usmc-sgt

Nice post.

Fins Up

Agree. The vast majority of us who want a CBA aren't "anti-company". We just see the changes that need to be made and we want a better process to be able to work with management to make those changes happen.

Kellwolf

That pretty much sums it up exactly for me. Despite the issues I've heard from friends that are here, I've been trying for years to get hired on here. It finally happened, and I'm happy. That being said, I'd like to work WITH management as well as my fellow pilots to make this a better place for all of us. It IS possible to bring a union on board, keep the nimbleness in place we'll need to take advantage of growth opportunities and keep the business successful for management, pilots, FAs, AO agents and all the business partners involved. A union does not necessarily mean we hate management, it simply means we want a guarantee that the company won't grow/profit by taking advantage of us.

gloopy

Probably answered a zillion times by now, but AT's scope/merger/frag language was their old in house language. ALPA merger policy applied, and even that is limited, and SWAPA well, wasn't ALPA, and was much, much more powerful. In addition to that, SWA management was all about helping their bigger more influential pilot group come out ahead.

AT didn't get a full relative because they were ALPA. They likely weren't going to get it under any circumstances, although for a while I also over estimated the power of the so called "federal merger law" and was wondering why they didn't just "go for it" but as it turns out there's many ways to navigate that little speed bump, especially if a larger more powerful pilot group and management team are willing to work together to some degree to do it.

Not sure what you mean by the CMR/PCL comments. CMR was a high cost albatross that lead to rapidly worsening death spiral of shrinkage and progressively higher unit costs. The DL TA, despite its flaws in other areas and even in the way it went about doing it, reduced block hours and net seats to the very flawed and anti labor DCI "C scale" system of outcourcing.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't JB, inc now have the ability to outsource a certain percentage of ASM's in 70-something seaters to the lowest bidder off the JB seniority list? They aren't doing it yet, but they just recently agreed to allow to do it. If and when that is ever implimented, it will be every bit as damaging to JB "mainline" as it will be to the carriers fighting for scraps by undercutting each other to get, and to keep, the flying that is performed off list in the first place.

PCL was a similar situation. The low bidder RFP ACMI industry only works with perpetual juniority and "churn" in the long run. ALPA carriers allow that mess. But then again so do some in house unions. And so do some non union pilot groups. JB pilots even recently "voted" for it, so to speak.

Bluedriver

No the 5 documents do not allow 70 seat outsourcing. Not even 50 seat jets.

benzoate

Wrong.

It does and it allows jetblue to fly similar size aircraft on our routes for a different company.

I cannot stress this to you enough. Email your PVC rep and get the legal interpretation of section 15. What Jetblue told you in emails, mailers and pamphlets during the last union drive is absolutely false.

Again, email your rep and get the legal interpretation.

Bluetruthpilots.com

“Farming out flying” is a way for an airline to collect direct or indirect revenue. Codeshares and interline agreements provide indirect revenue in that they allow the passenger an opportunity to fly on our airline by first flying on another airline, then maybe switching to ours. To create direct revenue, an airline company (in our case, JetBlue Airways) might purchase or create another airline (for example, Caribbean Blue) which is technically independent of the original airline, but is generating revenue for the parent company. This allows the parent company to “whipsaw” between carriers that are operated or controlled by a single entity. Any flying that is “given” to another carrier (Caribbean Blue) that generates revenue for the controlling company (JetBlue Airways) means that you do not necessarily have access to that revenue in the form of improved pay, benefit, retirement or bonuses. Furthermore, the ability to improve your lifestyle by transitioning from one aircraft to another (Cessna 402 to E-190 to A-320 to A-330 to A-380) is inhibited because the carriers are technically independent, operating separately under different work rules and contracts despite being owned or controlled by a single entity. A by-product of industry deregulation has been “whipsawing”, a norm among the regionals, but also a technique used between mainline and regional carriers (AMR and American Eagle). That said, the ability for management to “whipsaw” begins with pilots allowing such an activity through their contract. Many of us believe that Section 15, as a whole, gives the company explicit permission to do so and explains why there was a “rush” by the ELT for pilot group approval after the union vote last year.

Some opinions indicate that Sections 15 (a) and (b) are designed to limit the company’s ability to whipsaw—the question is to what extent? Many of us, to include the few industry lawyers who have been able to review our PEAs, believe that Section 15(a) specifically opens us up to a potential whipsaw without triggering Section 15(c). Section 15(c) depends on what happens in Section 15(a), which together defines what the resulting controlling or affiliated entities might look like after a transactional event- are they independent airlines or one airline? So, if Section 15(a) does NOT apply, then Section 15(c) does NOT apply either. Within Section 15(a), JB could purchase, or be a partner with, another carrier without triggering Section 15(c) because Section 15(a) has convenient loopholes relative to defining how JB might “own” or “control” an acquired airline (or NOT “own” or NOT “control” an acquired airline). There are at least two examples where the purchased carrier could fail to meet JB “ownership” criteria or in which JB might not “control” the purchased carrier; therefore, Section 15(c)’s whipsaw prevention would also NOT be applicable.

The first case is if JB purchases less than 30% of another carrier and the acquired partial ownership does NOT trigger an “affiliation”. Some of us believe this will allow JetBlue to “farm out” flying:

“…if the Airline directly or indirectly makes a strategic investment in a previously unaffiliated Entity constituting less than thirty percent of that unaffiliated Entity’s ownership interest, such unaffiliated Entity shall not be construed to be an Affiliate of the Airline”.

JB would not “own” the airline in this scenario, thus Section 15(c) is not triggered and merging of pilot lists is not required. Given that JetBlue is not the owner, what type of scenario exists where flying could be given to the airline in which JetBlue Airways has partial ownership? Let’s imagine that there exists a “Peterson Group” which could be 71% owners of the acquired airline and they agree to “partner” with JetBlue Airways who has the 29% of the remaining interest of the newly acquired and named Peterson Airways (formally American Eagle). Peterson Group could contract with JetBlue Airways to run Peterson Airways for them. Under this scenario, the pilot group could be a victim of “whipsaw” where JetBlue and the Peterson Group devise a method for distributing flying where costs are minimized—to include labor costs! Where have we seen this before? Republic did this for years BEFORE the five regional airlines were able to acquire ALPA contracts.

The second case is if JB purchases more than 30% interest, yet still does NOT “control” the acquired airline:

“…if the Airline directly or indirectly makes a strategic investment in a previously unaffiliated Entity constituting more than thirty percent of that unaffiliated Entity’s ownership interest, the unaffiliated Entity shall only be construed to be an Affiliate of the Airline if the Airline exercises Control of the unaffiliated Entity following such strategic investment.”

Under this condition, by NOT “controlling” the acquired airline, JetBlue could actually be the senior partner or have majority interest in the acquired airline, and avoid merging operations. The key in this scenario is the word “control”, which is explained in the subsequent paragraph. When one evaluates the “control” definitions, JetBlue has enough latitude to purchase an airline, but allow it to operate independently of us (JetBlue Airways), as a stand-alone airline, avoiding merging of operations and merging of seniority lists.

For example, JB could purchase all of Frontier and let Frontier operate independently under the “Frontier” flag, as a wholly owned subsidiary of JB (Live TV is a “wholly owned subsidiary of JetBlue”). By retaining the former Frontier operations and scheduling systems, providing only some “suggestions” on their route and growth, JetBlue does NOT “control” the airline. ALL definitions of “control” in Section 15 (a) can be avoided by: (1) overtly keeping the Frontier Denver-based system operations in place to run the Frontier airline; (2) allowing the majority of Frontier’s ELT and senior officers to be retained; (3) ensuring that the majority of management services are still run by Frontier—capacity planning, financial planning, strategic planning, marketing, sales, technical ops, flight ops AND human resources; and (4) retaining the majority of Frontier’s BOD, adding a few JB officers, similar to how Lufthansa sits on our board. In short, JetBlue Airways owns the acquired airline but would not physically “control” the acquired airline, thereby NOT triggering pilot list integration.

One more scenario—what happens IF JetBlue Airways purchases EXACTLY 30% of another airline? Because our contract deals with “less than 30%” and “greater than 30%”, there is a scenario where the Peterson Group owns exactly 70% of Frontier, JetBlue the remaining 30%, where JB runs the acquired airline for the senior partner and is not obligated to be concerned with whipsawing flying or seniority list integration.

So, we’ve seen that there are examples where Section 15(a) would NOT trigger Section 15(c). So what happens if JB does in fact comply with Section 15(a) and Section 15(c) is triggered, are there any other limitations or surprises we need to be aware of? In fact, Section 15(c) provides examples of how JetBlue can AVOID seniority lists integration:

“…the Airline will arrange for the integration of the two carriers’ seniority lists in accordance with the method of seniority integration set forth in Sections 15(j)(i)-(viii) herein unless if (a) JB purchases a 50-seat or less airline OR (b) the purchased airline flies 10% or less of the company’s total ASM.

The question asked before the 5-doc signature expiration date was whether this meant BOTH of these had to apply to trigger the SLI—the company’s non-lawyer CPs, leadership members and pro-management pilots kept telling us that both conditions had to apply, whereas industry lawyers advised many of us that the use of “or” means either condition may be used to AVOID seniority list integration. Also, the JetBlue legal department did NOT issue an explanation on this question! This means JB could purchase Cape Air (a “50-seat or less airline”), leave them as a stand-alone, flying all short-haul routes between Florida and the islands, inter-island, and interior mainland northeast routes which might add up to more than 10% ASM. Another example might be that JB purchases North American and lets them fly international routes in/out of JFK and BOS as a stand-alone, restricting North American ASM to 10% of total JetBlue Airways ASM. The key to these possibilities is that the word “or” was used, allowing the company latitude to purchase small aircraft or a limited-number, large-aircraft airline without the current JetBlue Airway merging lists. Sandy’s chart does NOT include these options and also gives false examples that do NOT qualify for SLI!

Columbia

While I agree B6 needs a union, don't kid yourself by thinking having a union guarantees the company won't take advantage of you. Heck, your union might even take advantage of you.

cyrcadian

So, question for the masses: If we vote in a union (which I hope we do) our current situation freezes. Everything from work rules to pay will maintain status quo. Is this correct?

Pretty sure I know the answer to this question already.

Kellwolf

True, however a CBA limits the ways the company could take advantage of you. For example, if health care is in the CBA then there can't be any changes without input. Same with scheduling issues. Of course, there's always gonna be a loophole or twelve.

And true on the union standpoint. All the more reason to pay attention to who we elect to certain positions.

Bluedriver

You mean through code sharing? Like every ALPA legacy airline aready does?

Either way, our PEA does not specifically allow outsourcing RJs or 50 or 70 seats in the traditional sense that all legacy contracts do. So his statement was incorrect.

However, I agree we need a union.