Northwest A330 Hong Kong to Toyko
06-29-2009, 11:14 AM
#21
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Posts: 292
Call it what you want but something smells fishy. From the 2nd post, conditions were 10am, FL390 mostly clear, with areas of heavy rain and tops at 410. Now I ask you, if you were at 390 on a mostly clear day, would you keep heading for that rain cloud directly ahead? Or would you ask for a vector?
06-29-2009, 12:51 PM
#22
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Posts: 829
No vectors when dealing with Oceanic control. They may or may not have asked for deviations and they may or may not have been approved. I have flown with many who would not deviate in a non-radar environment without coordination from control.
They may or may not have seen the cloud tops - although it may have been mostly clear, they could have been running in some of that haze that forms in the vicinity of convective activity. Depending on the water content in the tops, they may not have shown on the radar either.
They may or may not have seen the cloud tops - although it may have been mostly clear, they could have been running in some of that haze that forms in the vicinity of convective activity. Depending on the water content in the tops, they may not have shown on the radar either.
06-29-2009, 01:11 PM
#24
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Nov 2006
Position: 767 FO
Posts: 8,047
I think a structural failure caused by excessive dynamic loading is a result of anything but stabilized flight!
The assumption (from the AA flight and probably this one too since the focus is on the rudder limiter being given inaccurate inputs with a pitot malfunction) is that the vert stab is lost due to excessive side-loading caused by a yaw condition combined with excessive rudder input.
The initial rudder input creates a yaw condition, the opposite instantaneous rudder input starts the yaw movement in the opposite direction but the resulting side-loading on the vert stab structure causes it to separate from the aircraft.
The condition of the aircraft at the immediate moment of separation is at least a steady yaw condition and more likely a transition in yaw, with the nose position of the aircraft certainly reacting to the loss of the yaw input that was being created by the previously intact vert stab.
Any aileron input after the failure causes adverse yaw.
The assumption (from the AA flight and probably this one too since the focus is on the rudder limiter being given inaccurate inputs with a pitot malfunction) is that the vert stab is lost due to excessive side-loading caused by a yaw condition combined with excessive rudder input.
The initial rudder input creates a yaw condition, the opposite instantaneous rudder input starts the yaw movement in the opposite direction but the resulting side-loading on the vert stab structure causes it to separate from the aircraft.
The condition of the aircraft at the immediate moment of separation is at least a steady yaw condition and more likely a transition in yaw, with the nose position of the aircraft certainly reacting to the loss of the yaw input that was being created by the previously intact vert stab.
Any aileron input after the failure causes adverse yaw.
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