LYMAN, Ukraine (AP) — When the Russian army mounted a full-scale invasion two years ago, Ukrainian men zealously rushed to recruitment centers across the country to enlist, ready to die in defense of their nation.

Today, with Russia in control of roughly one-quarter of Ukraine and the two armies virtually deadlocked along a 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) front line, that spirit to enlist has faded: Many Ukrainian men are evading the draft by hiding at home or trying to bribe their way out of the battle.

Along the frigid and muddy front line, commanders say their army is too small and made up of too many exhausted and wounded soldiers. As the war enters its third year, the most urgent and politically sensitive challenge pressing on Ukraine is whether it can muster enough new soldiers to repel an enemy with far more fighters at its disposal.

To replenish its ranks, the Ukrainian government is struggling to find a balance between coercion and persuasion.

The parliament is considering legislation that would increase the potential pool of recruits by about 400,000, in part by lowering the enlistment age from 27 to 25. But the proposal is highly unpopular, forcing elected officials to grapple with questions that cut to the heart of nationhood: Can they convince enough citizens to sacrifice their lives? And, if not, are they willing to accept the alternative?

WHO WILL DIG THE TRENCHES?

Because there aren’t enough new recruits, soldiers on the front line aren’t getting enough rest in between rotations. Two years of grueling battles have left men fatigued and more susceptible to injury. When there are new recruits, they are too few, too poorly trained and often too old, according to interviews with two dozen Ukrainian soldiers, including six commanders.

Commanders say they don’t have enough soldiers to launch offensives, and barely enough to hold positions amid intensifying Russian assaults.

Brigades of 3,000-5,000 soldiers are typically fighting with only 75% of their full strength, according to Vadym Ivchenko, a lawmaker who is part of the parliament’s national security, defense and intelligence committee. Some brigades have as few as 25%, he added.

Igor Ivantsev, 31, has been wounded twice in the span of four months. His body aches when he carries his machine gun, but doctors deem him fit to serve. Ivantsev said that of the 17 men he enlisted with, most are dead; the rest are like him, wounded.

Ivantsev’s commander, who would only provide his first name, Dmytro, said his exhausted and depleted company is working overtime to dig deeper trenches and build better locations from which to counter constant Russian artillery. “We have no people, nowhere to get them from,” Dmytro said.

At the start of the war, soldiers were rotated every two weeks for one week of rest, he said. But now his soldiers fight for a month, then get four days of rest.

“We are not made of steel,” said Ivantsev.

The average Ukrainian servicemen is in their 40s, according to Western officials. Commanders say the older the soldiers, the more they experience chronic illness, such as ulcers, hernias and pinched nerves.

Dima’s assault company recently received seven new recruits ages 55 to 58.

“What positions are they going to storm?” he asked sarcastically. “If he walks 4 kilometers with a backpack full of gear and weapons, he will fall down in the middle of the road.”


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Germany's Bundestag votes against Taurus missiles to Ukraine

Published 6 hours agoPublished 6 hours agolast updated 10 minutes agolast updated 10 minutes agoLawmakers have rejected an opposition motion to deliver cruise missiles to Ukraine, but backed another motion to send Kyiv "necessary long-range weapons systems."


https://p.dw.com/p/4ciza

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Bundestag votes against sending Taurus to Ukraine

A majority of German lawmakers voted against an opposition motion to deliver Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine.

The motion was put forward by the center-right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) bloc.

Only 182 parliamentarians voted in favor of it, while 480 were against. There were 5 abstentions.

In the run up to the vote, opposition leader Friedrich Merz had urged members of the ruling coalition to support the motion.

The ruling alliance, for their part, are putting forward their own joint motion calling for the delivery of "additional, necessary long-range weapons systems and ammunition" to Ukraine, without explicitly mentioning Taurus.

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Europe must stand on its own two feet on defence

Americans owe it to our European partners to be honest: we want allies, not client states, and our generosity in Ukraine is coming to an end.

JD Vance

The United States has provided a blanket of security to Europe for far too long. In the aftermath of the Cold War, European nations made deep and lasting cuts to their defence budgets.

Estimates suggest the continent would have spent an additional $US8.6 trillion ($13.2 trillion) on defence over 30 years had they maintained Cold War levels of military expenditure. As the American defence budget nears $US1 trillion per year, we ought to view the money Europe hasn’t spent on defence for what it really is: an implied tax on the American people to allow for the security of Europe.

Nothing in recent memory demonstrates this more clearly than the war in Ukraine. There is frankly no good reason that aid from the US should be needed. Europe is made up of many great nations with productive economies. They ought to have the capacity to handle the conflict, but over decades they have become far too weak. America has been asked to fill the void at tremendous expense to its own citizens.

Behind the price tag, this conflict has revealed the shocking weakness of the defence industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe and America, fragmented defence industries make limited quantities of the most advanced weapons on Earth, but struggle to produce heavy weaponry at the speed and scale needed to win a major conflict.

For all the talk about who spends the most on defence by percentage of gross domestic product, Russia currently makes more than twice the amount of artillery shells each month than Europe and the US combined.


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These issues go beyond budgetary gimmicks and trilateral summit attendance. They demand tangible military capacity and industrial power. London is the banking centre of Europe, and perhaps the world. But wars are not fought with dollars, pounds and financial derivatives, they are fought with bullets.

Germany is the most important economy in Europe, but it relies on imported energy and borrowed military strength. US leaders across the spectrum support Europe and see the value of generations-old alliances. But as we watch European power atrophy under an American protectorate, it is reasonable to ask whether our support has made it easier for Europe to ignore its own security.

Which brings us to Ukraine. In the press, the burden-sharing debate is often framed in monetary terms: who spends what, and how much should each nation spend? But this conceals the real resource constraint. Wars are won with men and matériel.

Starting with matériel: we don’t make enough of it. At current production rates, it will take years to rebuild military stockpiles after this war – even if we stop sending critical defence stocks today, as we most certainly should. A firm commitment to Western re-industrialisation, to training skilled workers and rebuilding production capacity is needed.

Ukraine also needs more men. The average Ukrainian soldier is about 43 years old. Its former top general, Valery Zaluzhny, recently said he needed a mobilisation of fresh troops. Ukraine will only be able to continue at this rate for so long until Western troops are asked to answer the call.

We owe it to our European partners to be honest: Americans want allies in Europe, not client states, and our generosity in Ukraine is coming to an end. Europeans should regard the conclusion of the war there as an imperative. They must keep rebuilding their industrial and military capabilities. And Europe should consider how exactly it is going to live with Russia when the war in Ukraine is over.

In the US, justifications for the war often depend on a contemporary domino theory: unless we stop Putin in Ukraine, he won’t stop there. But the time has come for Europe to stand on its own feet. That doesn’t mean it has to stand alone, but it must not continue to use America as a crutch.

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