Ukraine conflict
#281
Banned
Joined APC: Oct 2010
Posts: 96
All of your arguments are words one would expect from an accountant or a russian propagandist. Not someone who already “gave at the office,” as was immodestly characterized as the genesis of your reluctance to support Ukraine in their attempt to defend themselves.
So did we do it wrong? Should we have committed harder in Afghanistan to win and recoup our fiscal investments? Should we have been less “casualty averse” in order to achieve more economic gain which seems to be your yardstick for victory on the battlefield.
#282
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Jun 2022
Posts: 1,466
Trying to entertain myself before I die and become star food. What’s yours?
I guess if you are asking specifically, In this instance in time, then I guess I would say this random carbon unit has read thousands and thousands of pages of military history and I find this conflict absolutely fascinating because we are about to see modern mech units go toe to toe, in a near peer engagement (Iraq v USA was a blowout) for the first time on a scale not seen since ww2. That good sir, is worthy of discussion
I guess if you are asking specifically, In this instance in time, then I guess I would say this random carbon unit has read thousands and thousands of pages of military history and I find this conflict absolutely fascinating because we are about to see modern mech units go toe to toe, in a near peer engagement (Iraq v USA was a blowout) for the first time on a scale not seen since ww2. That good sir, is worthy of discussion
#283
This is interesting. A few pages back you authored posts bemoaning the loss of 2500 Americans in Afghanistan, which by anyone’s measure, is minimal in terms of casualty numbers for the timeframe, the complexity of the mission and the ferocity of the enemy. And multiple complaints were registered about the fiscal loss from Afghanistan and Iraq. But now there is complaining because America is “casualty averse.” I’m confused.
https://www.usip.org/publications/20...s-better-peace
Meanwhile our allies in Afghanistan lost about 70,000 military and police.
All of your arguments are words one would expect from an accountant or a russian propagandist. Not someone who already “gave at the office,” as was immodestly characterized as the genesis of your reluctance to support Ukraine in their attempt to defend themselves.
So did we do it wrong? Should we have committed harder in Afghanistan to win and recoup our fiscal investments? Should we have been less “casualty averse” in order to achieve more economic gain which seems to be your yardstick for victory on the battlefield.
#284
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Jun 2022
Posts: 1,466
[/QUOTE]
War seldom ever has any economic gain, but $2,3 Trillion is a lot to expend on a losing effort. And you ask what we did wrong? Simple. We had the war won and our initial mission accomplished in late 2001-early 2002 when we had driven the Taliban from power and into hiding in Pakistan. At that point we could have just left in victory, ready to return, rinse, and repeat as necessary, but instead mission creep set in and it was decided we would bring American culture to Afghanistan, and win the hearts and minds if the people who pretty much resented the cultural imperialism. Rather than simply leave them to their fate, pursue them into their safe havens in Pakistan, or beat them into submission, we embarked on a 20 year mission of playing social worker while hamstrung by ROE so restrictive that even our own State Department and Agency for International Development was hiring contractors to protect themselves. But as you say, we were there for 20 years and took 2500 casualties. How you can think that’s anything but casualty averse I’m uncertain.[/QUOTE]
Bro, I still respectfully disagree with almost all you say, but this is spot on. Had to acknowledge that 😂. Afghanistan was a cluster ****
War seldom ever has any economic gain, but $2,3 Trillion is a lot to expend on a losing effort. And you ask what we did wrong? Simple. We had the war won and our initial mission accomplished in late 2001-early 2002 when we had driven the Taliban from power and into hiding in Pakistan. At that point we could have just left in victory, ready to return, rinse, and repeat as necessary, but instead mission creep set in and it was decided we would bring American culture to Afghanistan, and win the hearts and minds if the people who pretty much resented the cultural imperialism. Rather than simply leave them to their fate, pursue them into their safe havens in Pakistan, or beat them into submission, we embarked on a 20 year mission of playing social worker while hamstrung by ROE so restrictive that even our own State Department and Agency for International Development was hiring contractors to protect themselves. But as you say, we were there for 20 years and took 2500 casualties. How you can think that’s anything but casualty averse I’m uncertain.[/QUOTE]
Bro, I still respectfully disagree with almost all you say, but this is spot on. Had to acknowledge that 😂. Afghanistan was a cluster ****
#285
A quick look at military non-nuclear munitions logistics…
https://time.com/6252541/inside-the-...s-for-ukraine/
Never did Army but it appears much the same as Air Force. Nobody is really capable of massive surges in production. Most is produced in government owned contractor operated facilities on a continuous low rate production schedule that between wars is stored in munitions bunkers except for a few being dropped in full scale weapons deliveries (for the USAF anyway although the Army no doubt uses more actual ordnance in training.
The problem is scaling up production quickly is somewhat limited by what your existing personnel can do with existing factories and equipment on overtime - which is maybe 15% above your regular continuous low rate production. Which appears to be well below current Ukrainian consumption.
But hiring and training new personnel takes a long time as does adding new facilities and getting the supply chain lined up to support it.
In fairness, Russia undoubtedly has much the same problem.
But if you’ve never been exposed to it, it’s got far less ‘surge’ capacity than you would believe and even throwing money at it generally takes years rather than months for meaningful improvement.
An excerpt:
An example:
And the Navy opinion:
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...enging/381722/
https://time.com/6252541/inside-the-...s-for-ukraine/
Never did Army but it appears much the same as Air Force. Nobody is really capable of massive surges in production. Most is produced in government owned contractor operated facilities on a continuous low rate production schedule that between wars is stored in munitions bunkers except for a few being dropped in full scale weapons deliveries (for the USAF anyway although the Army no doubt uses more actual ordnance in training.
The problem is scaling up production quickly is somewhat limited by what your existing personnel can do with existing factories and equipment on overtime - which is maybe 15% above your regular continuous low rate production. Which appears to be well below current Ukrainian consumption.
But hiring and training new personnel takes a long time as does adding new facilities and getting the supply chain lined up to support it.
In fairness, Russia undoubtedly has much the same problem.
But if you’ve never been exposed to it, it’s got far less ‘surge’ capacity than you would believe and even throwing money at it generally takes years rather than months for meaningful improvement.
An excerpt:
The Biden Administration has already given Ukraine more than 1 million 155-millimeter shells. With hundreds of miles of contested frontlines, the Ukrainian military depends on firing the rounds from about 300 155-millimeter howitzers to repel Russian positions. With no end to the fighting in sight, the U.S. Army plans to boost its current production rate of around 14,000 155-millimeter howitzer shells per month to 20,000 by this spring and as many as 90,000 by 2025, spending $1.9 billion this year alone in the process.
And the Navy opinion:
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...enging/381722/
Last edited by Excargodog; 02-03-2023 at 11:10 AM.
#287
A quick look at military non-nuclear munitions logistics…
https://time.com/6252541/inside-the-...s-for-ukraine/
Never did Army but it appears much the same as Air Force. Nobody is really capable of massive surges in production. Most is produced in government owned contractor operated facilities on a continuous low rate production schedule that between wars is stored in munitions bunkers except for a few being dropped in full scale weapons deliveries (for the USAF anyway although the Army no doubt uses more actual ordnance in training.
The problem is scaling up production quickly is somewhat limited by what your existing personnel can do with existing factories and equipment on overtime - which is maybe 15% above your regular continuous low rate production. Which appears to be well below current Ukrainian consumption.
But hiring and training new personnel takes a long time as does adding new facilities and getting the supply chain lined up to support it.
In fairness, Russia undoubtedly has much the same problem.
But if you’ve never been exposed to it, it’s got far less ‘surge’ capacity than you would believe and even throwing money at it generally takes years rather than months for meaningful improvement.
An excerpt:
An example:
And the Navy opinion:
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...enging/381722/
https://time.com/6252541/inside-the-...s-for-ukraine/
Never did Army but it appears much the same as Air Force. Nobody is really capable of massive surges in production. Most is produced in government owned contractor operated facilities on a continuous low rate production schedule that between wars is stored in munitions bunkers except for a few being dropped in full scale weapons deliveries (for the USAF anyway although the Army no doubt uses more actual ordnance in training.
The problem is scaling up production quickly is somewhat limited by what your existing personnel can do with existing factories and equipment on overtime - which is maybe 15% above your regular continuous low rate production. Which appears to be well below current Ukrainian consumption.
But hiring and training new personnel takes a long time as does adding new facilities and getting the supply chain lined up to support it.
In fairness, Russia undoubtedly has much the same problem.
But if you’ve never been exposed to it, it’s got far less ‘surge’ capacity than you would believe and even throwing money at it generally takes years rather than months for meaningful improvement.
An excerpt:
An example:
And the Navy opinion:
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...enging/381722/
But in the event a major peer conflict, we could pull out all stops and ramp up by virtue of having a very large and diverse technical mfg base.
That's low and mid-tech weapons... the really Gucci munitions needs to be produced and stockpiled in advance. To say nothing of tip-of-the-speer platforms like stealth fighters, subs, etc.
#288
But in the event a major peer conflict, we could pull out all stops and ramp up by virtue of having a very large and diverse technical mfg base.
“Bids were solicited with one received.”
Most people in military procurement would challenge your assertion:
https://www.industryweek.com/supply-...n-is-in-crisis
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine....ndustrial-base
An excerpt:
Kurt Wendelken, vice commander of Naval Supply Systems, said the COVID-19 pandemic did bring supply chain issues to the fore for consumers, but the military has a different set of problems.
“The products that we’re dealing with are very complicated. They’re not Pert shampoo. They’re not Snickers. They’re not things from Amazon … It can take [industry] a year or two years to go make those things for us. And that’s assuming that they understand what our demand signal is,” he said.
About 80 percent of his command’s suppliers are “single-source,” meaning there is no other company that can produce the item.
Exacerbating the lack of materials and goods is a labor shortage.
“The products that we’re dealing with are very complicated. They’re not Pert shampoo. They’re not Snickers. They’re not things from Amazon … It can take [industry] a year or two years to go make those things for us. And that’s assuming that they understand what our demand signal is,” he said.
About 80 percent of his command’s suppliers are “single-source,” meaning there is no other company that can produce the item.
Exacerbating the lack of materials and goods is a labor shortage.
https://www.industryweek.com/supply-...n-is-in-crisis
An excerpt:
Covid and the war in Ukraine are just two recent events that have stressed our nation’s “just-in-time” and “ruthlessly cost-efficient” national defense supply chain. While the defense industry is subject to the same delays and budget overruns caused by supply chain disruptions that influence the private sector, the consequences can be more dire—such as an inability to meet strategic defense objectives and combat casualties.
Strengthening our nation’s defense supply chain will require fundamental changes in the way that the government and private sector conduct business.
Strengthening our nation’s defense supply chain will require fundamental changes in the way that the government and private sector conduct business.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-...dustrial-base/
Excerpts:
The report observes that extreme consolidation in the defense sector has reduced competition and heightened national security risks. Since the 1990s, the number of aerospace and defense prime contractors has shrunk from 51 to just 5. The same pattern has played out across categories of major weapons systems: for example, today, 90% of missiles come from 3 sources. Such consolidation leaves DoD increasingly reliant on a handful of companies for critical defense capabilities. It also hurts taxpayers, as companies no longer feel the competitive pressure to innovate or perform at the highest level to win contracts.
- Implementing Sector-specific Supply Chain Resilience Plans: DoD should take steps to ensure resilience in the supply chain for five priority sectors: casting and forgings, missiles and munitions, energy storage and batteries, strategic and critical materials, and microelectronics.
#289
True enough for RU/UR conflict.
But in the event a major peer conflict, we could pull out all stops and ramp up by virtue of having a very large and diverse technical mfg base.
That's low and mid-tech weapons... the really Gucci munitions needs to be produced and stockpiled in advance. To say nothing of tip-of-the-speer platforms like stealth fighters, subs, etc.
But in the event a major peer conflict, we could pull out all stops and ramp up by virtue of having a very large and diverse technical mfg base.
That's low and mid-tech weapons... the really Gucci munitions needs to be produced and stockpiled in advance. To say nothing of tip-of-the-speer platforms like stealth fighters, subs, etc.
#290
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/1...TRIAL-BASE.PDF
The bottom line:
Ah yes, the North American B-25, built by one of a number of. Aircraft companies that disappeared through merger and acquisition - eventually becoming part of Boeing IIRC.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lagging...on-11672754128
The bottom line:
Ah yes, the North American B-25, built by one of a number of. Aircraft companies that disappeared through merger and acquisition - eventually becoming part of Boeing IIRC.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lagging...on-11672754128
Last edited by Excargodog; 02-05-2023 at 09:57 PM.
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post