What if a no vote means less?
06-15-2012, 06:55 PM
#21
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2009
Position: right for a long, long time
Posts: 2,642
Do I desire more out of the TA? D@mn right I wanted more.
C2K was a roughly 19% increase with 50% retro that required 18 months past the amendable date and a release from the NMB to achieve. I believe we have accomplished the same type of result, but 7 months ahead of the amendable date and not tying ourselves to a 5 year deal afterward.
Don't expect a Romney WH to offer a release EVER, much less let a PEB go unexercised. I still question the reasoning behind "more leverage", I just don't see it.
However, in the real environment we find ourselves in, if our mgt is going shopping soon, I'd like to start our JCBA talks at a point 19.7% higher than where we are now, with much better scope protection.
Greece, Spain and Italy are pretty muh going to cause the collapse of the European Union, and if you read the WSJ this morning you'd realize how fragile and rapidly slowing Chinese economy is right now.
I'm not willing to gamble on a "but Richard wants a deal quickly so he undercut us" argument.
06-15-2012, 07:02 PM
#22
Line Holder
Joined APC: Aug 2008
Position: A320
Posts: 65
Voting no does mean less, less jumbo RJ's. No'd the sh!t out of that thing today.
06-15-2012, 07:13 PM
#23
Banned
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Position: Space Shuttle PIC
Posts: 2,007
Disclaimer:
These are my personal thoughts and that is all. They don’t represent the views of anyone else or any organization.
What happens if we say no?
The common forum wisdom is that if we say no, then Delta management will simply roll over and start dishing out money to us. I haven’t seen one shred of analysis to give any credence to this contention and so I assume that this belief is based on the individual merely hoping it was true. It would be quite convenient for all of us, if the CEO would look at a rejected deal, realize how truly hurt and upset the pilots were and then salve us all with heaping tablespoon of cash. I am not sure how people that have been around this industry very long can contend that, look at history and that is not the experience that labor groups have had.
From a practical standpoint, how could a CEO draw a line ever in any negotiation if it was known that his bottom line still had a lot of slop left? How many times would the CEO respond to a no vote with more money? Would this continually work, vote no and more cash rolls in, or is there some limit? If there is some limit, how would we know when to stop?
Perhaps some of this “hope strategy” comes from the fact that line pilots are not there for the constant back and forth of negotiation. They only see the final result of what were hundreds of offers/counteroffers made in this deal. Perhaps they conclude that the negotiation process is still in its infancy and there is more to go. This is not the first offer, nor the hundredth, but the result of over 350 different proposals. If someone places some magical hope in the 351st offer, that that particular one would do the trick, then again this is based more on wishing that were true rather than on any real logic.
Remember, this deal is the combination of multiple negotiations, with Boeing/Southwest and/or Airbus, all the DCI carriers (except Comair because we own them), regional jet manufacturers, and debt/leaseholders. All of these deals had to come together pretty much all at once because they are all dependent upon each other. If Delta rewards pilots for unraveling this complicated deal, then how would all these other parties respond? It’s good to think of various options and consider all aspects of a deal, but self-delusion is not a basis for strategic planning. There is no bag of money waiting under the CEO’s desk that we simply have to ask for and he will hand it over.
Timeline
A lot of pilots have questions about the timeline. Why July 1st? Why the rush? Did we get pushed into making a quick deal?
Let’s go to the last point first. Go back to the MEC communications from all last year. It was ALPA that wanted to move quickly on negotiations. We did not want to wait for years past our amendable date, so we had been quite insistent to management that they put us back on their “to-do list” so that we could have a deal done by the amendable date. That is why we started our contract preparations so early. We had the contract history, contract comparison, and contract survey all completed more than a year before our amendable date. The idea that we got pushed into some rush deal just doesn’t match the facts. We wanted them to negotiate.
Delta did see an opportunity, but it was an opportunity that had a short shelf life. There are fleet plans from multiple airlines, staffing plans, and manufacturing deadlines all dependent upon the timing of this deal. We are already selling tickets for Spring Break 2013 and so these fleet plans cannot wait until the last minute. Delta is already planning on posting bids for 717’s in the fall, there is not much slop left in that timing. So speed is money and if you slow things down you have less money.
Deadlines are difficult to measure. What if we are done by July 2nd, does the whole deal fall apart? The best analogy is if you were 30 or 40 feet from the edge of the Grand Canyon and you put on a blind fold and start walking towards the cliff. At first, you can take steps with a lot of confidence. Later, your progress would become more tentative moving to small baby steps. At some point you would stop because you know if you take one step too far you are off the cliff. Everyone involved in this negotiation thinks we are pretty close to the edge right now.
A practical application
We saw many of these principles play out in the negotiations surrounding the merger. Delta wanted to move quickly on the merger. Just as in this negotiation, WE CAME TO THEM asking for a deal. We both had bankruptcy deals that lasted for years into the future and we told them that we could speed up the deal in exchange for money and stock. Speed is money. We told them that we would wrap up the seniority integration quickly in exchange for money. Delta had a timeline that was less definite than today but there were time considerations. A Presidential election was coming up in the fall and Delta wanted the current government to review the merger and not take a chance on the next.
We started negotiations in January and after several rounds into March there was no deal. The JCBA negotiations were finalized but no seniority deal. The corporate negotiations were also in fits and starts but no final deal. This created a moving timeline that led some to believe there was no timeline and the world would wait for us forever. In the waning days of March, both MEC’s were given a call, the merger was happening with or without us, we had 14 days to try to reach a deal or the company would just go the traditional route. We had gone off the edge of the cliff but we had a lifeline for 14 days and then it was down to the bottom. People that had talked about “false deadlines” found out what a real deadline looked like.
So we grabbed the lifeline and negotiated LOA 19 and then the JCBA. Speed was money and we cost them time so there was less money. Like about $250 million less. That money will never come back. Ouch, that was a painful lesson about what it’s like to step over the edge.
Conclusion
My view is that this deal has a much steeper cliff than even the merger. Delta has to make long range decisions about issues that take years to accomplish and not months. They have a plan to move forward without us, the MEC has seen it, and it doesn’t involve a billion dollars coming into our pockets over the next three years.
It has been a tragic decade for this industry and especially for airline pilots. Almost every other pilot group has approached the recovery from this tragedy as a make or break, take it or leave it proposition. They have achieved nothing. You have a series of poor leaders that get the short term sugar high of calling their management a bunch of thieves. Everyone slaps them on the back for a while until they realize they have gone another 3, 4, or 5+ years without a penny of gain. Yipee, he voted no, isn’t he a hero.
So when I see the “Vote No and they will give us more” arguments, I personally see more of this failed strategy. Whatever short term sugar high you get for sticking it to the man, will get erased when you start adding up the dollars and Delta pilot jobs you just threw away. In my opinion, you will get three or four years to figure that out.
These are my personal thoughts and that is all. They don’t represent the views of anyone else or any organization.
What happens if we say no?
The common forum wisdom is that if we say no, then Delta management will simply roll over and start dishing out money to us. I haven’t seen one shred of analysis to give any credence to this contention and so I assume that this belief is based on the individual merely hoping it was true. It would be quite convenient for all of us, if the CEO would look at a rejected deal, realize how truly hurt and upset the pilots were and then salve us all with heaping tablespoon of cash. I am not sure how people that have been around this industry very long can contend that, look at history and that is not the experience that labor groups have had.
From a practical standpoint, how could a CEO draw a line ever in any negotiation if it was known that his bottom line still had a lot of slop left? How many times would the CEO respond to a no vote with more money? Would this continually work, vote no and more cash rolls in, or is there some limit? If there is some limit, how would we know when to stop?
Perhaps some of this “hope strategy” comes from the fact that line pilots are not there for the constant back and forth of negotiation. They only see the final result of what were hundreds of offers/counteroffers made in this deal. Perhaps they conclude that the negotiation process is still in its infancy and there is more to go. This is not the first offer, nor the hundredth, but the result of over 350 different proposals. If someone places some magical hope in the 351st offer, that that particular one would do the trick, then again this is based more on wishing that were true rather than on any real logic.
Remember, this deal is the combination of multiple negotiations, with Boeing/Southwest and/or Airbus, all the DCI carriers (except Comair because we own them), regional jet manufacturers, and debt/leaseholders. All of these deals had to come together pretty much all at once because they are all dependent upon each other. If Delta rewards pilots for unraveling this complicated deal, then how would all these other parties respond? It’s good to think of various options and consider all aspects of a deal, but self-delusion is not a basis for strategic planning. There is no bag of money waiting under the CEO’s desk that we simply have to ask for and he will hand it over.
Timeline
A lot of pilots have questions about the timeline. Why July 1st? Why the rush? Did we get pushed into making a quick deal?
Let’s go to the last point first. Go back to the MEC communications from all last year. It was ALPA that wanted to move quickly on negotiations. We did not want to wait for years past our amendable date, so we had been quite insistent to management that they put us back on their “to-do list” so that we could have a deal done by the amendable date. That is why we started our contract preparations so early. We had the contract history, contract comparison, and contract survey all completed more than a year before our amendable date. The idea that we got pushed into some rush deal just doesn’t match the facts. We wanted them to negotiate.
Delta did see an opportunity, but it was an opportunity that had a short shelf life. There are fleet plans from multiple airlines, staffing plans, and manufacturing deadlines all dependent upon the timing of this deal. We are already selling tickets for Spring Break 2013 and so these fleet plans cannot wait until the last minute. Delta is already planning on posting bids for 717’s in the fall, there is not much slop left in that timing. So speed is money and if you slow things down you have less money.
Deadlines are difficult to measure. What if we are done by July 2nd, does the whole deal fall apart? The best analogy is if you were 30 or 40 feet from the edge of the Grand Canyon and you put on a blind fold and start walking towards the cliff. At first, you can take steps with a lot of confidence. Later, your progress would become more tentative moving to small baby steps. At some point you would stop because you know if you take one step too far you are off the cliff. Everyone involved in this negotiation thinks we are pretty close to the edge right now.
A practical application
We saw many of these principles play out in the negotiations surrounding the merger. Delta wanted to move quickly on the merger. Just as in this negotiation, WE CAME TO THEM asking for a deal. We both had bankruptcy deals that lasted for years into the future and we told them that we could speed up the deal in exchange for money and stock. Speed is money. We told them that we would wrap up the seniority integration quickly in exchange for money. Delta had a timeline that was less definite than today but there were time considerations. A Presidential election was coming up in the fall and Delta wanted the current government to review the merger and not take a chance on the next.
We started negotiations in January and after several rounds into March there was no deal. The JCBA negotiations were finalized but no seniority deal. The corporate negotiations were also in fits and starts but no final deal. This created a moving timeline that led some to believe there was no timeline and the world would wait for us forever. In the waning days of March, both MEC’s were given a call, the merger was happening with or without us, we had 14 days to try to reach a deal or the company would just go the traditional route. We had gone off the edge of the cliff but we had a lifeline for 14 days and then it was down to the bottom. People that had talked about “false deadlines” found out what a real deadline looked like.
So we grabbed the lifeline and negotiated LOA 19 and then the JCBA. Speed was money and we cost them time so there was less money. Like about $250 million less. That money will never come back. Ouch, that was a painful lesson about what it’s like to step over the edge.
Conclusion
My view is that this deal has a much steeper cliff than even the merger. Delta has to make long range decisions about issues that take years to accomplish and not months. They have a plan to move forward without us, the MEC has seen it, and it doesn’t involve a billion dollars coming into our pockets over the next three years.
It has been a tragic decade for this industry and especially for airline pilots. Almost every other pilot group has approached the recovery from this tragedy as a make or break, take it or leave it proposition. They have achieved nothing. You have a series of poor leaders that get the short term sugar high of calling their management a bunch of thieves. Everyone slaps them on the back for a while until they realize they have gone another 3, 4, or 5+ years without a penny of gain. Yipee, he voted no, isn’t he a hero.
So when I see the “Vote No and they will give us more” arguments, I personally see more of this failed strategy. Whatever short term sugar high you get for sticking it to the man, will get erased when you start adding up the dollars and Delta pilot jobs you just threw away. In my opinion, you will get three or four years to figure that out.
+++++++++++717
06-15-2012, 07:16 PM
#24
Banned
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Position: Space Shuttle PIC
Posts: 2,007
I'm saying that it is my opinion that we have exhausted the maximum amount of leverage that we have at this current juncture.
Do I desire more out of the TA? D@mn right I wanted more.
C2K was a roughly 19% increase with 50% retro that required 18 months past the amendable date and a release from the NMB to achieve. I believe we have accomplished the same type of result, but 7 months ahead of the amendable date and not tying ourselves to a 5 year deal afterward.
Don't expect a Romney WH to offer a release EVER, much less let a PEB go unexercised. I still question the reasoning behind "more leverage", I just don't see it.
However, in the real environment we find ourselves in, if our mgt is going shopping soon, I'd like to start our JCBA talks at a point 19.7% higher than where we are now, with much better scope protection.
Greece, Spain and Italy are pretty muh going to cause the collapse of the European Union, and if you read the WSJ this morning you'd realize how fragile and rapidly slowing Chinese economy is right now.
I'm not willing to gamble on a "but Richard wants a deal quickly so he undercut us" argument.
Do I desire more out of the TA? D@mn right I wanted more.
C2K was a roughly 19% increase with 50% retro that required 18 months past the amendable date and a release from the NMB to achieve. I believe we have accomplished the same type of result, but 7 months ahead of the amendable date and not tying ourselves to a 5 year deal afterward.
Don't expect a Romney WH to offer a release EVER, much less let a PEB go unexercised. I still question the reasoning behind "more leverage", I just don't see it.
However, in the real environment we find ourselves in, if our mgt is going shopping soon, I'd like to start our JCBA talks at a point 19.7% higher than where we are now, with much better scope protection.
Greece, Spain and Italy are pretty muh going to cause the collapse of the European Union, and if you read the WSJ this morning you'd realize how fragile and rapidly slowing Chinese economy is right now.
I'm not willing to gamble on a "but Richard wants a deal quickly so he undercut us" argument.
So many on here focus down the road with blinders on. Zero situational awareness. It's just like wanting to sell your house NOW for what you paid for it in 2005. It just won't happen.
06-15-2012, 07:20 PM
#25
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2009
Position: right for a long, long time
Posts: 2,642
06-15-2012, 07:21 PM
#26
Banned
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Position: Space Shuttle PIC
Posts: 2,007
All Answers are from Slowplay---copied from a page back
This is a real quick reply (dangerous) so I reserve the right to edit errors later after doing some additional checking.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
What are your thoughts on these items?Is a potential move from Narita to Haneda addressed in this contract? Does it protect pilot jobs? [/B]Yes. The company still has to maintain 315 slots (use or lose) in NRT, otherwise they can't codeshare across the Pacific. They have to negotiate to go to Haneda.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
If JAL leaves from One World (AMR) and joins SkyTeam (Delta), what happens to our south (5th freedom) flying?
This is where the new JV language protects us shold Delta try to go that route. Delta still has to maintain 315 slots even if JAL were added. The routes may change (as they can now) but Delta pilot flown slots won't.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
How many top level jobs could we lose? Where do those pilots displace too? Are we not overstaffed now? What happens if the 250-300 pilots expected to retire do not do so?
Fewer than we could lose now because of the additional JV protection. This TA will not accelerate displacements, it will help prevent them by protecting both top and bottom end scope. We are overstaffed now. Even though the most common call that ALPA's getting right now is about early retirement and the worry it won't get down to that individual's seniority, the efficiencies in our contract would show a net reduction of around 100 jobs. Any retirements over that number will mean a net increase in seniority for remaining pilots. Also, in order to access 76 seat jets, Delta has to buy 88 B717. Those plus 737-900ER and MD-90 deliveries should mean fleet growth.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Are you ok with the potential for the company to access your medical records in order to get 100% sick paid?
They have greater access now. This TA tightens the requirement for management to access your records, lengthens the requirement for them to require a Doctor's note and codifies when verification is required. They can no longer monitor as they are currently doing. This is a clear, big win that produces a far better result than the grievance.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
ALV plus 15 for reserves—How much efficiency does this gain mean to staffing? Does this lead to less green slip opportunities? Does quality of life matter?
All the "negative" staffing changes result in a need for 300 less pilots. All the positive staffing changes add back in about 175-200 (depending on block hours) for a net reduction of 100-125.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Does 4%, 8.5%, 3% and 3% for 42 months keep up with inflation? Does this meet your survey expectations?
19.7% in the first 30 months of a new contract are solid numbers. Everybody wants them higher but they are what are achievable.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Do 88 717s really mean 88 aircraft worth of growth? What happens to older MD-88s, A320s, and 757s? Again, higher paying aircraft retiring and lower paying aircraft being acquired?
The 737-900ER is the mainline "replacement" aircraft. It pays more than the A320 and less than the B757. There is no current plan to park MD-88's. The 717 is replacing DCI CRJ flying. While it doesn't guarantee growth, it guarantees that Delta pilots will be flying a higher percentage of Delta passengers.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Are you ok with the numerical increase in more two-class 76 regional aircraft?
That's subjective, but exchanging 70 additional 76 seaters for a net decrease of 148 DCI airframes, block hour ratios, top end scope JV protections, international scope, tightening Alaska scope, tightening the exception all are a very positive trade.
Those are some great questions and answers. Thanks to both of you.
This is a real quick reply (dangerous) so I reserve the right to edit errors later after doing some additional checking.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
What are your thoughts on these items?Is a potential move from Narita to Haneda addressed in this contract? Does it protect pilot jobs? [/B]Yes. The company still has to maintain 315 slots (use or lose) in NRT, otherwise they can't codeshare across the Pacific. They have to negotiate to go to Haneda.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
If JAL leaves from One World (AMR) and joins SkyTeam (Delta), what happens to our south (5th freedom) flying?
This is where the new JV language protects us shold Delta try to go that route. Delta still has to maintain 315 slots even if JAL were added. The routes may change (as they can now) but Delta pilot flown slots won't.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
How many top level jobs could we lose? Where do those pilots displace too? Are we not overstaffed now? What happens if the 250-300 pilots expected to retire do not do so?
Fewer than we could lose now because of the additional JV protection. This TA will not accelerate displacements, it will help prevent them by protecting both top and bottom end scope. We are overstaffed now. Even though the most common call that ALPA's getting right now is about early retirement and the worry it won't get down to that individual's seniority, the efficiencies in our contract would show a net reduction of around 100 jobs. Any retirements over that number will mean a net increase in seniority for remaining pilots. Also, in order to access 76 seat jets, Delta has to buy 88 B717. Those plus 737-900ER and MD-90 deliveries should mean fleet growth.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Are you ok with the potential for the company to access your medical records in order to get 100% sick paid?
They have greater access now. This TA tightens the requirement for management to access your records, lengthens the requirement for them to require a Doctor's note and codifies when verification is required. They can no longer monitor as they are currently doing. This is a clear, big win that produces a far better result than the grievance.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
ALV plus 15 for reserves—How much efficiency does this gain mean to staffing? Does this lead to less green slip opportunities? Does quality of life matter?
All the "negative" staffing changes result in a need for 300 less pilots. All the positive staffing changes add back in about 175-200 (depending on block hours) for a net reduction of 100-125.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Does 4%, 8.5%, 3% and 3% for 42 months keep up with inflation? Does this meet your survey expectations?
19.7% in the first 30 months of a new contract are solid numbers. Everybody wants them higher but they are what are achievable.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Do 88 717s really mean 88 aircraft worth of growth? What happens to older MD-88s, A320s, and 757s? Again, higher paying aircraft retiring and lower paying aircraft being acquired?
The 737-900ER is the mainline "replacement" aircraft. It pays more than the A320 and less than the B757. There is no current plan to park MD-88's. The 717 is replacing DCI CRJ flying. While it doesn't guarantee growth, it guarantees that Delta pilots will be flying a higher percentage of Delta passengers.
Quote:
Originally Posted by johnso29
Are you ok with the numerical increase in more two-class 76 regional aircraft?
That's subjective, but exchanging 70 additional 76 seaters for a net decrease of 148 DCI airframes, block hour ratios, top end scope JV protections, international scope, tightening Alaska scope, tightening the exception all are a very positive trade.
Those are some great questions and answers. Thanks to both of you.
06-15-2012, 07:21 PM
#27
Da Hudge
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: Poodle Whisperer
Posts: 17,473
Good to see you're keeping emotion out of it tonight, Bill. 
06-15-2012, 07:31 PM
#29
Back on TDY
Joined APC: Apr 2008
Position: 747-400 Captain
Posts: 12,487
Great job shiznit. Since the window is open for another two weeks and people can change their votes, I'm sure your emotionally based insults will change a lot of hearts and minds.
Awesome!
Carl
Awesome!
Carl
Last edited by Carl Spackler; 06-15-2012 at 07:44 PM.
06-15-2012, 07:38 PM
#30
veut gagner à la loterie
Joined APC: Apr 2008
Position: Light Chop
Posts: 23,286
Is a potential move from Narita to Haneda addressed in this contract? Does it protect pilot jobs?
If JAL leaves from One World (AMR) and joins SkyTeam (Delta), what happens to our south (5th freedom) flying?
How many top level jobs could we lose? Where do those pilots displace too? Are we not overstaffed now? What happens if the 250-300 pilots expected to retire do not do so?
If JAL leaves from One World (AMR) and joins SkyTeam (Delta), what happens to our south (5th freedom) flying?
How many top level jobs could we lose? Where do those pilots displace too? Are we not overstaffed now? What happens if the 250-300 pilots expected to retire do not do so?
The Haneda/Narita question is mind boggling. Does someone think we have a way to guarantee where Delta flies? The Haneda issue will be figured out in international negotiations between the US government and the Japanese government. How could our contract possible bind those parties to some outcome? What is our Narita/Haneda protection today?
If JAL joins Skyteam then we will have a stronger position in Japan and in Haneda. If Delta wanted to form a JV with JAL we now have contractual provisions to guarantee Delta pilots a share of the JV. No such protection exists today.
If JAL joins Skyteam then we will have a stronger position in Japan and in Haneda. If Delta wanted to form a JV with JAL we now have contractual provisions to guarantee Delta pilots a share of the JV. No such protection exists today.
Yes. The company still has to maintain 316 slots (use or lose) in NRT, otherwise they can't codeshare across the Pacific. They have to negotiate to go to Haneda.
This is where the new JV language protects us should Delta try to go that route. Delta still has to maintain 316 slots even if JAL were added. The routes may change (as they can now) but Delta pilot flown slots won't.
This is where the new JV language protects us should Delta try to go that route. Delta still has to maintain 316 slots even if JAL were added. The routes may change (as they can now) but Delta pilot flown slots won't.
We'd be telling them they still have to use 316 slots in NRT if they trigger that language in 1.E. 
But seriously, that’s a great addition to protect against potential changes in NRT- but that’s as long as the MEC does not consent to changing the protections. And if there were tectonic shifts in Japan changing how our flying would be done, relief could be allowed in this area right?
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