Ukraine conflict
#511
I think we've already "won", at least as far as NATO, the west, and the liberal democratic world order is concerned. Vlad won't be doing this chit again any time soon, and other potential like-minded imperialists have been discouraged, if not deterred. At this point it's just about closing it out on the most favorable terms we/UR can get.
That’s going to put paid to any realistic chance of containing the nuclear ambitions of a number of bad actors and potential bad actors.
And international sanctions, don’t seem nearly as effective as the State Department insists they are, especially when you have the majority of the population of the world not complying with them. (Think China, India, much of Africa, even countries in So. America https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/30/ukra...ing-world.html).
The good thing to come out of this is, yeah, you MIGHT get NATO countries that have been underfunding their own militaries for a half century to start paying a little more attention to their defense budgets, but that’s been promised many times before. MAYBE they will actually do it this time, if that doesn’t once again get subsumed in their domestic agendas. Time will tell, but the expectations need to be tempered by the poor historical performance.
One thing that this unequivocally shows, however, that in a non nuclear fight, the defense industrial base really matters. The West presently has a technological edge, but the ability of other countries (rhymes with China) to do industrial espionage and then build or reverse engineer that technology is a real one and right now the actual capabilities in building heavy stuff - like shipyards and munitions plants - clearly goes to the countries that don’t hinder themselves greatly with EPA and OSHA regs, sad to say.
#512
That's a very broad spectrum, from milquetoast statements of support backed with nothing tangible, to nuking moscow.
The question is where on the spectrum should we be, and there's plenty of room for different opinions within a very reasonable range.
No tangible support, or declaring war on RU are fairly obvious extreme ends. I don't think anyone would advocate the latter, and only russian agents provocateur would advocate the former.
The practical problem with the former is it could eventually lead to a worse conflict which we *don't* have a choice in (ex. Poland, article V).
The question is where on the spectrum should we be, and there's plenty of room for different opinions within a very reasonable range.
No tangible support, or declaring war on RU are fairly obvious extreme ends. I don't think anyone would advocate the latter, and only russian agents provocateur would advocate the former.
The practical problem with the former is it could eventually lead to a worse conflict which we *don't* have a choice in (ex. Poland, article V).
#513
In a land of unicorns
Joined APC: Apr 2014
Position: Whale FO
Posts: 6,633
#514
Jeez, knock it off guys. There's a wide spectrum here and none of us know with certainty what the best answer is. Unlike some other APC threads everybody on this one seems to have some relevant background and rational insight, no need to get personal.
#515
I don’t think the Ukraine can count on NATOs biggest European economy to provide a lot more help.
Germany’s military cannot completely fill its existing gaps by 2030, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius was quoted as saying, as Berlin seeks to revamp its armed forces after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine following decades of neglect.
“We all know that the existing gaps cannot be completely closed by 2030 … It will take years. Everyone is aware of that,” Pistorius said in an interview with Welt am Sonntag newspaper published on Saturday (Apr 1).
Already worn down by decades of underinvestment since the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr is in even worse shape than a year ago given weapons and munitions donated to Ukraine have mostly not yet been replaced, say experts.
Pistorius rejected further arms deliveries to Ukraine from the Bundeswehr stocks beyond the announced commitments.
“To put it bluntly, like other nations, we have a limited inventory. As federal defence minister, I cannot give everything away,” he said.
The minister, who was appointed earlier this year, said increasing the defence budget to reach the NATO spending target of 2 per cent of national output, from currently around 1.5 per cent, was his highest priority.
“If that is then set in motion at the end of the (legislative) period, then I would be satisfied,” he added
“We all know that the existing gaps cannot be completely closed by 2030 … It will take years. Everyone is aware of that,” Pistorius said in an interview with Welt am Sonntag newspaper published on Saturday (Apr 1).
Already worn down by decades of underinvestment since the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr is in even worse shape than a year ago given weapons and munitions donated to Ukraine have mostly not yet been replaced, say experts.
Pistorius rejected further arms deliveries to Ukraine from the Bundeswehr stocks beyond the announced commitments.
“To put it bluntly, like other nations, we have a limited inventory. As federal defence minister, I cannot give everything away,” he said.
The minister, who was appointed earlier this year, said increasing the defence budget to reach the NATO spending target of 2 per cent of national output, from currently around 1.5 per cent, was his highest priority.
“If that is then set in motion at the end of the (legislative) period, then I would be satisfied,” he added
#516
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Mar 2016
Position: Cl65 left
Posts: 175
#517
#518
#519
If NATO needs to depend on Germany or Italy…
…they are hurting. And Germany has the highest GDP in NATO outside of the US. From Deutsch Welle:
Italy - another of the countries with a larger GDP in NATO, finds their forces even somewhat more constrained by past underfunding and political decisions:
https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/to...lian-military/
What the Ukraine war is truly doing us showing how decades of underfunding and neglect by the major non-US NATO countries are now coming home to roost, with hollowed out forces not really ready to defend their own countries, far less to help out the Ukraine.
The German Bundeswehr is falling short of its goal to boost the number of its personnel and must focus on recruitment, the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, Eva Högl, told Funk Media Group in an interview published Sunday.
"The Defense Ministry is pursuing the target that the Bundeswehr should grow from currently 183,000 soldiers to 203,000 by 2031," Högl said.
"I see that as unattainable," she added.
The warning comes as Germany is looking to massively increase spending on defense to update its armed forces in the wake of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
"The challenge with personnel is even greater than with materiel," she said.
Högl's role as commissioner is to advocate for the rights of soldiers. They can contact her directly if they feel they are being mistreated.
The Bundeswehr has taken a hit in recent years due to scandals highlighting the influence of far-right extremism on a significant number of soldiers, including the sharing of antisemitic remarks in chat groups, singing happy birthday to Adolf Hitler and even some individuals taking part in a far-right plot to overthrow the government.
"The Defense Ministry is pursuing the target that the Bundeswehr should grow from currently 183,000 soldiers to 203,000 by 2031," Högl said.
"I see that as unattainable," she added.
The warning comes as Germany is looking to massively increase spending on defense to update its armed forces in the wake of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Bundeswehr's numerous problems
Högl said the main problem was the high dropout rate of recruits as well as an extensive delay between potential recruits registering their interest and the Bundeswehr career center sending a response, which she said could be as long as a year."The challenge with personnel is even greater than with materiel," she said.
Germany's armed forces face chronic problems
02:43On Saturday, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that he expected shortfalls in funding and equipment for the Bundeswehr to continue beyond 2030, pointing in part to Germany sending equipment from its own stockpiles to Ukraine.Högl's role as commissioner is to advocate for the rights of soldiers. They can contact her directly if they feel they are being mistreated.
The Bundeswehr has taken a hit in recent years due to scandals highlighting the influence of far-right extremism on a significant number of soldiers, including the sharing of antisemitic remarks in chat groups, singing happy birthday to Adolf Hitler and even some individuals taking part in a far-right plot to overthrow the government.
From an operational standpoint, implementing this proactive and more assertive posture requires not only acquiring substantial expeditionary and multi-domain combat capabilities but also developing highly professional armed forces capable of conducting complex high-tempo operations with allies and partners. As noted by the Italian Chief of Staff Adm. Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, investing in the human component and prioritizing necessary training is essential for any fighting force, as without these, “fielded technology is ineffective.” Likewise, defense planning entails a difficult balancing act among readiness, investments, and force size — what Kathleen Hicks calls the “unavoidable iron triangle of painful trade-offs.” The right equilibrium has been a major issue for many European countries, including Italy, especially in a decade characterized by fluctuating defense budgets.
To date, Italy’s modernization efforts have been hampered by an unbalanced distribution of funds among the various segments of the military. In line with a long-standing trend, this year’s personnel expenses will swallow around 60 percent of the defense function’s budget — the second-highest share in NATO after Portugal’s — whereas only 11 percent will go to the operations and maintenance budget. By comparison, major allies such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have a much more balanced expenditure policy, with Paris and Berlin allocating around 40 percent for personnel and London appropriating as little as 31 percent. A more balanced budget means extra resources available for key activities such as training, education, weapons’ testing, and equipment maintenance, which will provide direct benefits in terms of skills, motivation, and readiness. The Ministry of Defense has acknowledgedthe need to address this issue, including through improved cost-efficiency, standardized weapons procurement programs, and cuts in personnel.
High personnel expenditure is partly linked to the limited generational change within the armed forces. In 2020, for instance, the average age in the Italian Army was 38 and 44 for the air force. By contrast, the average age is 31 in the U.K. military and 33 in both France’s armed forces and the Bundeswehr’s. As the likelihood of high-intensity challenges looms, a younger force should become a priority for Italian defense and policy planners.
In Italy’s case, the problems posed by an aging population is exacerbated by an old professional model that, by favoring permanent contracts, has limited rejuvenation and professional turnover while increasing salaries.
To date, Italy’s modernization efforts have been hampered by an unbalanced distribution of funds among the various segments of the military. In line with a long-standing trend, this year’s personnel expenses will swallow around 60 percent of the defense function’s budget — the second-highest share in NATO after Portugal’s — whereas only 11 percent will go to the operations and maintenance budget. By comparison, major allies such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have a much more balanced expenditure policy, with Paris and Berlin allocating around 40 percent for personnel and London appropriating as little as 31 percent. A more balanced budget means extra resources available for key activities such as training, education, weapons’ testing, and equipment maintenance, which will provide direct benefits in terms of skills, motivation, and readiness. The Ministry of Defense has acknowledgedthe need to address this issue, including through improved cost-efficiency, standardized weapons procurement programs, and cuts in personnel.
High personnel expenditure is partly linked to the limited generational change within the armed forces. In 2020, for instance, the average age in the Italian Army was 38 and 44 for the air force. By contrast, the average age is 31 in the U.K. military and 33 in both France’s armed forces and the Bundeswehr’s. As the likelihood of high-intensity challenges looms, a younger force should become a priority for Italian defense and policy planners.
In Italy’s case, the problems posed by an aging population is exacerbated by an old professional model that, by favoring permanent contracts, has limited rejuvenation and professional turnover while increasing salaries.
What the Ukraine war is truly doing us showing how decades of underfunding and neglect by the major non-US NATO countries are now coming home to roost, with hollowed out forces not really ready to defend their own countries, far less to help out the Ukraine.
#520
This is a good thing.
But we've also learned a lot about RU capabilities... if anything that degrades the sense of urgency
In my mind the issue isn't whether NATO can deter/confront RU as a unified entity (they can), but why are we paying for their budget shortfalls? Hopefully the shortfalls improve soon in light of this development.
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