 2 fatalities; in 1983 to a cabin fire on landing that resulted in 23 fatalities; in 1985 in response to a mishap in Manchester, England that resulted in 55 fatalitis; and a 1991 landing mishap in Los Angeles that resulted in 22 fatalities. Since that last update, no changes have been made in response to load factors, cabin baggage, seat pitch and increased passenger values, cabin pets, wheelchair pasengers, and so on. Moreover, the IG notes that evacuation certification isn't necessarily conducted by evacuating a fully configured cabin filled with passengers, but can be done using an analysis of a secton at a time and estimated by projecting the analysis onto each exit, and extrapolated: in other words, the airplane doesn't actually need to be evacuated to meet the current 90-second standard.
It's worth noting that the final update to evacuation standards, in response to the 1991 mishap didn't actually take place until 2004. The FAA has not updated it's current standards since that time "because of high rates of accident survivability." Perhaps it's time that changed.
In 2011, a DoT review by the IG questioned the FAA's updating of it's evaucation standards. The FAA responded that it had updated standards each time it reviewed them in response to a specific aircraft mishap (the five noted above), and that it reviews its standards every ten years. The IG observed that a review every ten years is not sufficient, nor is it SMS compliant. Ultimately, the IG's 2020 report made two recommendations, with which the FAA agreed. in 2016, the NTSB recommended that the FAA conduct research on passenger attempts to evacuate with baggage. The FAA agreed, but did nothing. The IG noted that out of 40 mishaps reviewed, 12 cited passenger baggage use as factors. The FAA declined to address this, citing a concern that "the problem is known and conducting research could result in a risk of injury to volunteers."
The FAA hasn't altered it's mixture of age and gender in the certification demographic, since 1993.
The IG report also notes that the FAA does not maintain or collect certification data or use it or review it to not trouble area. The FAA also allows analysis, instead of a full demonstration, in certification. While comments have been made here in this thread about the use of a 90 second demonstration, that demo isn't actually performed in many cases, or utilized; alternate means of analysis are used, one section at a time, and that data is compiled by the manufacturer and retained by the manufacturer. The FAA hasn't retained or used any of it in assessing or updating evacuation standards. Furthermore, the actual demonstration for most models was done in much older models of the same line of aircraft. For example, the 737 standard was demonstrated with certification of the 737-300 and -400. The 737-900 wasn't demonstrated: it was done by analysis, relying on the original demonstration on the 737-300. Likewise, the A320 was demonstrated 28 years prior, with subsequent evaluations of models up through the A321 made using analysis, or mathematical projections using the original data, and old standards.
The IG found that where the analysis is done for newer models, using old data, the old data is insufficient, and that using more recent data would not permit the evacuation in the necessary time (emphasis is mine):
Based on our analysis, use of recent data can yield results that differ from the results based on old data. For example, a manufacturer used data that were about 12 years old to calculate the evacuation time for an aircraft model, despite the fact that data approximately 3 years old were available. The test with the 12-year-old data indicated that participants evacuated through an exit door in under 90 seconds. However, we found that use of the 3-year-old data indicated participants could not evacuate through the same door in 90 seconds.
In our review of the reports of all 43 demonstrations and all 29 analyses provided by FAA that manufacturers completed between 1966 and 2017, we found that the number of demonstrations that manufacturers conducted decreased while their use of analyses increased. Since the 1980s, the number of demonstrations has declined, with only two occurring between 2010 and 2017, while manufacturers used the analyses method nine times (see figure 3). Aircraft models among these nine include the Boeing 737-900 and the Airbus 380-800.29 FAA’s acceptance of manufacturers’ greater reliance on analyses rather than on demonstrations poses risks as demonstration data grows older.
Based on our analysis, we found that FAA certified 10 aircraft models based on inaccurate data or allowed manufacturers to exclude the evacuation times of some passenger and crew participants when determining exit times.
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