The Ukrainian operation in Kursk is almost one week into execution. Ukrainian government representatives are yet to speak in any great detail about the operation, although President Zelenskyy did refer to it briefly in his 10 August speech when he noted that:

Today, Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi has already reported several times – on the frontline situation and on our actions to push the war out into the aggressor's territory. I thank every unit of our Defense Forces that makes this happen.

It is apparent that the Ukrainians have committed several brigades, or at least the elements of multiple brigades, to form what appears to be an Operational Maneuver Group.

The concept of an Operational Maneuver Group had its origins in the Second World War German Panzergruppes and Soviet mobile groups. The concept matured during the Cold War, as Operational Maneuver Groups. These organizations were designed to circumvent NATO tactical nuclear strikes by concentrating combined arms forces forward and – hopefully – achieving surprise against NATO forces.

There are many good references that explore the development of Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups during the Cold War. This declassified CIA study is worth reading, as are many other books, reports and articles. In its mature conceptual state, an Operational Maneuver Group was designed to be a combined arms formation that was flexible in size and organization, and designed to operate further away from friendly forces from normal Soviet armies.

It appears that is exactly what this Ukrainian force is doing. As such, for the remainder of this article I will use the term Operational Maneuver Group (Kursk) (OMG-K) for the Ukrainian forces involved in the continuing Battle of Kursk.

The aim of this article is not to discuss Soviet or Ukrainian combined arms doctrine, however. The focus of this piece is to explore the options now available to Ukraine as it moves into the second week of OMG-K operations in Kursk, and the considerations and risks involved with each option

The Next Phase: Ukraine’s Options

Like all military operations, this Ukrainian Kursk operation will have been planned as a multiphase operation, including the prelude shaping operations. These shaping operations would have included all of the intelligence collection, force preparation, deception, operational security, logistics and other aspects necessary to prepare the Ukrainian OMG-K for battle.

Other phases of the operation will have been planned, including the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ battles, ongoing exploitation and consolidation phases. These phases will have a range of forces and support elements applied to each.

But at the same time, minimal and maximalist goals will have been defined, with the potential to adapt operations depending on factors such as the degree of enemy resistance, the rate of advance of the Ukrainian OMG-K, consumption of critical resources (fuel, food, ammunition, etc) and the sustainability of critical enablers such as EW, air defence, logistics, air support, etc.

The Ukrainian’s the first phase, the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ are complete. They are currently in an ‘exploitation’ phase. Many operations also normally include a ‘limit of exploitation’ which is governed by things like terrain, logistics, posture and reaction of the enemy, as well as the operational and strategic objectives of the operation. As the Russians slowly but surely begin redeploying forces to seal off the breach in their border and attempt to push the Ukrainians back into Ukraine, it is worth pondering the options the Ukrainians might have once they reach their limit of exploitation.

I think they probably have three options. Each will have minor branch plans, as well as opportunities and risks.

​​​​​​​

Ukraine’s Big Swing: Changing the War’s Status Quo

This Ukrainian operation represents a very significant effort on the part of the Ukrainians to reset the status quo in the war, and change narratives about Ukraine prospects in this war.

It is the kind of strategic risk-taking that I don’t think is well understood in many Western capitals anymore. For nearly two generations now, Western nations have been able to cut military spending. None of them have faced existential threats, even though the War on Terror did require a significant response for more than a decade after 9/11.

The slow decision-making cycles in Western military and political circles, and in military procurement, is indicative of institutions that no longer understand the imperative to act quickly and decisively while taking major risks.

This is not the case for the Ukrainians. They have faced an existential threat since February 2022 (and more broadly, for the entirety of their existence as a people) and have a very different political and military decision-making calculus than those of their supporters. A nation and a people who face an existential risk from their neighbour tend to think differently from those who do not.

As such, Ukraine’s operation in Russia might have surprised most observers of the war, and even the governments of their key supporters. But from Ukraine’s perspective, it appears to be a risk that has considerable up side if the operation succeeds. So far, it appears that taking a risk by not reinforcing their forces in the Donbas and using them in Kursk may be paying off for Ukraine. But, like all wars and military campaigns, predicting the future is impossible.

There are sure to be more surprises ahead.

But, like all wars and military campaigns, predicting the future is impossible.

There are sure to be more surprises ahead.

Russia's suspicions, unease, and sense of insecurity over Europe and the West go back to the 1700s, writes Dr David Murphy, Department of History

This week, the world has been coming to terms with the latest round of conflict in Ukraine, a continuation of a conflict that began with the Russian invasion in 2014. There has been much negative comment about the lost opportunities for diplomacy in the intervening years. While this is true, it is also worth considering how recent events fit into historic Russian concerns about security issues along its western borders.

In a significant telegram in 1946, the US ambassador to the USSR, George Kennan, noted that "at [the] bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is [a] traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity". This was an extremely accurate summation and reflected the fact that Russia’s attitude to the West and its influence along its western borders had been informed over the preceding centuries.

We have a tendency to focus on former Soviet attitudes and the spotlight is currently on the actions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin. However, the patterns of strategic behaviour and the culture of mutual suspicion between Russia and the powers of Europe date back to the 1700s. Moreover, the fault lines of this historic tension run through current strategic "hot spots", regions that now encompass Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine.

As Imperial Russia began to emerge as a major European power in the 1700s, it found itself in competition with other Nordic and European powers. Relations between neighbouring states were often tense and 18th century diplomats, such as the French ambassador, the Baron de Breteuil, noted the cultural disjoints between Russia and other European powers. In diplomatic exchanges, it became increasingly obvious that the Russian take on strategic issues was significantly different, and this often resulted in tension.

​​​​​​​

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — The Russian army is intensifying its attacks in eastern Ukraine, military authorities said Tuesday, even as the Kremlin’s forces try to check a stunning weeklong incursion into Russia by Kyiv’s troops.

Ukraine’s General Staff said Tuesday that over the previous 24 hours Russian troops launched 52 assaults in the area of Pokrovsk, a town in Ukraine’s Donetsk region that is close to the front line. That’s roughly double the number of daily attacks there a week ago.

Ukraine’s sensational charge onto Russian soil that began Aug. 6 has already encompassed some 1,000 square kilometers (386 square miles) of Russian territory, the Ukrainian military claims.

The goals of the swift advance into the Kursk region are a closely-guarded military secret.

But analysts say a catalyst may have been Ukraine’s desire to ease pressure on its front line by attempting to draw the Kremlin’s forces into defending Kursk and other border areas. If so, the increased pressure around Pokrovsk suggests Moscow didn’t take the bait.


Still, Ukraine’s cross-border operation — the largest attack on Russia since World War II — has rattled the Kremlin. It compelled Russian President Vladimir Putin to convene a meeting on Monday with his top defense officials.

About 121,000 people have been evacuated from Kursk or have fled the areas affected by fighting on their own, Russian officials say. The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, said it has seen geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced as much as 24 kilometers (15 miles) from the border.

The Russian Defense Ministry appeared to support that claim when it said Tuesday it had blocked an attack by the units of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian armed forces towards Maryinka, which is about that distance from Ukraine.




​​​​​​​

UK Blocks Use of Storm Shadow Missiles for Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive

The UK denied Ukraine use of Storm Shadow weapons in Kursk operation despite Zelensky’s request, while claiming to "support Ukraine’s clear right of self-defense in accordance with international law.”


by Kyiv Post August 13, 2024, 3:36 pm

The UK refused Ukraine‘s request to use Storm Shadow missiles for strikes in the Kursk region despite President Volodymyr Zelensky‘s appeals, The Telegraph reports from an anonymous source in the British Prime Minister‘s office.

As Russian forces launch counterattacks on the Kursk front, Zelensky has again asked Western allies for permission to use long-range missiles against targets deep within Russia.

However, the source stated that “there has been no change.“

“There has been no change in the UK’s position. We have been providing military aid to support Ukraine’s clear right of self-defense against Russia’s illegal attacks in accordance with international humanitarian law. We are clear that equipment provided by the UK is intended for the defense of Ukraine.“


​​​​​​​

​​​​​​​ The use of Storm Shadow missiles also depends on France, as the missiles are a joint development between the UK and France (British Aerospace and Matra). Paris also has a say in their employment.

Ukraine has also sought permission from the US to use its long-range ATACMS missiles during the Kursk offensive but has so far been denied.