In the courtroom.
01-20-2024, 08:07 AM
#921
The REAL Bluedriver
Joined APC: Sep 2011
Position: Airbus Capt
Posts: 6,920
Our internal email gave the distinct impression of a reluctant appeal. I truly feel for the Spirit group. They're getting F'd over in all this. They most likely would have been fine with a Frontier merger. And now we have to wait for this damn appeal process to play out before we can open up Section 6....while we continue to operate on a 2018 contract. Fun times.
01-20-2024, 11:05 AM
#923
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2022
Posts: 869
01-20-2024, 03:21 PM
#924
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Sep 2014
Posts: 505
ch7, ch11 whatever , doesn't matter with this management. After the town hall and b6 email stating the appeal, I have no faith what so ever.
01-20-2024, 05:45 PM
#925
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2007
Position: A320
Posts: 1,316
reading into the judge’s decision as it relates to the official complaint per the DOJ, simply, a rise in price doesn’t constitute as “harm to the consumer”. The harm that deems this particular merger unlawful, is the fact that the increase in price, based on the clear and obvious metrics of the JetBlue model and planned elimination of the budget Spirit option, results in the inability for some consumers to afford the same flight that they were once able to pay for prior to the transaction.
It would appear as if even though the defense stated there would be some kind of benefit to the consumer as a combined company, the burden was on them to prove how this would materialize. In which it could not be articulated to overcome the legal doubt.
01-20-2024, 07:00 PM
#926
The REAL Bluedriver
Joined APC: Sep 2011
Position: Airbus Capt
Posts: 6,920
I‘m definitely no business guru and certainly not one of those dudes that does a really good job of making it sound like I know what I’m talking about on APC (when I really don’t - you know who you are) but……
reading into the judge’s decision as it relates to the official complaint per the DOJ, simply, a rise in price doesn’t constitute as “harm to the consumer”. The harm that deems this particular merger unlawful, is the fact that the increase in price, based on the clear and obvious metrics of the JetBlue model and planned elimination of the budget Spirit option, results in the inability for some consumers to afford the same flight that they were once able to pay for prior to the transaction.
It would appear as if even though the defense stated there would be some kind of benefit to the consumer as a combined company, the burden was on them to prove how this would materialize. In which it could not be articulated to overcome the legal doubt.
reading into the judge’s decision as it relates to the official complaint per the DOJ, simply, a rise in price doesn’t constitute as “harm to the consumer”. The harm that deems this particular merger unlawful, is the fact that the increase in price, based on the clear and obvious metrics of the JetBlue model and planned elimination of the budget Spirit option, results in the inability for some consumers to afford the same flight that they were once able to pay for prior to the transaction.
It would appear as if even though the defense stated there would be some kind of benefit to the consumer as a combined company, the burden was on them to prove how this would materialize. In which it could not be articulated to overcome the legal doubt.
I'll wait when you look for those references.
The antitrust law in question is intended to prevent a substantial reduction in competition in the market, which the DOJ said was city pairs. And the broader context of the law, was to prevent the creation or enhancement of monopoly power.
The monopoly power issue is quite clearly irrelevant in the context of JB+NK. Now, if you want to talk about the ULCC segment as being relevant, as you seem to argue in your post, now it would seem F9+NK would creat a near monopoly or the enhancement of monopoly power in the ULCC segment... Most other ULCCs are almost irrelevant when viewed against F9+NK, and you can't see how that would create a neat monopoly or enhancement of monopoly power in that segment? Now for the record, I don't believe the Clayton act was intended to parse market segments from the broader "relevant market ", but this judge did add that consideration to the reasoning behind his ruling (which is one area that I believe is ripe for appeal) and you have blessed that view with your post.
As for the "substantial reduction in competition in the relevant market", F9 and NK have CONSIDERABLY more overlap than JB+NK. So a substantially larger number of relevant markets would have competition reduced with an F9 tie up.
But you will set us straight with your Clayton act references to pricing and market segmentation.
01-20-2024, 07:15 PM
#927
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2021
Posts: 378
Can’t expect JB to cough off a 1/2 Billion because Spirit mgmt said they have a plan and really they just want the break up fee.
The narrative is whatever they say it is.
Judge can use them as scape goat and flip the decision.
01-20-2024, 07:36 PM
#928
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2021
Posts: 378
Delta can have more than 1 flight a day from ATL-DTW, if doesn’t mean each departure competes with the prior one.
Spirit and frontier can each have 200 seats on a market that supports 400 seats a day and it looks like competition, but it isn’t.
01-20-2024, 07:54 PM
#929
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Sep 2017
Position: NK CA
Posts: 840
From the Clayton act, which this ruling was supposed to be based on, can you show me where it talks about "price" or the consideration of the "business model (in other words, what segment of the industry the company exists, ULCC as an example)"?
I'll wait when you look for those references.
The antitrust law in question is intended to prevent a substantial reduction in competition in the market, which the DOJ said was city pairs. And the broader context of the law, was to prevent the creation or enhancement of monopoly power.
The monopoly power issue is quite clearly irrelevant in the context of JB+NK. Now, if you want to talk about the ULCC segment as being relevant, as you seem to argue in your post, now it would seem F9+NK would creat a near monopoly or the enhancement of monopoly power in the ULCC segment... Most other ULCCs are almost irrelevant when viewed against F9+NK, and you can't see how that would create a neat monopoly or enhancement of monopoly power in that segment? Now for the record, I don't believe the Clayton act was intended to parse market segments from the broader "relevant market ", but this judge did add that consideration to the reasoning behind his ruling (which is one area that I believe is ripe for appeal) and you have blessed that view with your post.
As for the "substantial reduction in competition in the relevant market", F9 and NK have CONSIDERABLY more overlap than JB+NK. So a substantially larger number of relevant markets would have competition reduced with an F9 tie up.
But you will set us straight with your Clayton act references to pricing and market segmentation.
I'll wait when you look for those references.
The antitrust law in question is intended to prevent a substantial reduction in competition in the market, which the DOJ said was city pairs. And the broader context of the law, was to prevent the creation or enhancement of monopoly power.
The monopoly power issue is quite clearly irrelevant in the context of JB+NK. Now, if you want to talk about the ULCC segment as being relevant, as you seem to argue in your post, now it would seem F9+NK would creat a near monopoly or the enhancement of monopoly power in the ULCC segment... Most other ULCCs are almost irrelevant when viewed against F9+NK, and you can't see how that would create a neat monopoly or enhancement of monopoly power in that segment? Now for the record, I don't believe the Clayton act was intended to parse market segments from the broader "relevant market ", but this judge did add that consideration to the reasoning behind his ruling (which is one area that I believe is ripe for appeal) and you have blessed that view with your post.
As for the "substantial reduction in competition in the relevant market", F9 and NK have CONSIDERABLY more overlap than JB+NK. So a substantially larger number of relevant markets would have competition reduced with an F9 tie up.
But you will set us straight with your Clayton act references to pricing and market segmentation.
01-20-2024, 08:43 PM
#930
In a land of unicorns
Joined APC: Apr 2014
Position: Whale FO
Posts: 6,601
The antitrust law in question is intended to prevent a substantial reduction in competition in the market, which the DOJ said was city pairs. And the broader context of the law, was to prevent the creation or enhancement of monopoly power.
But you will set us straight with your Clayton act references to pricing and market segmentation.
But you will set us straight with your Clayton act references to pricing and market segmentation.
“Congress used the words ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ ... to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.”
"Section 7 does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition has caused higher prices in the affected market. All that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future."
Guilty unless proven innocent.
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