Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on September 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. UkrainianMain Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General KyryloBudanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early 2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years.[1] Budanov noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025, alongside increasing difficulties with military recruitment.[2] Budanov stated that the Russian military is experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts.[3] Recent significant rises in one-time payments to contract military personnel (kontraktniki), with at least 36 Russian federal subjects (regions) reportedly having increased their one-time payments to kontraktniki in 2024 and at least 11 federal subjects paying Russian kontraktniki one million rubles ($11,000) or more, are likely evidence of mounting costs and difficulties with the Russian military's ability to continue recruiting personnel.[4] Budanov also stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, coupled with constant Ukrainian strikes into Russian territories, has demoralized Russian citizens and eroded the Russian public’s perception of Russian invincibility.[5] Budanov assessed that mounting issues will force Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine. Budanov’s assessment implicitly assumes that Western states will maintain support for Ukraine at current levels over the next one to two years. It remains unclear what Putin may do between now and 2026 or how effective Putin’s efforts to offset the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including via foreign partners like Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), will be. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to announcing another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and will likely continue to instruct the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to pursue ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts until such efforts begin to fall far short of operational requirements in Ukraine.[6] Putin maintains the option to call another round of mobilization - as he did in Fall 2022 - despite his desire to avoid having to do so. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is also unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian forces’ combat operations because the Kremlin sees maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative.[7] It remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022, as Russia’s investments to grow Russia’s force generation system, war economy, and international defense relationships have matured over the past two years, and likely will continue to do so through 2026

UkrainianMain Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General KyryloBudanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early 2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years.

Western allies bought roughly $2 billion in fuel made from Russian oil in the first half of 2024, using a sanctions loophole that enables Moscow to pay its soldiers in Ukraine, an upcoming report seen by POLITICO has found.

The analysis, set to be unveiled jointly on Tuesday by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air and the Center for the Study of Democracy, determined that shipments of gasoline, diesel and other products made from Russian crude oil have grown in recent months as a result of imports from just three Turkish refineries.

The imports are technically legal due to a well-known sanctions workaround. While the EU and its Western allies banned nearly all Russian oil imports long ago, countries can still buy fuel of Russian origin if it is first processed in another country, such as Turkey.

According to the report, Turkey — and the Western firms buying from it — is taking increasing advantage of this so-called refining loophole, despite repeated Ukrainian pleas that it be closed.

In the first half of 2024 alone, the EU, U.S., U.K. and other Western allies bought around $2 billion worth of fuel made from Russian oil by the trio of Turkish facilities, the report found. Turkey, meanwhile, has cashed in on discounts of from $5 to $20 per barrel from Moscow, stepping up its purchases from Russia annually by 34 percent in 2023 and a colossal 70 percent this year.

“When the EU imports gasoline from Turkey, it is 10 percent cheaper than it would be from Saudi Arabia,” said Vaibhav Raghunandan, an analyst with the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air. “But those savings aren’t passed on to consumers at all; it’s just companies and traders who benefit. Someone is making a killing from this trade, but it isn’t ordinary people.”

While EU and U.S. policymakers have defended the sanctions arrangement, arguing it deprives Moscow of a “refining premium” on its fuels, the fossil fuel industry remains a lifeline for Russia’s war machine. According to the analysis, the tax revenues collected by Moscow on the fuel sold to Western countries would allow Russia to recruit an additional 6,200 soldiers a month to fight in Ukraine.



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CNN — US military aid packages for Ukraine have been smaller in recent months, as the stockpiles of weapons and equipment that the Pentagon is willing to send Kyiv from its own inventory have dwindled. The shift comes amid concerns about US military readiness being impacted as US arms manufacturers play catchup to the huge demand created by the war against Russia.

The shortage means the Biden administration still has $6 billion in funds available to arm and equip Ukraine, but the Pentagon lacks the inventory it is willing to deliver more than two years into the war, two US officials told CNN.

“It’s about the stockpiles we have on our shelves, what [the Ukrainians] are asking for, and whether we can meet those requests with what we currently have” without impacting readiness, one of the officials said.

The Pentagon has asked Congress for more time to spend that money before it expires at the end of September, according to Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary. It’s a stark reversal from last winter, when the administration was pleading with lawmakers for additional funding to support Ukraine against Russia’s invasion.

“Replenishment is also an issue,” the official said. The US is ramping up production of key items, such as 155 mm ammunition and Patriot missile systems, both to supply Ukraine and to refill US inventories. But it is a yearslong process that won’t quickly meet the surging demand.

Before the war in Ukraine, the US produced approximately 15,000 155 mm artillery shells each month. With new factories and production lines opening, the US is now producing 40,000 shells a month. But it will still take more than a year for the Pentagon to hit its goal of 100,000 shells each month. The process of ramping up production is on schedule, but the process will take years, requiring new facilities, expanded factories and Congress willing to allocate the money.

Ukraine is feeling the impact of the inventory shortages, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky. During a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Germany this month, Zelensky told the US and other allies that deliveries of promised air defense systems were moving too slowly and warned of a “significant” shortfall in vital aid.

In April, Congress gave the Biden administration an additional $13.4 billion to use specifically to send Ukraine weapons and equipment drawn from US stockpiles. But the Defense Department hasn’t been able to use it all because of a lack of corresponding supply that it is willing to part with without risking the US’ own readiness, officials told CNN.

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