AA 757 rolls off the end in ORD
09-27-2008, 11:01 AM
#41
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Posts: 2,918
Did I miss anything, Cycle?
10-13-2008, 07:59 PM
#42
Snakes & Nape
Joined APC: Nov 2006
Position: B-767 Captain
Posts: 775
I'm Relieved
aa73:
Boy, I'm relieved. I thought I was going to have to self-disclose and go back to recurrent as I've been negligent in pre-flighting the pitot static system on the 75 and 76.
As for the "story" ....do we want to hear it in class ?
Have a Budvar and G'Day Mates
Boy, I'm relieved. I thought I was going to have to self-disclose and go back to recurrent as I've been negligent in pre-flighting the pitot static system on the 75 and 76.
As for the "story" ....do we want to hear it in class ?
Have a Budvar and G'Day Mates
10-20-2008, 11:25 AM
#44
On Reserve
Joined APC: Aug 2006
Position: Washed up Rock Star
Posts: 14
Sh8t happends!
Thes guys were both x TWA and I have flown with each of them. They are both well above your average line pilot in their job performance. There are some peculiarities surrounding the course of events, and investigation is ongoing.
Armchair quarterbacking is ok "IF" you have all the facts (which are still not out)
Reino...............out
Armchair quarterbacking is ok "IF" you have all the facts (which are still not out)
Reino...............out
10-24-2008, 04:47 PM
#45
Snakes & Nape
Joined APC: Nov 2006
Position: B-767 Captain
Posts: 775
NTSB Preliminary Report
The NTSB has issued a preliminary report on American Airlines flight 268 from SEA to JFK on September 22, 2008. The aircraft was N197AN, a B-757-223 and diverted into Chicago O'Hare, landing on runway 22R. Without going into great detail or reproducing the entire report here, it is my opinion that the crew did an excellent job in handling a series of serious electrical anomalies.
Post flight maintenance investigation revealed that the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay had failed. In effect, the crew was faced with serious pitch control problems on final approach with the elevator and standby elevator pitch trim systems inoperative, the thrust reversers and spoilers not functioning, there was some doubt whether the manual spoilers had deployed after landing and the brakes and accululator did not "perform well". To compound the problem, with an "electrical aircraft", once an electrical anomaly begins, one never can be sure exactly what is powered and functioning and what isn't. The United B-767 flight from Sao Paulo to Miami a couple of years ago was similiar. The crew followed the QRH and contacted maintenance but no one knew what systems were powered and which ones were not. They ended up shooting a stand-by (DC) power approach into Bogota, Columbia at 3:00 am. Not a pretty picture !!
All in all, you would not see this scenario in the simulator during a PC even if the instructor was a real &^@!*& much less in "real life". I think they did a very commendable job and were able to keep a very serious situation from becoming a real disaster.
Good job Mates and my hats off to you !!
Post flight maintenance investigation revealed that the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay had failed. In effect, the crew was faced with serious pitch control problems on final approach with the elevator and standby elevator pitch trim systems inoperative, the thrust reversers and spoilers not functioning, there was some doubt whether the manual spoilers had deployed after landing and the brakes and accululator did not "perform well". To compound the problem, with an "electrical aircraft", once an electrical anomaly begins, one never can be sure exactly what is powered and functioning and what isn't. The United B-767 flight from Sao Paulo to Miami a couple of years ago was similiar. The crew followed the QRH and contacted maintenance but no one knew what systems were powered and which ones were not. They ended up shooting a stand-by (DC) power approach into Bogota, Columbia at 3:00 am. Not a pretty picture !!
All in all, you would not see this scenario in the simulator during a PC even if the instructor was a real &^@!*& much less in "real life". I think they did a very commendable job and were able to keep a very serious situation from becoming a real disaster.
Good job Mates and my hats off to you !!
10-24-2008, 10:27 PM
#47
Line Holder
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Position: CRJ Captain
Posts: 38
True. Here's the report, it isn't that long:
NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of American Airlines, Inc. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
Incident occurred Monday, September 22, 2008 in Chicago, IL
Aircraft: BOEING 757, registration: N197AN
Injuries: 192 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223, N197AN, operated by American Airlines as flight 268, diverted to Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) due to electrical system anomalies. During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. There were no injuries to the 2 flight crew, 5 flight attendants, or 185 passengers. The domestic passenger flight was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, at 0802 pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York.
While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). The flight crew then referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) regarding the AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, "The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes." The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH.
Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. The airplane was over western Michigan and the captain elected to turn around and divert to ORD. Also, the flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems. A short time later, the cabin crew was informed that they were diverting to ORD. One of the flight attendants then walked through the aisle informing the passengers of the unscheduled landing at Chicago.
While aligned with the runway to land, the flightcrew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution. As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flightcrew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flightcrew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flightcrew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees. The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass.
As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway.
After coming to a stop, the flightcrew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs.
Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light which the flight crew received.
With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.
---------------
Source:http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...07X03940&key=1
NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of American Airlines, Inc. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
Incident occurred Monday, September 22, 2008 in Chicago, IL
Aircraft: BOEING 757, registration: N197AN
Injuries: 192 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223, N197AN, operated by American Airlines as flight 268, diverted to Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) due to electrical system anomalies. During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. There were no injuries to the 2 flight crew, 5 flight attendants, or 185 passengers. The domestic passenger flight was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, at 0802 pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York.
While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). The flight crew then referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) regarding the AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, "The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes." The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH.
Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. The airplane was over western Michigan and the captain elected to turn around and divert to ORD. Also, the flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems. A short time later, the cabin crew was informed that they were diverting to ORD. One of the flight attendants then walked through the aisle informing the passengers of the unscheduled landing at Chicago.
While aligned with the runway to land, the flightcrew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution. As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flightcrew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flightcrew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flightcrew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees. The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass.
As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway.
After coming to a stop, the flightcrew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs.
Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light which the flight crew received.
With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.
---------------
Source:http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...07X03940&key=1
10-24-2008, 11:17 PM
#48
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2007
Position: The IPA EB speaks for me
Posts: 530
The Sioux City crew, class of 2008, but no bloodshed, so no real news. Maybe a plaque at some industry convention in a year... Don't plan on a speaking tour, though....
Lovely industry and media balance. Where's my unmanned protection clause? I'm sure a remote operator would have done as well, cargo, pax or combat....
Lovely industry and media balance. Where's my unmanned protection clause? I'm sure a remote operator would have done as well, cargo, pax or combat....
10-25-2008, 12:15 AM
#49
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Mar 2008
Position: DAL Pilot
Posts: 1,133
Ya... the media was all over the report when it came out that an airplane rolled off the runway. Where's the media now to report how the crew brought a severely disabled aircraft in safely? We wouldn't want to report that! It might look like we really aren't overpaid whiny workers! 
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