Russian forces have made significant tactical advances in the Pokrovsk direction amid reports that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from select areas southeast of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on August 27 confirms that Russian forces have advanced over two kilometers from their last confirmed position into northwestern Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) along Dubinina Street, suggesting that Russian forces additionally hold positions within the central part of the town.[1] A Ukrainian soldier reported in a now-deleted Telegram post that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Novohrodivka, which Russian state media and several Russian milbloggers amplified and used to claim that Russian forces control the majority of the settlement.[2] Additional geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Russian forces have marginally advanced in southeastern Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk and northeast of Novohrodivka) and have seized Kalynove (further southeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Novohrodivka).[3] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces "lost" Marynivka (directly south of Novohrodivka) and that elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) seized Memryk (southeast of Novohrodivka), although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces operating in these settlements.[4] Some Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Mykhailivka (south of Novohrodivka) and are attacking into northeastern Selydove (southwest of Novohrodivka).[5]

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Russia's most combat-capable troops are currently sustaining Russian advances towards Pokrovsk, and Russia's offensive operations are emblematic of the wider Russian theory of victory in Ukraine, premised on seemingly indefinite grinding tactical advances. Russia's continuous and complete prioritization of the Pokrovsk direction will likely impact Russia's overall combat capabilities in Ukraine in the aftermath of any Pokrovsk scenario, especially as the Kremlin tries to balance gains in Pokrovsk with defending against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during a press conference on August 27 that one of Ukraine's main goals in launching the Kursk incursion was to divert Russian forces from critical areas of the front, and that Russia anticipated this goal and is instead concentrating its main efforts and strengthening its presence in the Pokrovsk direction.[8] Syrskyi also reported that Russia has redeployed over 30,000 troops from other unspecified sectors of the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and forecasted that this number will continue to grow while noting that Russia is simultaneously intensifying its efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. Syrskyi's observations cohere with ISW's current assessment that the Russian military command continues to prioritize the Pokrovsk front over pushing Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. ISW has previously noted that ISW has not observed evidence of Russia redeploying units currently engaged near Pokrovsk to Kursk Oblast but has observed evidence of Russia instead deploying reserve units and units from non-critical sectors of the front, which likely accounts for the bulk of the 30,000 troops redeployed to Kursk Oblast that Syrskyi noted.[9] Syrskyi's statements suggest that the Russian military command remains unwilling to redeploy troops currently fighting near Pokrovsk and will continue to prioritize using these relatively more combat-capable troops to secure tactical gains and maintain the initiative in Donetsk Oblast. The apparent continued Russian prioritization of territorial gains near Pokrovsk is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine, which assumes that Russian forces maintain the initiative and pursue a constant grinding war of attrition to outlast Ukraine and Ukraine's partners.

Russian authorities are reportedly offering land in occupied Crimea to Russian citizens in exchange for military service. The Crimean occupation administration announced on August 27 that they would issue free land plots in occupied Crimea to Russian citizens who sign a military service contract with the Russian MoD regardless of the Russian citizen's place of residence.[61] Such incentives were previously offered only to Russian citizens living in Crimea.

AUGUST 30, 2024 4:00 AM CET
BY MARTIN VLADIMIROVMartin Vladimirov is director of the Energy and Climate Program at the Center for the Study of Democracy.

Announcing its plans for what could be called TurkStream 2 on Aug. 21, Turkey finally dropped all pretenses.

According to the country’s energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, the state-owned gas monopoly BOTAŞ would now be able export around 7 to 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas through Bulgaria to Central Europe under a new brand called “Turkish Blend,” mixing gas from various sources.

While Russia is set to have a 40 percent share in this mix, the real amount may well be higher, as Gazprom and BOTAŞ have been working out the details of a Russian gas hub in Turkey since early 2023.

This expansion will make use of the existing European extension of TurkStream, as well as a 2023 agreement between Bulgarian public gas supplier Bulgargaz, Bulgarian system operator Bulgartransgaz and BOTAŞ, which allows the Turkish company to export around 3.6 bcm per year to the EU. And maximizing the TurkStream pipeline network in this way will add another 4 bcm of camouflaged Russian gas exports to Europe.

Just like Russian oil companies sell relabeled oil products to Europe from Turkey, India, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, Europe cannot look away as Gazprom tries to launder Russian gas exports. And along this path, the EU’s decision to ban the trans-shipments of Russian LNG destined for Asia via European ports is a small but crucial step in phasing out Russian gas. But there’s more that could be done.

Despite efforts by major European natural gas consumers to reduce dependence, Russian gas still accounts for 15 percent of the EU’s total gas imports, even overtaking U.S. LNG supply to Europe this year. In simple terms, Europe currently spends twice as much on Russian energy as it gives Ukraine in aid.

Moreover, apart from Russian LNG exports to Europe, natural gas flows through Ukraine and TurkStream are also delivering Russian gas to Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Bulgaria and the Western Balkans. So, to fully cut off the Kremlin from EU-generated gas profits and deprive it of its energy weapon once the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine ceases at the end of 2024, the EU must halt Russian gas transit through TurkStream’s European expansion.

The impact of cutting Russian pipeline gas imports shouldn’t be exaggerated either. Gazprom sales via Turkey and Ukraine make up around 8 percent of total EU gas demand, which could be replaced with global LNG supply, or by reverse flows from saturated markets in Northwestern Europe.

But while the Ukrainian route can be stopped overnight, halting TurkStream will be more challenging. TurkStream not only facilitates continued Russian gas exports, but it also undermines European diversification by flooding the market with discounted gas. And this cheap Russian gas jeopardizes domestic production projects in the Black Sea, while also delaying alternative LNG imports through terminals in Greece, Croatia and Poland, which risks creating stranded assets.

Moreover, the BOTAŞ deal allows Russia to obscure the origins of its gas, providing Gazprom with a new outlet to sell to its clients directly, bypassing Ukraine. As such, these new plans would complete Russia’s goal of circumventing Ukraine for its gas sales to Europe, side-stepping potential sanctions.

Turkey’s lack of obligation to adhere to EU rules further complicates efforts to monitor the gas flow through its borders as well. And there’s even a chance the Turkish-Bulgarian agreement might actually violate EU competition law, as it blocks third-party gas companies’ access to the gas transmission network. Thus, the EU’s antitrust body, DG Competition, has already begun assessing the deal for rules rigging.

Several months after the U.S. approved a significant $61 billion Ukraine aid package, bringing total American aid to $175 billion, the German government is putting the brakes on new military aid to Ukraine as part of a plan to cut spending. This freeze is already in effect and will apply to future funding requests, not previously approved aid.
Berlin had previously decided to halve future military assistance to Ukraine, allocating €4 billion to address other pressing budgetary needs. Ukraine may need to rely more heavily on funding from "European sources" moving forward, according to German Finance Minister Christian Lindner.

These developments are but the latest in a longstanding trend: Berlin never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity at genuine leadership. It's not just Europe that needs Germany to step up; the future of transatlantic relations hinges on whether it can take a defense leadership role in Europe. At stake is the future of the U.S.' relationship with its allies across the Atlantic as Washington looks to free its resources and pivot into Asia—for real this time.

The moment is grim. Following Ukraine's unsuccessful counteroffensive last year, Russia began a slow, steady advance further into the country's territory. In response, Kyiv launched another bold counteroffensive, this time into Russia's Kursk region, aiming to establish a buffer zone within Russian territory. Ukraine may also aim to force Moscow to reallocate troops, thereby slowing the Russian offensive in the east. So far, Moscow has shown reluctance to pull significant numbers from the eastern front, but that could shift with time. Ukraine now confronts a perilous dilemma: whether to pursue territorial gains in Kursk at the potential cost of compromising its already strained position in Donetsk.

​​​​​​​ With the Ukraine war raging on its doorstep and now entering a new phase with the Kursk campaign, Germany's decision to freeze aid to Ukraine is disastrous and short-sighted. It sends the message that Germany doesn't consider the war to be existential, or it expects the United States to shoulder the entire burden of European defense. Even within Europe, if Berlin cuts aid to Ukraine to address its budgetary needs, how can German Chancellor Olaf Scholz expect to succeed in his pleas for more European support for Ukraine? Ukraine urgently needs "a lot of munitions, artillery, tanks, and air defense, especially the Patriot and Iris-T systems from Germany, which will be most helpful," Scholz stated earlier this year. "We will support Ukraine as long as it takes," he promised. Freezing aid contradicts every statement and plea the chancellor has made over the last two years. It would be a self-inflicted wound to Germany's credibility and raise serious questions about its commitment.