eaglefly

This is EXACTLY what happened with the pilots of American Eagle 4184.

They were blamed by the French for the accident until irrefutable evidence showed a problem with the airplane, it's systems and the effects of certain types of ice accretion. The manufacturer, the various European governments, the FAA and many of the airlines all participated in a philosophy of "whistling past the cemetary" when it came to acknowledging the deficiencies (and long and WELL documented history) that led to Roselawn. It's just as easy (and more desireable by some) to blame the pilots for their decisions this time and for what they may not have known or understood.

BroncoBird

Here is something interesting I found....

Go to this link:

Aircraft Icing Training -Related Information

Go about half way down the page to where the "information" section ends and the "videos" begin. Click on the "Information: Transitory Nature of Icing" resource and look at the graphic. It's from the eerily similar crash of the Comair EMB120 going into DTW back in the '90s.

It shows that you can't always expect to pick up the kind of ice that everyone else is reporting, even if its within minutes of when you expect to enter the conditions. Icing is so dynamic that everything from exact altitude, temperature, moisture content, a/c surface type, etc, etc, can make the difference between no ice and severe ice from minute to minute.
Interesting stuff.

GravellyPointer

NTSB: Colgan 3407 pitched up despite anti-stall push-15/02/2009-Washington DC-Flightglobal.com
NTSB: Colgan 3407 pitched up despite anti-stall push
By John Croft
"Flight data recorder information shows the Colgan Air Q400 that crashed in Buffalo Thursday night pitched 31 degrees nose-up after stick shaker and stick pusher systems activated at the start of the instrument approach.

The events occurred as the crew began configuring the twin-engine turboprop for landing in light to moderate icing and snow conditions.
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) member Steven Chealander, data shows that the stick shaker and stick pusher activated roughly 34 seconds after the landing gear was deployed and as the wing flaps transitioned between 5 and 10 degrees down. The pilots had commanded the flaps to the 15 degree down position.

A “reference speed increase” switch that increases by 20kt the speed at which the stall warning system activates had been set to the ON position by the pilots as called for in icing conditions, says Chealander. The crew turned on the aircraft’s automatic de-icing system shortly after departure from Newark. Flight 3407, flying as Continental Connection, crashed into a house about 5mi from the airport, killing all 49 on board and one person in the house.

Chealander says aircraft had been flying in autopilot mode until the stick shaker activated, an action that automatically disengaged the system. The stick pusher follows the stick shaker if the aircraft continues to approach an aerodynamic stall, driving the control column forward to decrease the angle-of-attach and wing loading. The stick pusher is designed so that pilots can overpower it however.

While the NTSB has recommended that pilots hand flying their aircraft in icing conditions to get a better sense for trim changes, Chealander says the US Federal Aviation Administration has not mandated the practice, in part due considerations over pilot workload in such conditions without the use of autopilot.

Further, he says that Bombardier, the manufacturer of the Q400, recommends hand flying only if icing conditions are severe. “From what we’ve seen so far, we haven’t determined there was severe icing,” he says.

Investigators are still in the process of determining what the aircraft’s stall speed would have been for its weight and configuration, says Chealander. Flight data recorder (FDR) information shows the aircraft was flying at a calibrated airspeed of 134kt just before the landing gear was deployed.
Following the initial pitch upset to 31 degrees nose up, Chealander says the aircraft experienced a nose-down pitch of 45 degrees with a roll to the left of 46 degrees. The Q400 then rolled right to 105 degrees. Engine power was increased to full-power about 6 seconds after the upset. The pilots had commanded the flaps and landing gear to retract after the upset.

The last data point from the FDR, captured when the aircraft was approximately 250ft above the ground, showed a heading of 53 degrees (magnetic), a 26-degree right roll, 30 degree nose-down attitude and a speed of 100kt, says Chealander.

Radar data from air traffic control showed a descent rate of 9,600fpm between approximately 1,150ft and 350ft above the ground.
Chealander says the G-forces during the final minute of the flight ranged from 0.75G to 2G. "

The reference speed increase switch was selected on, which increases the shaker speed by 20 kts, does this increase the pusher speed by 20 kts as well?

The A/C had a shaker and pusher event. A shaker and pusher event indicates a wing stall, not a tail stall.

Considering the pax and fuel on board, and the flap and reference speed increase switch on, the airspeed at the point of upset was 134 kts. Q400 pilots, is this an appropriate airspeed at this point?

No, I'm not a member of the media. May the friends and relatives of the victims of 3407 find peace in their loss and grieving.

Freightdog1

has anyone given any thought about the pitot-static system? Perhaps something there was iced-up/over and giving erroneous indications.

Diver Driver

Interesting short video on tailplane stalls from NASA taken from Bronco's website mentioned above: Actual Tail Stall Event (NASA Research Flight)

JoeyMeatballs

should have had some kind of indication if it failed......

Also 6 seconds is a looooooooooong time from upset to bringing the P/L's to max. I am not faulting the pilots the upset was SEVERE and I can only imagine what it must of been like, especially being nose down 40 something degrees, max power that low to the ground in that pitch..........you get the idea.

I dunno I know every aircraft accident is unique this one will be extremely interesting........

Jetstream 823JS

-[/quote]

Fatty,

You asked for thoughts on this so here goes. Yes, your companies' OPS specs [I suspect you mean OPS Manual] are out of wack.

The definition of moderate icing is like you say The "rate of accumulation is such that even short encounters become potentially hazardous"

But goes on to read "and use of deicing/anti-icing equipment or diversion is necessary."

So we can conclude from this that in moderate ice one can either;

A] Turn on deicing/anti-icing equipment

B] Divert.

Their is nothing unsafe or illegal about flying an A/C certified for flight into known icing in moderate ice.

DAL4EVER

You are correct that manufacturers have spent a lot of money certifying aircraft so yes, anything that they can find that puts the burden on the pilots removes them from decreased sales, product liability, etc.

That said, wait until the report comes out and more information becomes available. There is some info that highlights the need for pilots to always be vigilant and fly the airplane and prevent distractions.

Excel

Any Q pilots want to chime in? what airspeeds are you guys targetting at the marker? Does 135ish sound appropriate?

ewrbasedpilot

And what's even more interesting is that some of the comments made by the NASA engineers near the beginning of that video are EXACTLY the indications and movements this aircraft appears to have experienced......................