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US, EU, Ukraine slam Russia's nuclear deterrence doctrine

32 minutes ago32 minutes agoThe US, EU and Kyiv all lambasted Russian President Vladimir Putin's "irresponsible" plans to amend the doctrine. The Kremlin meanwhile defended the move, describing it as a warning to the west.

Western allies of Ukraine have condemned Russia's plans to amend its nuclear deterrence doctrine, in a manner which might consider a "massive" aerial attack on Russia supported by a nuclear state as a "joint attack," even if the attacker is a non-nuclear state.

The update was proposed on Wednesday by President Vladimir Putin, who has the right to pass it. It is seen as a clear reference to Ukraine, as Kyiv presses its Western allies to grant it permission to use the long-range weapons they provide to strike deep within Russia.

Putin gave the example of Russia receiving "reliable information of a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border," as a case where Russia might consider nuclear retaliation.

How did the West react?

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken criticized the proposed amendment on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on Thursday.

"It's totally irresponsible, and I think many in the world have spoken clearly about that when he's been rattling the nuclear saber, including China in the past," Blinken said in an interview with MSNBC.

European Union foreign policy spokesman Peter Stano also rejected the plan as "reckless and irresponsible."

"Not for the first time, Putin is playing [a] gamble with his nuclear arsenal," Stano told reporters. "We of course strongly reject these threats."

Kyiv also strongly rejected Putin's proposal.

"Russia has nothing left but nuclear blackmail; it has no other instruments to intimidate the world," Andriy Yermak, head of the president's office, wrote on Telegram on Wednesday evening.

He said attempts to spread fear would not work.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

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Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has deep expertise in nuclear deterrence and the nuclear programs of Russia and China.

He previously served as the Director of Strategic Deterrence Programs at the National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI)—serving US Strategic Command. Prior to joining NSRI, Dr. Lowther served as the director of the department of multi-domain operations (MDO) at the Army Management Staff College (AMSC) where he led efforts to develop MDO education programs in collaboration with an interdisciplinary faculty of engineers and scientists. Prior to this assignment, Dr. Lowther was a Professor of Political Science at the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and taught 21st-century conflict to lieutenant colonels and colonels.

Previously, he served as the founding director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies (SANDS), Kirtland AFB. Dr. Lowther led the school’s academic, professional development, and research efforts.

He also served as the director of the Center for Academic and Professional Journals at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), Maxwell AFB, where he oversaw publication of the Air Force’s professional journals: Strategic Studies Quarterly and Air and Space Power Journal (English, Spanish, Chinese, French). Prior to assuming this position, Dr. Lowther was a research professor at AFRI where he led and participated in studies directed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

He is the author or editor of many books and academic journal articles. Dr. Lowther has published in outlets like the New York Times, Boston Globe, Joint Force Quarterly, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and a variety of other places.

Early in his career, Petty Officer Lowther served in the US Navy aboard the USS RAMAGE (DDG-61), at CINCUSNAVEUR–London, and with the Seabees (NMCB 17).


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