Test pilot at center of 737 Max...
08-11-2020, 04:34 PM
#31
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2005
Position: Under the Frog
Posts: 1,125
Aaaaaaand still a piece of junk.
Loud, cramped, archaic, but yeah. Fanbois gonna fanboi I guess.
🤷♂️
By using your convoluted logic, I must only conclude that you’re a Flat Earther, because clearly as you’ve never been to orbit you’ve never seen the curve.
Maybe someday someone will invent books and stuff where one can read up on these things, and not have to rely on first hand experiences to understand how the world works.
That would be an amazing time for humanity. Could you imagine? The things we could learn by reading about others experiences.
Incredible. Hope to see it someday.
08-11-2020, 04:42 PM
#32
Logbook...
Joined APC: Sep 2008
Posts: 416
Wowzers. Still trying to catch that train, a year and a half after it already left the station.
Yeah. Poor piloting skills by the short funny brown people is why the MAX remains grounded some 18 months later...
GMAFB.
But like you said yourself; blame someone else.
Anyone got a dead horse lying around? Mine’s missing.
Yeah. Poor piloting skills by the short funny brown people is why the MAX remains grounded some 18 months later...
GMAFB.
But like you said yourself; blame someone else.
Anyone got a dead horse lying around? Mine’s missing.
08-11-2020, 07:27 PM
#33
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Oct 2013
Posts: 231
08-14-2020, 08:50 AM
#34
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2008
Posts: 862
Every 737 ever built has two AoA vanes. The optional "equipment" was an AoA display. Relatively few transport jets have AoA displays as no procedures rely on them.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
08-15-2020, 10:34 AM
#35
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2017
Position: 175 CA
Posts: 1,285
Every 737 ever built has two AoA vanes. The optional "equipment" was an AoA display. Relatively few transport jets have AoA displays as no procedures rely on them.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
Thanks for the narrative. Good information.
08-15-2020, 12:25 PM
#36
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2011
Position: A320 FO
Posts: 976
Every 737 ever built has two AoA vanes. The optional "equipment" was an AoA display. Relatively few transport jets have AoA displays as no procedures rely on them.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
08-15-2020, 03:54 PM
#37
Banned
Joined APC: Apr 2017
Posts: 627
Every 737 ever built has two AoA vanes. The optional "equipment" was an AoA display. Relatively few transport jets have AoA displays as no procedures rely on them.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
737s traditionally conducted lower-than-standard approaches using a dual-autopilot fail-passive autoland system. Since it was a fail-passive system it was limited to a 50' DH (the old CAT IIIa) where you must see to land at 50'. Fail-active systems (the old CAT IIIb) had no DH and there was no requirement for the pilot to see anything before touchdown. At some point during the NGs long run, Boeing added an option HUD system which allowed hand-flown CAT III approaches to lower minimums than the fail-passive autoland system. The HUD had an AoA display so most (all?) of the airlines that bought the HUD option also bought the AoA display. Many airlines with large existing 737 fleets opted to remain with the autoland system, instead of retrofitting HUDs on their existing aircraft. Those aircraft were ordered without the AoA display.
All MAX aircraft were suppose to have an "AOA DISAGREE" message that would appear under the altimeter tape on each primary flight display when the two AoA indicators disagrees by more than set amounts. In the investigation after the crashes, it was found that a bug in the software prevented the "AOA DISAGREE" message from working on airplanes that lacked the AoA display option.
I think all 737 pilots have been through the expanded runaway stabilizer training by now. I did it (twice) within the past year. In that training we fly significantly out-of-trim airplanes through a range of airspeed and power settings. The airplane is controllable, and trim-able, even at Vmo and full power. It doesn't become uncontrollable until well into the barber pole.
08-16-2020, 05:31 AM
#39
weekends off? Nope...
Joined APC: Apr 2014
Posts: 2,016
oh you mean the “rebuilt” AOA vane Lyon Air got from some now-closed repair shop in Florida and then installed it on the accident aircraft without proper calibration checks and then fraudulent pictures were used to document said repair job (fraudulent as evidenced by the time displayed in the clock in pic not matching the logbook time entires)? No, Lyon’s maintenance was top notch. That accident aircraft flew for several minutes with the compromised system malfunctioning. It wasn’t until the FO took over the controls that the aircraft almost immediately crashed.
08-16-2020, 07:58 PM
#40
On Reserve
Joined APC: Aug 2020
Position: Why don't you have a seat right over there.
Posts: 14
oh you mean the “rebuilt” AOA vane Lyon Air got from some now-closed repair shop in Florida and then installed it on the accident aircraft without proper calibration checks and then fraudulent pictures were used to document said repair job (fraudulent as evidenced by the time displayed in the clock in pic not matching the logbook time entires)? No, Lyon’s maintenance was top notch. That accident aircraft flew for several minutes with the compromised system malfunctioning. It wasn’t until the FO took over the controls that the aircraft almost immediately crashed.
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