Randy Babbitt.... don't backtrack
12-12-2009, 05:26 PM
#52
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Oct 2008
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Posts: 1,154
How do you know he would have just instructed till 1500 hours? What if he didn't have what it takes to become a CFI. After all the training, ratings and certificates I have, the hardest was my initial CFI. He may have given up and gone back to his old career. I know many people who have become CFIs and got burnt out in the industry and switched careers. He may have become a CFI and gone out and gotten himself and a student killed. He may have become a great CFI and built up his basic airmenship and the whole situation would not have happened.
On the training side, I think there is much to be done. First of all, with a new airplane at an airline there is an extensive process the airline has to go through to get the aircraft certified to fly passengers. Because of economical restraints, ie being a cheap airline, the people that made critical decisions for the Q400 program probably weren't as good as the people who made the decisions at an airline like Horizon. I have gone through a lot of the information available on the NTSB's website and am not too impressed with some of the things I've seen. For instance, the POI failed training on the aircraft.
One of the factors I believe may have contributed to the crash is Colgan's normal landing profile. http://www.ntsb.gov/dockets/aviation...027/417476.pdf It says you shall be configured and done with checklists before the final approach fix. This to me shows that they wanted to be very conservative on flying the new aircraft but I think it may have had a large factor in the crash. At 22:16:07 the gear comes down at 176 knots. The profile calls for doing the landing flow after the gear comes down. I haven't found the "flows" on the NTSB site but by reading the CVR and checklist it looks like chiming the FAs, setting the props forward and setting the bleeds and standby pumps on. I don't know the Q 400 that well I've only jumpsat on it a couple of times but I would assume that the pilot doing the flow would be too wrapped up in doing the flow to pay much attention at what is going on with the airplane. While the FO was doing the flow the airspeed went from 176 kts to 140 kts. The airplane was straight and level while she was doing the flow. I believe this is the grave mistake. There is no reason to be fully configured in straight and level flight before the outer marker. The airspeed dropped 36 knots in 16 seconds with the gear and condition levers being moved. At 22:16:23 He calls for flaps 15 landing checklist at 140 kts. The FO now just finished with her flow selects flaps 15 and has her head buried in an 8 1/2 by 11 checklist, 3 seconds later the shaker went off and no recovery was made. So while a big configuration change was made in straight and level flight there was really only one pilot because the other one was busy doing flows and checklists. They could have easily done 170-180 to the marker dropped the gear over Klump done the flow set flaps 15 and been on speed by 1000'. After passing 1000 feet the FO could have then gone through the before landing checklist. It appears that the people who came up with the profiles were either afraid of the airplane, didn't know the capabilities of it or were just way too conservative. They also didn't have much real world experience to think they could go into EWR and be doing 120 kts outside the Marker while going in. This is something the FAA needs to be looking into instead of just approving an AOM/FOM without reading the contents.
One of the factors I believe may have contributed to the crash is Colgan's normal landing profile. http://www.ntsb.gov/dockets/aviation...027/417476.pdf It says you shall be configured and done with checklists before the final approach fix. This to me shows that they wanted to be very conservative on flying the new aircraft but I think it may have had a large factor in the crash. At 22:16:07 the gear comes down at 176 knots. The profile calls for doing the landing flow after the gear comes down. I haven't found the "flows" on the NTSB site but by reading the CVR and checklist it looks like chiming the FAs, setting the props forward and setting the bleeds and standby pumps on. I don't know the Q 400 that well I've only jumpsat on it a couple of times but I would assume that the pilot doing the flow would be too wrapped up in doing the flow to pay much attention at what is going on with the airplane. While the FO was doing the flow the airspeed went from 176 kts to 140 kts. The airplane was straight and level while she was doing the flow. I believe this is the grave mistake. There is no reason to be fully configured in straight and level flight before the outer marker. The airspeed dropped 36 knots in 16 seconds with the gear and condition levers being moved. At 22:16:23 He calls for flaps 15 landing checklist at 140 kts. The FO now just finished with her flow selects flaps 15 and has her head buried in an 8 1/2 by 11 checklist, 3 seconds later the shaker went off and no recovery was made. So while a big configuration change was made in straight and level flight there was really only one pilot because the other one was busy doing flows and checklists. They could have easily done 170-180 to the marker dropped the gear over Klump done the flow set flaps 15 and been on speed by 1000'. After passing 1000 feet the FO could have then gone through the before landing checklist. It appears that the people who came up with the profiles were either afraid of the airplane, didn't know the capabilities of it or were just way too conservative. They also didn't have much real world experience to think they could go into EWR and be doing 120 kts outside the Marker while going in. This is something the FAA needs to be looking into instead of just approving an AOM/FOM without reading the contents.
12-12-2009, 05:40 PM
#53
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Eclat Consulting - Aviation, Airline, Airport Consulting
Everyone knows what Babbit's job was before his appointed to the FAA post - right? He's been out of the pilot representation business for a long long time.
You can bet his solution will be what's best for airlines - not line pilots.
Everyone knows what Babbit's job was before his appointed to the FAA post - right? He's been out of the pilot representation business for a long long time.
You can bet his solution will be what's best for airlines - not line pilots.
12-12-2009, 06:22 PM
#54
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2008
Posts: 443
Same here. That may be "standard procedure" for training but is that what you do on the line? The problem isn't isolated to Colgan. The FAA pencil whips through these manuals without looking at them. My airline has a handful of things in the FOM/AOM that are ILLEGAL but somehow they were overlooked when they were approved by the FAA. Why would they sign something off when we all know you routinely get maintain 180/170 knots to the marker or 5 out etc. Personally I think it is much safer doing a nice clean power off approach to the marker where you start configuring then start adding power instead of reducing power configure add power then reduce power again once the glideslope comes in.
12-12-2009, 06:50 PM
#55
The NeverEnding Story
Joined APC: Sep 2005
Posts: 7,611
Originally Posted by shfo
My airline has a handful of things in the FOM/AOM that are ILLEGAL but somehow they were overlooked when they were approved by the FAA.
Examples of things in your FOM/AOM that are counter to FARs, please...
12-12-2009, 06:53 PM
#56
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Joined APC: Jul 2008
Posts: 443
Why then does it seem in the midst of all this that all line pilots see as whats best is a knee jerk reaction to supposedly raise pay, rather than what is needed to really make a safer industry. I am behind Babbit on this one, he is calling for stricter training and oversight, rather than an arbitrary number, to appease the public ( really look and pay attention to what he said). It actually looks like instead of some magic pill we all might face stricter, tighter standards to continue to fly 121, regardless of your hours when you entered. Is that so bad. My question is what are some of you scared of... Wouldn't you rather have an 800 hour pilot that has been vetted and proved himself, rather than a 1500 hr pilot that got a free pass into the industry because of an arbitrary hours minimum he met??? Trust me even back during the boom there were plenty of 1500+ hr pilots that were failing training events. HR 3371 as currently written is but a bandaid.
Babbitt wants an endorsement for flying in icing conditions. Why? He said you need an endorsement for high altitude operations. I don't have one and I have 1000s of hours in the flight levels. That is all covered in airline training. The icing would just be another box to check. He wants CRM training. I don't know of any airline that doesn't do CRM training. I know some do more than others. There are so many different experiences out there. There are many well rounded pilots out there but everyone has some area that is their weak point and some area that they excell at. I've done mountainous back country flying, high performance aerobatics and flown in some of the worst icing in the world (Cascades) in a light twin, but I never had experience in tropical weather with daily thunderstorms like what you see in Florida or Squall lines like in the great plains until I flew for an airline. You have the best chance of having well rounded, experienced crew, when people with a vast spectrum of experiences come together.
Last edited by shfo; 12-12-2009 at 08:29 PM.
12-12-2009, 06:58 PM
#57
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Joined APC: Jul 2008
Posts: 443
2 There is no difference between the accelerate/stop distance on a dry runway and on a runway with poor braking action. 14 CFR 25.109
3 A lot of our Mx procedures but I won't get into that as there is a formal investigation going on regarding that.
12-12-2009, 07:38 PM
#58
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2006
Position: Spartan
Posts: 3,652
Why then does it seem in the midst of all this that all line pilots see as whats best is a knee jerk reaction to supposedly raise pay, rather than what is needed to really make a safer industry. I am behind Babbit on this one, he is calling for stricter training and oversight, rather than an arbitrary number, to appease the public ( really look and pay attention to what he said). It actually looks like instead of some magic pill we all might face stricter, tighter standards to continue to fly 121, regardless of your hours when you entered. Is that so bad. My question is what are some of you scared of... Wouldn't you rather have an 800 hour pilot that has been vetted and proved himself, rather than a 1500 hr pilot that got a free pass into the industry because of an arbitrary hours minimum he met??? Trust me even back during the boom there were plenty of 1500+ hr pilots that were failing training events. HR 3371 as currently written is but a bandaid.
12-12-2009, 08:10 PM
#59
Line Holder
Joined APC: Oct 2009
Posts: 36
For visuals, no, just configure by 1000' AGL. For instrument approaches (in real weather), yes, just like the sim... and I've never had a controller complain.
Last edited by therapy; 12-12-2009 at 08:47 PM.
12-12-2009, 08:22 PM
#60
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Joined APC: Jul 2008
Posts: 443
What airports do you operate at? I don't think that would go over too well at ORD. And I know when SEA is down to CAT IIIs they usually want 170 to the marker. What do you do at airports like SJC where the marker is 8 miles from the threshold?
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