Citing intelligence data, the Ukrainian government noted the presence of Special Operations Forces from Belarus, alongside a notable amount of engineering equipment and air defence systems. The deployment is being carried out under the guise of military exercises, raising suspicions of more hostile intentions.

The situation is further complicated by the presence of former mercenaries from the Wagner Group, a notorious private military company previously led by Yevgeny Prigozhin. After Prigozhin’s death, many of the mercenaries associated with Wagner were reportedly transferred to Belarus under agreements brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

This troop build-up comes amid heightened tensions between Ukraine and Belarus. Ukrainian officials have warned that any further hostile actions by the Lukashenko regime would justify a Ukrainian response in self-defence, particularly if Belarusian forces were to cross into Ukrainian territory.

Strategic Distracting Tactic

Ukrainian analysts suggest that the Belarusian manoeuvres may be part of a broader strategy orchestrated by Moscow. The purpose is likely to distract Ukrainian forces from critical battlefronts, particularly in the Donetsk region.

Russia’s military objectives include pushing Ukrainian troops out of the contested Kursk region by early October, as per orders reportedly issued by President Vladimir Putin. This would require not only substantial Russian military efforts but also a diversion of Ukrainian forces away from that region. By creating the appearance of a serious threat from the north, Belarus aims to force Ukraine to redeploy its military reserves.

Lukashenko’s role appears to be key in this diversion strategy. According to Ukrainian officials, the Belarusian president is under significant pressure from Moscow to play his part in the war, despite his public rhetoric advocating peace talks with Ukraine. This peace rhetoric, which includes recent statements by Lukashenko claiming that Ukraine has already been “denazified” and that there is no longer a reason to fight, is seen by Ukrainian officials as a smokescreen for more aggressive intentions. These intentions, they argue, are not solely Lukashenko’s but are dictated by Putin, who aims to use Belarus as a platform for his own strategic goals.

Monitoring the Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy

August 26, 2024

Policy Report
News
The report highlights the effects of international sanctions on Russia's economic performance up to mid-2024. Despite monetary tightening, Russia's early 2024 economic growth remained strong due to a tight labor market and continued credit expansion. The fiscal outlook has improved with more positive short- and medium-term projections despite increased military and social spending. The trade surplus remained almost unchanged, masking declines in both exports and imports. Russian imports surged at the end of 2023 but have recently declined: Increased payment difficulties with third countries, exacerbated by recent U.S. executive orders, have suppressed imports despite strong domestic demand and the ruble's real effective appreciation since late 2023. In terms of trade of high-priority sanctioned products, an analysis of quantities and values traded reveals that Russia has shifted towards lower-quality suppliers from countries like China, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan. The sanctions' effectiveness thus largely depends on substituting high-quality Western goods with lower-quality alternatives. In 2023, Russia secured between 60% and 170% of sanctioned high-priority items compared to 2021 levels.


EconPol Policy Report 51

Tightening the Screw? — EU’s New Sanctions on Russia

By Alexander Kolyandr
August 26, 2024