1. NEWS
2. DEFENSE

Europeans skeptical Ukraine will win war, polling shows

Most EU countries surveyed also opposed increasing their defense spending for Ukraine

JULY 3, 2024 5:01 AM CET
BY ELENA GIORDANOWhile the majority of Ukrainians believe Kyiv will prevail in its war with invading Russian forces, Europeans are more skeptical, a new study by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) shows.

The survey, published on Wednesday — days out from the July 9-11 NATO summit in Washington — mapped attitudes to the conflict in Ukraine and 14 EU countries. The fieldwork was undertaken in May.

It found that Europeans tend to believe that Ukraine won't defeat Russia on the battlefield, with roughly a third to half of those surveyed believing the war will end in a negotiated settlement, and up to 31 percent (Greece) seeing a Russian victory as most likely. Of the EU countries surveyed, only in Estonia was a Ukraine victory the prevailing view (38 percent).

On the contrary, the majority of Ukrainians (58 percent) remain confident their troops can win, and that they can continue to count on the support of their international allies. Only 1 percent of Ukrainians believe Russia will win the war, while 30 percent see a negotiated settlement as the most likely outcome.

The study also found considerable differences of opinion among EU countries on how to support the defense of Ukraine and on Kyiv’s EU and NATO accession.

NATO leaders are “unlikely to find domestic support for troop deployments" among member country populations, the findings revealed (country results ranged from 4 percent to 22 percent in favor).

On defense spending, the data showed that most countries are against increasing their contributions — the exceptions being Poland (where 53 percent support increasing defense spending), Estonia (45 percent), Sweden (41 percent) and Germany (40 percent).

However, most Europeans still support being involved in the war in other ways — such as by providing technical assistance and by increasing the supply of weapons and ammunition.

Only in Bulgaria, Greece and Italy does the majority of the population — 63 percent, 54 percent and 53 percent, respectively — think increasing the supply of ammunition and weapons to Ukraine is a “bad idea."



​​​​​​​

Only in Bulgaria, Greece and Italy does the majority of the population — 63 percent, 54 percent and 53 percent, respectively — think increasing the supply of ammunition and weapons to Ukraine is a “bad idea."

Russia claims it has captured a district in the key hilltop city of Chasiv Yar in eastern Ukraine, where Moscow’s troops have been slowly, but steadily advancing for months.

Seizing the whole of the crumbling Donbas city, close to Bakhmut, would allow Russia to threaten crucial Ukrainian supply lines and mount further offensives throughout the region.

Moscow’s claim was repeated by Ukrainian’s ‘DeepState’ Telegram channel, which has links to Kyiv’s army.

It said that the Novy neighbourhood in the city’s east had been flattened by Russia’s relentless bombardments and that withdrawing was “a logical, albeit difficult decision.”

Meanwhile, a major Russian missile and drone attack on the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro killed at least five and wounded 47 more, including a child.

The barrage damaged kindergartens, schools and hospitals and caused fires throughout the city on Wednesday morning.

The aerial onslaught sparked a fresh appeal from Volodymyr Zelensky for the West to supply more air defence systems and long-range weapons.

Overnight, Ukraine launched a drone attack targeting Russia’s Black Sea portof Novorossiysk, where Moscow’s once-revered Black Sea Fleet is hiding after it was forced to abandon its Crimean base in Sevastopol.

Russian officials were forced to restrict access to the beach as they attempted to repel Kyiv’s sea drones.

Satellites detected large fires surrounding the port, which is one of Russia’s largest and a major oil export and transit hub.

As Russian officials claimed to have brought the situation in Novorossiysk under control, Vladimir Putin arrived in Kazakhstan for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit where he prioritised talks with Chinese and Turkish leaders.

​​​​​​​

On April 23, just hours after the United States Senate approved $61 billion in new military aid to Ukraine, Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance took to the floor of the Senate to offer a sweeping rebuke of his colleagues’ decision. Standing behind his desk, Vance — who has emerged as a leading critic of U.S. policy toward Ukraine — unspooled a laundry list of objections: that American military capability is spread too thin; that Ukraine is outmanned and outgunned regardless of an increased level of U.S. support; that the Biden administration lacks a clear plan for bringing the war to a close.

Partway through his remarks, Vance suddenly got personal and pivoted to a less frequently discussed source of his skepticism: his time serving as a Marine during the Iraq War

Vance’s comments about the war in Iraq made up only a small part of his floor speech, but they provided a rare window into an underappreciated dynamic driving the Republican Party’s schism over the war in Ukraine and the direction of U.S. foreign policy: The rise of the GOP’s anti-intervention faction has been led in large part by veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In public, many of these members of Congress have shied away from discussing the ways their service in those conflicts shaped their foreign policy views, opting instead to frame their objections in more conventionally partisan terms. But in interviews with POLITICO Magazine, several leading members of the GOP’s anti-interventionist wing and their allies in Washington acknowledged that their experience serving on the ground in America’s two most recent wars played a decisive role in their rejection of the GOP’s more hawkish foreign policy consensus. Having witnessed the failures and lethal consequences of the U.S. wars firsthand, they said, they have grown skeptical of the efficacy of U.S. military power, distrustful of civilian and military leaders and weary of getting the United States involved in overseas conflicts that could cost additional American dollars and, in a worst-case scenario, American lives

​​​​​​​ These members’ accounts of their disillusionment with the wars in the Middle East and Central Asia complicate a prevailing explanation for the resurgence of anti-interventionism on the right. In contrast to the common claim that this resurgence is merely an artifact of the Republican Party’s loyalty to Donald Trump, conservatives’ own accounts indicate the origins of this shift — though undoubtedly encouraged and accelerated by Trump — predate him. As a result, they suggest that, contrary to the predictions — and, in some cases, the hopes— of its critics, the GOP’s anti-interventionist faction is not likely to dissipate anytime soon, even if Trump is defeated in November.

On April 23, just hours after the United States Senate approved $61 billion in new military aid to Ukraine, Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance took to the floor of the Senate to offer a sweeping rebuke of his colleagues’ decision. Standing behind his desk, Vance — who has emerged as a leading critic of U.S. policy toward Ukraine — unspooled a laundry list of objections: that American military capability is spread too thin; that Ukraine is outmanned and outgunned regardless of an increased level of U.S. support; that the Biden administration lacks a clear plan for bringing the war to a close.