Sputnik

First off your analogy is flawed. If the airline was switching next month the only qualified people probably would be qualified pilots. Right now. After 5 years it might very well be possible to train non pilots to do it just as safely. Seat of the pants doesn't do much when the seat of my pants is half the globe away from the plane.

I started my career as an enlisted infantryman (in peace, different world) and just spent three years with the Army including deployments to both sandboxs. I actually like the Army, no slams here. But I feel fully qualified to say that 90% of the times the Army gets in trouble it's because of the Army, not the AF. And most of the time, after the Col/Lt Col/etc finished screaming, they'd admit it. We do a lot to mitigate with liaisons everywhere, etc, but it is what it is.

If you can pull those instances and show where ground pounders had a problem because of a judgement error made by the operator (not in the opinion of the guy on the ground, in the opinion of someone with complete picture) I'll buy it. But right now, respectfully, we have a difference of opinion.

I've seen exactly one start to finish Pred kill. It took about 3 minutes, which our JTACs informed us was quite fast. This did not require the lightning fast reflexs and judgement of a trained fighter pilot at the controls of a large 70kt remote controlled model aircraft. Permission was requested, it went up an assinine level of approval, permission granted, butten pushed, guys waxed. I saw nothing that required a pilot. Like I said, only one. I did watch video of a few more strikes our guys did, similar.

So I saw a few, out of an infinite number of strikes and ops, but it made an impression.

So my question for you, you feel quite strongly on the subject. I know what you don't like--non rated guys, guys straight out of UPT, and I understand your rationale even if I don't agree. But what I don't get --what should we be doing? I feel like you're saying the only people who should do this are trained and experienced fighter pilots? Is that a correct assessment? How do we do that? What's experience? I mean, you'll take wingman into combat as soon as qual'ed, so could a guy spend six months in a fighter then go? 4ship lead? IP?

I'm getting nitnoid there, but if you take only experienced guys, and you need a 1000 UAV drivers (or whatever mindblowing number is) who then flies the fighters and who trains the new guys?

I'm rambling so let me boil it down again:
1 - Who should fly it (experience, etc)?
2 - How do we get enough?

LivingInMEM

Sputnik - look at those PM's that I sent a while back. They included a case where Army dudes were put in danger becuase of what the crew in the capsule did or did not do and a case where the intel analysis was severly flawed most likely due to inexperienced or first-term intel personnel. I have additional instances if you'd like - they are all of the same type. I also have stories where experienced operators who did what they thought right probably saved the day.

If you look at my posts, I have always emphasized using only experienced pilots, not just fighter pilots. Of course, as a fighter pilot I tend to use that term since I are one.

The first step to a solution is to get past the vision of what most people see as the pilot's role. The pilot is commanding an ISR and CAS platform, and needs to function in that role - we need a single point final decision maker in the capsule. He isn't there to only fly an ILS. To that end, we need competent and experienced operators filling these seats. The wingman that you mentioned or a copilot is not a decision maker to this extent, they are under the control of a flight-lead and have the direct supervision that no UAV operator has. Have you flown with a recent UPT grad? I do on a daily basis, and I can ensure you they will never be mistaken for competent decision-makers. It takes years to develop airmanship, SA, and judgement. With over 4500 military flight hours and 17 years service, I can attest that I probably spend about 2% of the number of brain cells on the specific task of flying the jet than I did when I was a 2LT. I am confident that if we operated any fighters as single-ships in an actual combat environment providing ISR and CAS support to the ground troops, there would be no new UPT grads or wingman going into these positions.

The USAF point that the UAS will rob the cockpits of qualified pilots is false. Ask any current fighter guys how many hours they are getting and how many pilots are getting ops-ops assigments. The USAF has been robbing the cockpits of experience long before UAVs came around. There have traditionally been a myriad of jobs filled by rated pilots, when all they really needed was someone with common sense. How about ranking these non-flying billets and filling them by priority - with impact on the combat mission being priority number 1. If we took every pilot assigned to command posts, to general's aides positions, to OSS positions (full-time, not additional dut), etc we would have more than enough pilots to fill the billets. To accomodate the experience, the typical UAV squadron makeup should be inverse of a traditional squadron - they should have more O-5's than O-4's than O-3's and more MSGT's than TSGT's than SSGT's and very few Airmen. Even if we had to rob the cockpits, we could take 10% of the qualified and experienced pilots from every airframe across the board without as much of a hiccup to the war effort. But, if we put those 10% of experienced aviators into the UAV, we would well more than double the number of UAV's crews available to support actual real-world going on right now combat ops within a matter of months.

The last thing I will say to this is who came up with the number of UAV pilots we need? If you are going to try to maintain a level of quality, will you look at how many pilots you can produce and strive for that goal? Or do you come up with some end number and then compromise selection criteria and training to get there?

If you go with option 2, you will see reports like this: Human Error Cited in Most UAV Crashes

And you will see quotes like this: "In the early Predator program, the typical sensor operator arrived with midlevel enlisted rank and had at least two previous assignments, many of them aviation-related, Herz wrote. Today, half of new sensor operators "have come directly from basic training as their first exposure to the professional workforce," Herz found. Col. Chris Chambliss, commander of the 432nd Wing at Creech Air Force Base, Nev., said in a telephone interview that many of his sensor operators are 18 or 19 years old."; or "Predator pilots, too, are less experienced than before. In the past, they typically had two, three or more tours with a warplane before coming to the drone. Now the average Predator pilot now has one tour, Herz found. Herz reported that most Predator mishaps were the result of three types of human errors: inadequate skills and knowledge necessary to operate the aircraft; lack of teamwork; and lack of situational awareness. The result, Herz wrote, is that operators are less able to conduct "real-world operations."

If there were an unclassified study concerning the operational errors with respect to combat support (not just Class-A mishaps), it would definitely be a lot more enlightening.

While that is what I have to say about the UAV in particular, my larger point all along is how combat capability was never mentioned by anyone with respect to how to man this asset - not on this board and not by the CSAF. While every officer in any service has to weigh the needs of the mission and the needs of the individual when making these decisions, the replies to this thread have been typical Air Force - 100% needs of the individual. Every USAF pilot signed up knowing that needs of the service come first, and combat capability should be number one among the needs. While very few people would want to leave a cockpit to fly a UAV, every officer should understand that ANY decrease in combat capability (especially with respect to the troop on the ground) is an unacceptable trade for the ability to not suck up a tour in a capsule. Whatever you fly, you fly because the USAF decided we needed someone doing that job to further the defense of the nation. No one came in with a signed contract saying "I agree to only fly the F-15, etc".

LivingInMEM

I have one point to add: the mission that you saw references only one facet of what the UAS does. Not all UAS missions involve having the asset orbit somewhere waiting for a call to drive over an engage a pre-selected well defined target - there are actual missions where it is the UAS that detects and engages the target solo, where the UAS detects and coordinates for other assets to engage, where the UAS detects the threat and monitors, ..... the list goes on - and it needs to do this from a location where it has appropriate coverage, is also not detected, and is not in conflict with a myriad of other airborne assets. Just because the one mission you observed did not rely on a high amount of SA, judgment and solid decision-making does not mean none of them do.

As far as why every USAF pilot (as a military officer) should recognize the UAS for what it is, I will reference this to C-17's only as an example (not as a slam as I am a former heavy driver). Many C-17 drivers have an impact on the war, but it is more of an indirect impact. They get the cargo and troops where they need to be, but pretty much every C-17 pilot from CP to AC can do that. I know you do medevac and other important missions, but nearly any strategic airlift asset can be used on any of those missions - they are definitely important missions, but as individual crewmembers your impact is somewhat limited. But, if we take one experienced C-17 driver and put him in a UAS, and that one experienced C-17 driver puts his UAS where he knows it will utilize its strengths most suitably (lets say in this case he stands up against poor direction from above) and that one C-17 driver in concert with the sensor operator decides that the dudes on the ground need coverage in this area (not that one), and those decisions result in additional threats being detected, engaged and prevented from harming US troops - then that one C-17 driver will have had more of a direct impact on the war (especially in the lives of those troops) than he could have otherwise had in a cockpit. There are dudes in cockpits having more of a direct impact than the guy in the UAS (A-10 CAS with troops in contact, even AC-130 CAS to placate DTFL, etc) - but the guy in the UAS is having more of a direct impact than the majority of other pilots out there right now. In a future war and different environment that may change, but that is what it is right now.

Sputnik

Mem,

I appreciate the words, I really do. I won't say I agree 100% with you, but I truly appreciate the well thought out words of someone who cares.

I like that you answered my questions. I don't know if you're correct or not on manning. I sit in a composite wing that isn't a composite wing (recently corrected by a chief who needs a job) but I'll tell you, we are desperately undermanned on fighter guys. We're actually fat on 17 drivers (no pun intended) but only on Lt's. If you took 10% of our experienced guys we'd pretty much have to shut down ops. Still, only one base.

I tell you this--with absolutely no sarcasm--you should write one of those guest closing page editorials in AF Times. As I said, I don't completely agree with you, but you present the most articulate and intelligent thoughts on UAVs I've seen, I think what you say is worth presenting to the AF community as a whole. Think about it.

Flameout

Memphis, your analogy of unmanned airliners and UAVs is way off. We don't and won't have unmanned airliners because of the real safety issues involved and the fact that passengers won't board an unmanned aircraft. So it's ridiculous to talk about operating unmanned airliners with new hires, old pros, or anyone else.

UAVs, on the other hand, are obviously unmanned. So it only makes sense to train the operators and weaponeers in the only realistic training environment for UAVs -- by actually operating UAVs! We need people who can recognize threats, judge the effects of weapons, etc., while operating in the unmanned environment, not by attempting to extrapolate from their experiences flying manned aircraft. UAV ops are no exception to the rule, "Train as you fight."

LivingInMEM

Flameout,

For the airliner thing, since you can't see the analogy for what it's worth, consider a cargo carrier for the example.

For your second paragraph, what are you talking about? We are talking about who the USAF selects to put into the seat, not how they train them. Are you telling me that a new guy trained in the left seat of an airliner will make as good a Capt as an experienced pilot trained in the left seat because they were both trained in the environment that they will operate on? After all, that experienced guy will have to extrapolate his previous experience from his previous seat or aircraft to bring his judgement with him. Of course the experienced pilot will make a better Capt (all else being equal) because he will be a better decision-maker.

Of course the USAF is training whoever they select in UAS ops - do you really think that they are taking F-16 pilots and throwing them into the seat and saying "have at it"? If you do understand that they train whoever goes there, do you really think thousands of hours in a manned aircraft and actual combat experience is a hindrance to succesful UAS operations and a neophyte LT would do a better job than a Maj or LtCol? I guess that Lt would do better in a 737 simulator than you since would be hindered by all those actual hours - I mean isn't the sim just virtual reality?

Flameout

"...do you really think thousands of hours in a manned aircraft and actual combat experience is a hindrance to succesful UAS operations?"

A hindrance? No. But necessary? Or even a worthwhile expenditure of training resources for the value received? Very debatable (despite your valiant attempt to portray the value received as indispensable). We're entering a new age of unmanned weapons, and we need new standards of necessary skill sets, as well as training, to operate these weapons.

LivingInMEM

You forgot judgement, decision-making, and situational awareness - which (despite whether you think it so or not) are critical in the interpretation of ROE and their analysis with respect to the current situation and the legality of the application of deadly force. Those characteristics are also critical in the tactical employment of the UAS with respect to mission requirements, enemy detection and destruction capabilities, and the location and capabilities of other assets in the area.

You may think that the sky being blue is debatable, that doesn't make it so. If you believe that being able to detect an image on a CRT is the most critical skill for a UAS pilot, you haven't figured out the role of these assets. As for physical tasks required of the pilot, those will be trained to anyone in that role. The ultimate role of Capt is decision-maker, that's why we still require experience to occupy that seat. The ultimate role of the UAS operator is as an ISR platform commander, still no change. The introduction of autopilot and glass technology did not change the basic requirements of the airline Capt (according to your line of thinking they should have), the same as where they pilot sits does not change the basic requirements of ISR commander.

You know, we do have other ISR assets that are manned. Do you believe we should put non-rated pilots into those assets? What's the difference between the two - in fact, the unmanned asset is bigger, faster, and flies higher and farther. I am sure you don't think they should, but for some reason you think the new non-rated guy with no previous experience should go into the only ISR platform that employs ordnance. That just does not make sense, regardless of what you think about it.

Flameout

Memphis, you're missing the point on a number of levels. Nothing I said indicates I believe airliners should be unmanned or I don't think unmanned ISR platforms should be bigger or faster than manned ones. That's just nuts.

My point has been that we should recruit and train operators with a view to the kinds of systems they'll be operating. If you're going to be operating a manned aircraft, you need to actually be trained up as a pilot. If you're going to drop ordnance from a manned aircraft, you need experience in doing that.

But if you're going to be "flying" a UAV, you don't need to have experience as pilot of a manned aircraft. That's right -- I firmly believe that, and so do a lot of other knowledgable people. And if you're going to drop ordnance from that UAV, you need to have training and experience in dropping ordnance from a UAV -- not a manned aircraft! Yes, you do need to know how to discriminate targets on a CRT. Yes, you do need to know the best way to drop a specific piece of ordnance, based on info you receive in the UAV control console -- not in a manned aircraft. In fact, I could argue that having manned experience is so dissimilar from one's experience as a UAV operator that the manned experience could be a distraction.

Again, I realize this is not exactly what the military pilot community wants to hear -- but it's a logic-based approach to manning UAVs, an approach I'm convinced is coming down the pike now, and rapidly.

Buzz

Last week Columbus dropped two UASs (it's an Unmanned Aerial System, not Vehicle, who made O-7 for that one?). 1 T-1 grad and 1 T-38 grad. Every class in fiscal '09 can expect the same drop as well as RC-12s and U-28s continuing to drop.