John Pennekamp

With all due respect, sir, you don't know what you're talking about. At the time of Roselawn, the MFCs locked out flap selection above flap extension speeds. This was modified after Roselawn to give you the flaps, but bark at you.

Pontius Pilot

Which is why I would like to see the AD - I wasn't aware of the MFCs locking out flap selection. With as much worthless info as they filled us in training, I'm surprised they never went over that topic.

ExperimentalAB

A Pilot needs total control, and the ability to overstress an airframe or any component if such a situation arises.

eaglefly

It's an unfortuante fact there are plenty of pilots out there that know little of the ATR and have deluded themselves of the facts of 4184 without ever doing any research. You obviously are one of those pilots.

To your "bull hockey" I proclaim your comments "PROPWASH" !

Here are some facts :

-ATR modified the wing of the ATR to obtain more performance and lift of the wing by strengthening its laminar flow. They did this by taking the orginial NASA 65000 series wing and moving the thickest area of wing farther aft. This did indeed improve lift, but had a downside. It made the wing more sensitive to any contamination and aggrivated the low pressure area above the wing and moved it aft when contaminated as it was at Roselawn. This increased area of low pressure then was placed just ahead of and even over the ailerons. This resulted in an aileron "snatch" at higher angles of attack and in the case of Roselawn only required 5 degrees of AOA to cause the snatch.

- The original wing deice boots effectively removed ice from the first 7% of chord (actually less inflation area), but icing tests AFTER the accident (which the ATR failed in this certification demonstration) demonstrated this wing design could accrete ice between 16-23% depending on configuration and speed and build "ridges" of ice behind it's boots. A new boot was installed to only 12.5% (go figure) to "solve" the problem.

- This aircraft was only in icing conditions outside of its certification envelope for approximately 5 minutes and NOT continuously. It was not sever by rate of accretion, but by TYPE of icing, not as well understood at the time. It was easy in those condtions to misread the severity of the icing.....an icing that most OTHER aircraft wouldn't have lost control even with this exposure.

- Most all carriers operating procedures were blessed by Avions De Transport Regionale (ATR) and involved the EXACT procedures used by these pilots.

- This aircraft has had a WELL documented history of lateral upsets, near crashes and fatal accidents in its history, FAR beyond any problems any other regional turboprop has encountered. This wasn't a "freak" accident, but was preceedded by MANY of these events that were band-aided along until the inevitable happended - ROSELAWN.

Thankfully, U.S. operators have removed them from extensive icing prolonged exposure in passenger operations and confined them to more southern operations with generally quicker escape routes and more options.

I was flying an ATR near this crew the same day and yes, there were some actions of the crew I wouldn't have done (and thus MAY not have met the same fate), but the LOSS OF CONTROL was not the fault of the crew, however the recovery may have indeed been aggrivated by their technique. Of course, in the -72, once control was lost, ATR locked out the flaps from re-deployment via computer, limited rudder travel to a ridiculous 6.5 degrees via computer, the ailerons were behaving BACKWARDS via the concept of "hinge-moment reversal" because of the wing design, de-ice system and approved procedures leaving the pilots in a drastic unusual attitide in IMC with backward aileron forces, virtually no rudder, no flaps and an aerodynamically loaded unpowered elevator to fix their problem.

With all due respect, do some due diligence on this situation you'll come across as more credible instead of an uninformed wingnut. As it stands now, you're out where the buses don't run.

BTW, if your "instructor" was above this aircraft in an ATR he was Eagle and that means you are too. Either that intructor was ME or someone I know and I assure you we both have forgotten more about this aircraft and this accident then you currently know.

eaglefly

You are correct. This "pilot" has NO idea what he's talking about with regard to this aircraft or accident.

eaglefly

That's because * SURPRISE*, they changed that after the accident (which means you're well post 4184 in this aircraft and a "babe in the woods").

The MFC would lock out any flap commands above 185 knots, so once the overspeed started at 180 (and it varied by 5-7 knots between aircraft), and they retracted them, they couldn't reselect them in an effort to regain control.

It wasn't an option.

Then, once they had done 2 snap rolls in the near virtical plane at a roll rate GREATER then that of a Pitts special they had no rudder either for the same reason..........they were too fast. You see, the French believe in taking the pilot out of the loop as much as possible and then blaming them for not being in the loop.

ExperimentalAB

And they still do (think Airbus family)...because apparently, Pilots are the most dangerous thing that can happen to an aircraft

eaglefly

Yes...........imagine that.

They believe it is better for it to be all "AUTOMATIQUE".

Pontius Pilot

Are your initials R.M.?

Obviously there is a passion here about this accident - especially when you are dealing with people who lost close friends. We never want to place blame on our fellow pilots if we can at all avoid it.

The truth is I have researched Roselawn - as diligently as I have a hundred other accidents - I fly that plane and I want to know everything about it that I can. I'm not just some guy who went out and got his license at the local FBO and knows nothing about aviation safety. I've had, in comparison to many pilots, extensive training in the subject.

I'm not saying the crew was totally derelict in their duties - nor was the plane. Both were a link in the chain that caused that unfortunate accident.

You can't blame the plane entirely. That icing could've brought down just about any aircraft holding in it for an extensive amount of time.

eaglefly

The LOSS OF CONTROL blame is SQUARELY on the manufacturer, the airline, the FAA and the French DGAC. We're talking well over a dozen documented incidents of loss of lateral control in icing conditions in multiple different situations both in Europe and here. Remember, this flight had 5 MINUTES exposure and the unprotected areas exhibited only 1/4 to 1/2 inches of accretion on visable surfaces and were being REMOVED by the boots (this crew thought they were doing pretty good). It's what was occuring OUTSIDE their view that caused the problem (ridges BEHIND the boots) and that they were obviously unaware of. This was 15 years ago and no other design has exhibited this anomaly (hinge moment reversal).

The RECOVERY (in my opinion) was where the primary error was made by the crew. Once the intial upset occurred, the ailerons snapped full right after the auto pilot gave up and disengaged in LESS then 1 second (this likely would have broken one or both wrists had one actually held onto the yoke under this circumstance). The aircraft rolled to the right to near vertical and the nose dropped 15 degrees below the horizon (try that in IMC in a 172 or something and let me know what your heart rate is). Then, there was an attempt to raise the nose and roll the aircraft back level. Unfortunately, in hinge moment reversal the the aileron pressure is reveresed (what the hell ?) and the yoke was easy to snap back to left but the aircraft didn't respond with it as it should. The aircraft did indeed begin to roll back to level and an effort was made to raise the nose, but this was the loss of the ballgame. The AOA increased again, the aircraft returned to the previous condition and snapped into two complete 360 degree rolls as the nose settled down to 55 degrees below the horizon (IMC still) with G forces ranging from +3 to -2 (IMC aerobatics). In case, you don't know when you look at that colorful little AI in your face, it's ALL brown now and whirling like a fan at greater than 50 degrees/second (not to mention the G's, but why aggrivate this discussion, eh ?).

Had they released back pressure after the inital upset and sacrificed some altitude, even several thousand feet, the second and more violent (and unrecoverable) loss of control may have been avoided. But, that's not where they were......they didn't know about what they were dealing with then.

Lets see.............can't reselect flaps (they DID do that to no avail), no rudder, backward ailerons and increasing elevator forces with a panel full of brown garbage.

How are we doing Mr. Hoover ?

O.K. back to the fun..........well, lets see, we're building speed dramatically in a near virtical dive in IMC with no lateral control (or controls !) and little disernable information from the panel. Airpeed ?...........over redline. Altimeter ?..........looks like a fan (the hundred hand is complete a complete sweep every two seconds). Attitude indicator ?........all Brown and can't read it, it's flopping around so fast. Vertical speed ?.......well, pegged out at 6,000 FPM (the actual rate reached 30,000 FPM.....yes, thats correct).

Jeez........what happened ?

We did have some ice, but the boots WERE breaking it away and what the hell is this ?

Well, you can guess the rest.

When they broke out of the overcast in this condition at about 1700 feet in a near inverted dive at 36,000 FPM and 370 knots they had two choices that didn't matter.

Do you want to hit the ground intact or in pieces ?

Well, one always trys to do SOMETHING, so they did. They tried to recover and at 5.5 G's both outer wings failed (one of which sheared off the horizontal tail) and hit the ground so hard 68 people became 2000 in a micro second.

You're concentrating your efforts on the straw that broke the camels back, when you should be worrying about why (and whom) overloaed the camel in the first place. If you're a current ATR driver, it's even more improtant to relinquish what you THINK you know and focus on the lessons of the past and the respect your survival requires.

What GOT this crew to this situation was not THEIR doing and you have to understand that.

Is the ATR a "deathtrap" in icing ?

Not necessarily, and I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is to be a BETTER ATR pilot, you'd better understand its history, what others didn't know then and the lessons their loss can teach you.

Personally, it think it unlikely that the wing will screw you. I think the tail has just as much, if not more chance under the right conditions to hand you a fecal sandwich as the wing.

For your own sake, don't be complacent in this aircraft with ice. It may be the cutest kitty you've seen but if placed in certain situations (which you may not recognize initially), it can easily show its fangs.