Ukraine conflict
08-18-2024, 06:28 PM
#3772
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2011
Posts: 1,829
Yes, they are. I perceive it differently. A bold defensive gambit. Fraught with risk. Eerily successful. No excuses humiliation for an aging Soviet era regime inching ever closer to the margins of collapse. Flip side, gets Steven King spooky now. Once again, fact follows fiction.
08-19-2024, 05:29 AM
#3773
Perennial Reserve
Joined APC: Jan 2018
Posts: 12,112
Yep. Since the future hasn't actually happened yet people have differing opinions. H€LL, for that matter historians even have differing opinions on what has ALREADY happened and why. But until there is an actual result, it's ALL opinion. Unless you just post FACTS, but people even argue over those.
08-19-2024, 05:56 AM
#3774
Perennial Reserve
Joined APC: Jan 2018
Posts: 12,112
Have you ever considered my motivation might be solely to laugh at how much your postings make you look like a fool? Now there's a psychological motivation for you.
Meanwhile, back in the war:
Thomson Reuters · Posted: Aug 19, 2024 5:21 AM PDT Last Updated: 1 hour ago
Civilians in Ukraine's eastern strategic logistics hub of Pokrovsk have just a week or two to evacuate as Russian troops press toward the city, an official said on Monday.
The head of city military administration, Serhiy Dobriak, on Monday stressed again that civilians should leave as fast as possible.
Civilians have "a week or two, no more," Dobriak told Radio Liberty's Ukrainian Service when asked about time left for evacuations considering the pace of Russian forces' advance. Authorities have the capacity to evacuate at least 1,000 people a day, he added, but only 500-600 people per day are currently leaving.
Some 53,000 people, including almost 4,000 children, remain in Pokrovsk and adjacent settlements, the regional governor of Donetsk Oblast, Vadym Filashkin, said on Telegram.
The forced evacuation of families with children was starting in the Pokrovsk area, he added.
Meanwhile, curfews in settlements lying close to Pokrovsk — Myrnohrad, Selydove and Novohrodivka — have been tightened.
"The situation at the front is very difficult and it is likely that the curfew will be tightened in other localities as well," Filashkin said on national television.
On Monday, Ukraine's General Staff reported 145 combat clashes for the last 24 hours, with 45 alone in the Pokrovsk direction.
Another 24 clashes took place near the mining town of Toretsk, some 47 kilometres from Pokrovsk, which has seen an intensified Russian push as well.
"Heavy fighting continues in the Pokrovsk direction. The defence forces are also doing everything necessary to protect Toretsk," army chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on Telegram.
Russia's Defence Ministry said on Monday that its forces had captured the town of Zalizne in Donetsk. Zalizne, which Russia calls by its Soviet-era name of Artyomovo, adjoins Toretsk.
Civilians in Ukraine's eastern strategic logistics hub of Pokrovsk have just a week or two to evacuate as Russian troops press toward the city, an official said on Monday.
The head of city military administration, Serhiy Dobriak, on Monday stressed again that civilians should leave as fast as possible.
Civilians have "a week or two, no more," Dobriak told Radio Liberty's Ukrainian Service when asked about time left for evacuations considering the pace of Russian forces' advance. Authorities have the capacity to evacuate at least 1,000 people a day, he added, but only 500-600 people per day are currently leaving.
Some 53,000 people, including almost 4,000 children, remain in Pokrovsk and adjacent settlements, the regional governor of Donetsk Oblast, Vadym Filashkin, said on Telegram.
The forced evacuation of families with children was starting in the Pokrovsk area, he added.
Meanwhile, curfews in settlements lying close to Pokrovsk — Myrnohrad, Selydove and Novohrodivka — have been tightened.
"The situation at the front is very difficult and it is likely that the curfew will be tightened in other localities as well," Filashkin said on national television.
Russia claims town in eastern Ukraine
The Pokrovsk front remains the area with the most intense fighting in eastern Ukraine, with a record number of clashes reported last week as the Ukrainian military proceeds with its shock incursion into Russia's Kursk region.On Monday, Ukraine's General Staff reported 145 combat clashes for the last 24 hours, with 45 alone in the Pokrovsk direction.
Another 24 clashes took place near the mining town of Toretsk, some 47 kilometres from Pokrovsk, which has seen an intensified Russian push as well.
"Heavy fighting continues in the Pokrovsk direction. The defence forces are also doing everything necessary to protect Toretsk," army chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on Telegram.
Russia's Defence Ministry said on Monday that its forces had captured the town of Zalizne in Donetsk. Zalizne, which Russia calls by its Soviet-era name of Artyomovo, adjoins Toretsk.
Now it's just OPINION, mind you, but with Ukraine blowing the bridges in front of them I think it's fair to assume they aren't planning on advancing much further in Kursk. It's also a fair OPINION, that Russia has not - AS OF YET - diverted enough troops from the strategically important eastern front to Kursk to make a noticeable difference in their offensive capability there.
it's difficult taking on the largest country on earth in a land battle - in part because they can give an awful lot of ground stretching out an attacker's supply lines and troop concentrations just from their geographic size alone. H€LL, the place spans 11 time zones. That's just an OPINION however...🤔
08-19-2024, 06:36 AM
#3775
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2011
Posts: 1,829
Whoa, didn't know that.
Thread OP otoh, familiar as an arthritic toe. Struggles with obsessive contempt for Tucker, boomers and Ex of course. Pigeons and pompano?? Bragging disruptor of his/her own thread. Gung-ho spiller of other people's blood, tapper other people's accounts. Banal to perfection. Lazy contributor consistently relying on TOS shade from somebody.
Carry on.
Thread OP otoh, familiar as an arthritic toe. Struggles with obsessive contempt for Tucker, boomers and Ex of course. Pigeons and pompano?? Bragging disruptor of his/her own thread. Gung-ho spiller of other people's blood, tapper other people's accounts. Banal to perfection. Lazy contributor consistently relying on TOS shade from somebody.
Carry on.
08-19-2024, 07:16 AM
#3776
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Jun 2022
Posts: 1,437
Whoa, didn't know that.
Thread OP otoh, familiar as an arthritic toe. Struggles with obsessive contempt for Tucker, boomers and Ex of course. Pigeons and pompano?? Bragging disruptor of his/her own thread. Gung-ho spiller of other people's blood, tapper other people's accounts. Banal to perfection. Lazy contributor consistently relying on TOS shade from somebody.
Carry on.
Thread OP otoh, familiar as an arthritic toe. Struggles with obsessive contempt for Tucker, boomers and Ex of course. Pigeons and pompano?? Bragging disruptor of his/her own thread. Gung-ho spiller of other people's blood, tapper other people's accounts. Banal to perfection. Lazy contributor consistently relying on TOS shade from somebody.
Carry on.
an adult would realize that you dont get to act this way without some consequences. But the baby boomer butthurt party cries foul when it’s against them…..you guys are just sad.
And I’ll gladly use this for entertainment. Theres only 6 ish people in this thread…..no one cares about some obsessed right wing nutjob, and a dude that refers to himself in the third person…..this is not an action movie with you in the lead role.
no
one
cares
last day of my greenie, so lets make it fun!
08-19-2024, 08:47 AM
#3778
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2011
Posts: 1,829
08-19-2024, 09:09 AM
#3779
Perennial Reserve
Joined APC: Jan 2018
Posts: 12,112
Other voices heard from…
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/uk...rsk-incursion/
Jasen J. Castillo, Co-Director, Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, George H.W. Bush School of Government, Texas A&M University
Once again, Ukraine's armed forces have demonstrated their tremendous will to fight, something Russia discounted when they invaded in 2022. Nevertheless, the military objective of this offensive remains unclear. In the short term, this is a public relations boost for Ukraine and a morale blow to Russia. The Kursk gamble might also reduce pressure on Ukraine's defenses as Russia moves forces to stop the incursion. My worry is that in the longer term, Ukraine, which is facing dangerous shortfalls in manpower and equipment, will deplete elite units that would have been needed elsewhere. In a war of attrition, manpower and equipment are essential. Ukraine's attack reminds me of Germany's audacious Western offensive in 1944 that surprised the Allies, made gains, and ended with a defeat at the Battle of the Bulge, which then wasted manpower and equipment it needed months later on the Eastern Front.
Once again, Ukraine's armed forces have demonstrated their tremendous will to fight, something Russia discounted when they invaded in 2022. Nevertheless, the military objective of this offensive remains unclear. In the short term, this is a public relations boost for Ukraine and a morale blow to Russia. The Kursk gamble might also reduce pressure on Ukraine's defenses as Russia moves forces to stop the incursion. My worry is that in the longer term, Ukraine, which is facing dangerous shortfalls in manpower and equipment, will deplete elite units that would have been needed elsewhere. In a war of attrition, manpower and equipment are essential. Ukraine's attack reminds me of Germany's audacious Western offensive in 1944 that surprised the Allies, made gains, and ended with a defeat at the Battle of the Bulge, which then wasted manpower and equipment it needed months later on the Eastern Front.
Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
The likely impact of Ukraine’s military incursion into Russia is going to affect two axes of interest; one material, and one psychological.
On the material axis, Ukraine may be able to temporarily degrade Russia’s ability to launch missile attacks against Ukrainian targets, the most sensitive of which involve the deliberate and systematic harm of Ukraine’s noncombatants. But in material terms, not much can be expected in terms of lasting impact. Ukraine will be forced to retreat from Russia, and its surviving troops and equipment will be redistributed, after rest and refit, to other critical areas of Ukraine’s front with Russia.
It is on the psychological axis we can expect the most impact. Already, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy as a “great leader” was damaged in the opening weeks of the war. This latest incursion is worse, because no Russian leader can afford to preside over the loss of Russian territory, even temporarily, and survive with reputation intact.
That said, Putin has unprecedented control over what Russians learn about the war. The psychological impact will be most felt by Ukraine and its allies. It will alleviate attention fatigue in the global sphere. It also reminds Western donors that Ukraine can fight and win, so the ongoing sacrifice of sending weapons and ammunition will not be wasted
The likely impact of Ukraine’s military incursion into Russia is going to affect two axes of interest; one material, and one psychological.
On the material axis, Ukraine may be able to temporarily degrade Russia’s ability to launch missile attacks against Ukrainian targets, the most sensitive of which involve the deliberate and systematic harm of Ukraine’s noncombatants. But in material terms, not much can be expected in terms of lasting impact. Ukraine will be forced to retreat from Russia, and its surviving troops and equipment will be redistributed, after rest and refit, to other critical areas of Ukraine’s front with Russia.
It is on the psychological axis we can expect the most impact. Already, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy as a “great leader” was damaged in the opening weeks of the war. This latest incursion is worse, because no Russian leader can afford to preside over the loss of Russian territory, even temporarily, and survive with reputation intact.
That said, Putin has unprecedented control over what Russians learn about the war. The psychological impact will be most felt by Ukraine and its allies. It will alleviate attention fatigue in the global sphere. It also reminds Western donors that Ukraine can fight and win, so the ongoing sacrifice of sending weapons and ammunition will not be wasted
Ivan Eland, Director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty.
Although Ukraine has insisted that its intent is not to hold captured land in Russia, one might then ask what purpose the incursion serves. It may have been designed to shock Russian leader Vladimir Putin about Russia’s vulnerability, but prior raids or attacks on Russia and Crimea have already so demonstrated.
Conducting offensive operations is usually much more costly in personnel and equipment than being on defense, so is it worth it for Ukraine to divert forces from already thin defense lines to go on a risky offensive with only nebulous benefits? Russia’s offensive is already making headway, and because Russia outnumbers and outguns Ukraine, it may not need to denude its attack forces in Ukraine to defend Russian territory. Ukraine indeed may desire to occupy Russian territory to eventually trade Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory for Russian-occupied Ukrainian land in any truce negotiations, but Ukraine risks being surrounded by superior forces.
Although Ukraine has insisted that its intent is not to hold captured land in Russia, one might then ask what purpose the incursion serves. It may have been designed to shock Russian leader Vladimir Putin about Russia’s vulnerability, but prior raids or attacks on Russia and Crimea have already so demonstrated.
Conducting offensive operations is usually much more costly in personnel and equipment than being on defense, so is it worth it for Ukraine to divert forces from already thin defense lines to go on a risky offensive with only nebulous benefits? Russia’s offensive is already making headway, and because Russia outnumbers and outguns Ukraine, it may not need to denude its attack forces in Ukraine to defend Russian territory. Ukraine indeed may desire to occupy Russian territory to eventually trade Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory for Russian-occupied Ukrainian land in any truce negotiations, but Ukraine risks being surrounded by superior forces.
Mark Episkopos, Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount University
The Kursk incursion seems to have been premised on the assumption that Ukraine can exploit Russia’s thinly manned border defenses to seize large swathes of land — including the Kursk nuclear power plant — in the first 48-72 hours, presenting Moscow with a fait accompli that can be used as a bargaining chip to quickly force a ceasefire and potentially even set the stage for peace talks on Ukraine’s terms. But Russia appears to have thwarted the AFU’s attempts to significantly expand its initial beachhead, and Ukraine lacks the long-term capacity to hold even the modest territory that it is currently contesting.
Efforts to keep open the Kursk pocket are unlikely to yield any strategic benefits for Ukraine and will demand a massive sustained investment of troops and equipment that may weaken Ukrainian defenses, inadvertently creating opportunities for Russian forces along the lines of contact in Ukraine’s Donbas region.
The Kursk incursion seems to have been premised on the assumption that Ukraine can exploit Russia’s thinly manned border defenses to seize large swathes of land — including the Kursk nuclear power plant — in the first 48-72 hours, presenting Moscow with a fait accompli that can be used as a bargaining chip to quickly force a ceasefire and potentially even set the stage for peace talks on Ukraine’s terms. But Russia appears to have thwarted the AFU’s attempts to significantly expand its initial beachhead, and Ukraine lacks the long-term capacity to hold even the modest territory that it is currently contesting.
Efforts to keep open the Kursk pocket are unlikely to yield any strategic benefits for Ukraine and will demand a massive sustained investment of troops and equipment that may weaken Ukrainian defenses, inadvertently creating opportunities for Russian forces along the lines of contact in Ukraine’s Donbas region.
Lyle Goldstein, Director of Asia Development, Defense Priorities, and visiting Professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Kyiv’s brazen offensive into Russia’s Kursk region illustrates that Ukraine still has significant combat capability, as well as some measure of fighting pluck. No doubt the operation has served its primary end to embarrass the Kremlin and so dramatically alter the conventional narrative on the war. Still, legitimate questions can be asked regarding the wisdom of the new offensive. Casualties for the attacking side are inevitably high, especially in circumstances when Russia retains a substantial firepower advantage. This may, in turn, create grave weaknesses on other part of the battle line that Russian forces could exploit. Most informed American strategists had been counseling Ukraine in 2024 to stay on the defensive to preserve its forces and thus adopt a “long war” strategy. Nor is it clear that such a symbolic gambit will make a peace easier to negotiate. Finally, this is yet another step in the inadvisable direction of general escalation.
Kyiv’s brazen offensive into Russia’s Kursk region illustrates that Ukraine still has significant combat capability, as well as some measure of fighting pluck. No doubt the operation has served its primary end to embarrass the Kremlin and so dramatically alter the conventional narrative on the war. Still, legitimate questions can be asked regarding the wisdom of the new offensive. Casualties for the attacking side are inevitably high, especially in circumstances when Russia retains a substantial firepower advantage. This may, in turn, create grave weaknesses on other part of the battle line that Russian forces could exploit. Most informed American strategists had been counseling Ukraine in 2024 to stay on the defensive to preserve its forces and thus adopt a “long war” strategy. Nor is it clear that such a symbolic gambit will make a peace easier to negotiate. Finally, this is yet another step in the inadvisable direction of general escalation.
John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, and non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute
Ukraine’s invasion (of Kursk) was a major strategic blunder, which will accelerate its defeat. The key determinant of success in a war of attrition is the casualty-exchange ratio, not capturing territory, which Western commentators obsess over. The casualty-exchange ratio in the Kursk offensive decisively favors Russia for two reasons. First, it has caused relatively few Russian casualties because Ukraine’s army effectively overran undefended territory. Second, once alerted to the attack, Moscow quickly brought massive airpower to bear against the advancing Ukrainian troops, who were in the open and easy to strike. Unsurprisingly, the attacking forces lost many soldiers and a huge proportion of their equipment.
To make matters worse, Kyiv removed top-notch combat units from the front lines in eastern Ukraine — where they are desperately needed — and made them part of the Kursk strike force. This move is tilting the already lopsided casualty-exchange ratio on that critically important front further in Russia’s favor. It is no wonder — given what a foolish idea the Kursk incursion is — that the Russians were caught by surprise.
Ukraine’s invasion (of Kursk) was a major strategic blunder, which will accelerate its defeat. The key determinant of success in a war of attrition is the casualty-exchange ratio, not capturing territory, which Western commentators obsess over. The casualty-exchange ratio in the Kursk offensive decisively favors Russia for two reasons. First, it has caused relatively few Russian casualties because Ukraine’s army effectively overran undefended territory. Second, once alerted to the attack, Moscow quickly brought massive airpower to bear against the advancing Ukrainian troops, who were in the open and easy to strike. Unsurprisingly, the attacking forces lost many soldiers and a huge proportion of their equipment.
To make matters worse, Kyiv removed top-notch combat units from the front lines in eastern Ukraine — where they are desperately needed — and made them part of the Kursk strike force. This move is tilting the already lopsided casualty-exchange ratio on that critically important front further in Russia’s favor. It is no wonder — given what a foolish idea the Kursk incursion is — that the Russians were caught by surprise.
Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Yale University
The Ukrainian incursion into Russia is a sideshow intended to bolster Ukrainian morale and give the West confidence to keep backing Kyiv, but it will not affect the outcome of the war. Ukrainian forces have reportedly seized about 1000 square kilometers of poorly defended Russian territory. Russia’s total land mass is more than 17 million square kilometers, which means that Ukraine now “controls” 0.00588% of Russia.
By comparison, Russian forces currently occupy roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and the failed Ukrainian offensive last summer shows how difficult it will be for Ukraine to retake these areas. The incursion may be a minor embarrassment for Putin (as well as additional evidence that Russia is far too weak to invade the rest of Europe), but Ukraine’s fate will be determined by what happens in Ukraine, and not by this operation.
The Ukrainian incursion into Russia is a sideshow intended to bolster Ukrainian morale and give the West confidence to keep backing Kyiv, but it will not affect the outcome of the war. Ukrainian forces have reportedly seized about 1000 square kilometers of poorly defended Russian territory. Russia’s total land mass is more than 17 million square kilometers, which means that Ukraine now “controls” 0.00588% of Russia.
By comparison, Russian forces currently occupy roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and the failed Ukrainian offensive last summer shows how difficult it will be for Ukraine to retake these areas. The incursion may be a minor embarrassment for Putin (as well as additional evidence that Russia is far too weak to invade the rest of Europe), but Ukraine’s fate will be determined by what happens in Ukraine, and not by this operation.
08-19-2024, 09:09 AM
#3780
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2015
Position: 777FO
Posts: 770
Not much to add right now to the discussion of the Kursk offensive, but I've wanted to post this article for a while. Sorry that it is old, I've only recently started watching this thread so have no idea whether this has been mentioned. Likely behind a paywall for most, so I'll just post a link and a couple of highlights. Russia's economy is highly dependent on oil/gas exports (can you name any Russian companies with a significant global presence besides Gazprom, Rosneft, etc.? I can't). Forget sanctions, the war that Putin started is going to accelerate the timeline of Russia's continuing economic and social decay even after a long term ceasefire is reached. I'm sure a lot of western money (and perhaps seized Russian assets) will pour into rebuilding Ukraine. Outside investment in Russia? Not so much while it is ruled by criminals.
https://www.economist.com/finance-an...een-transition
War and Subsidies have Turbocharged the Green Transition - They may have knocked as much as ten years off the timeline.
"In an alternative, less protectionist universe America’s and Europe’s vast spending plans would have an even bigger impact. But even in this fallen world, they are still momentous—sufficient, forecasters consulted by The Economist estimate, to help accelerate the energy transition by five to ten years. The investment surge and tighter targets should create a huge amount of renewable-generation capacity. All told, the iea expects global renewable-energy capacity to rise by 2,400gw between 2022 and 2027, an amount equivalent to China’s entire installed power capacity today. That is almost 30% higher than the agency’s forecast in 2021, released before the war. Renewables are set to account for 90% of the increase in global generation capacity over the period.
As green power is boosted and fossil-fuel use sags, the global economy is now expected to belch out much less carbon dioxide than had been predicted just 12 months ago. In part this is because emissions will not rise as high as they would have done had there not been a war. [size=9972px] [/size]S&P Global, a data firm, thinks that those from energy combustion will peak in 2028—at a level the world would still have been producing in 2032 without Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Once the decline starts, it is also likely to be more pronounced. Artem Abramov of Rystad says emissions from fossil-fuel use, which he had predicted would be stable until the late 2020s, or even the 2030s, are now set to slide from 2025."
https://www.economist.com/finance-an...een-transition
War and Subsidies have Turbocharged the Green Transition - They may have knocked as much as ten years off the timeline.
"In an alternative, less protectionist universe America’s and Europe’s vast spending plans would have an even bigger impact. But even in this fallen world, they are still momentous—sufficient, forecasters consulted by The Economist estimate, to help accelerate the energy transition by five to ten years. The investment surge and tighter targets should create a huge amount of renewable-generation capacity. All told, the iea expects global renewable-energy capacity to rise by 2,400gw between 2022 and 2027, an amount equivalent to China’s entire installed power capacity today. That is almost 30% higher than the agency’s forecast in 2021, released before the war. Renewables are set to account for 90% of the increase in global generation capacity over the period.
As green power is boosted and fossil-fuel use sags, the global economy is now expected to belch out much less carbon dioxide than had been predicted just 12 months ago. In part this is because emissions will not rise as high as they would have done had there not been a war. [size=9972px] [/size]S&P Global, a data firm, thinks that those from energy combustion will peak in 2028—at a level the world would still have been producing in 2032 without Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Once the decline starts, it is also likely to be more pronounced. Artem Abramov of Rystad says emissions from fossil-fuel use, which he had predicted would be stable until the late 2020s, or even the 2030s, are now set to slide from 2025."
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