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Opinion

The Red Sea fighting shows the humiliating difference between the US and Royal Navies

Tom Sharpe
Mon, January 29, 2024 at 2:08 AM PST

I am occasionally accused of being a little ‘cup half full’. When ships collide, or break down, I tend to see it as more annoying rather than embarrassing– a reflection of the complexities and difficulties of operating in a hazardous environment.

But when the Secretary of the Navy of your largest and most important ally comes to the UK and says you need to spend more on defense, then that is unambiguously humiliating.

Secretary Del Toro sits between the US Defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Lisa Franchetti. The role is comparable to our Armed Forces Minister, if we had one for each service. He therefore has a pivotal role to play between the US Navy, the SecDef and President Biden.

He, like everyone else with an interest in global affairs, recognises that the world is becoming less stable, and that our armed forces remain our best hedge against uncertainty and disruption. But in order to do that, they need to be properly resourced and supported. With the direct charm typical of many senior US politicians, he made it clear that the UK is falling behind in doing this.

The Red Sea is a naval case study in how disruption in a seemingly faraway place has an impact that can be felt at home. Despite the defensive actions of Operation Prosperity Guardian turning to the offensive actions of Operation Poseidon Archer, shipping through the Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal is down by 30 per cent.

Container ship transits are down by 80 per cent. A recent report by LSEG Shipping Research, a division of the London Stock Exchange Group, revealed that rerouting an tanker from Asia to NW Europe via the Cape of Good Hope incurs an incremental cost of just under a million USD per voyage, and extends the transit time from 16 to 32 days. Everything in your home is about to start arriving late and costing more.

The US Navy has ‘freedom of navigation’ in their DNA. They currently have an aircraft carrier and five escorts in and around the Red Sea. The standard conversion for ships at sea is (just over) three to keep one on task. So if this mission endures, and I think it will, that’s a commitment of sixteen escorts for this alone – more escorts than the Royal Navy currently owns.

Of all the countries with ships there, the US is probably the one who least depends on keeping the lane open. You can see why they might get a little frustrated when other nations only partially contribute, running political agendas and talking of a Euro-solution.

It’s hard to overstate what not having US military support and logistics means in terms of warfare enablers. Anyone who has seen that machine from close up, once they have finished gawping at the sheer size of it, gets instinctively nervous about offering any sort of military solution that doesn’t have that placed at its core.

Del Toro discussed more than just the Red Sea. The Black Sea remains heavily contested, and whilst the humanitarian corridor is working with trade there restored to 70 per cent of its pre-war levels, the debate over levels of support to ensure this can be maintained are as live as ever.

He touched on the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route there which a combination of increased accessibility, proximity to Russia and value to China means that it becoming contested feels inevitable. And all this before we even get to the big one – China’s increasingly belligerent stance in the Southern and Eastern China Seas and a gradual encircling of Taiwan which many perceive as a precursor to invasion.

That naval recruiting and retention came up in discussion was inevitable. This is a global issue: maritime recruiting across the entire industry is down 9 per cent. UK armed forces are feeling the pinch acutely with figures down across the board. Reviews have been conducted and advice sought from our US colleagues but until the offer matches expectations, this is going to take a long time to fix. But it must be fixed or the whole system fails. The Royal Navy is decommissioning two frigates early due to lack of numbers and Royal Fleet Auxiliary numbers are even worse.https://s.yimg.com/ny/api/res/1.2/3PRa_a8sKKkGjhjW3Ph6kw--/YXBwaWQ9aGlnaGxhbmRlcjt3PTk2MDtoPTYwMA--/https://media.zenfs.com/en/the_telegraph_258/ed471100b6897b63f544be15377f1246The oil tanker Marlin Luanda on fire after a Houthi attack - Indian NavyI had a discussion afterwards with a young man who had joined the Royal Navy to become a clearance diver, only to emerge from basic training (at which he excelled) to find that there was a waiting list of 6 years. He has now left the service. A gathering with some old and bold types from HMS Ark Royal the other day revealed that literally everyone there knew of someone whose attempts to join had been thwarted by some form of bureaucratic inefficiency, technicality or sheer delay.

Whatever the Haythornthwaite Review of Armed Forces Incentivisation recommended to fix all of these issues, it isn’t working yet. Red lights are blinking on all over the world and yet even now, it appears that the UK Government doesn’t see defense spending as a priority. When the head of the British Army event hints at something like conscription then you know all is not well.

More money isn’t the solution to everything, and there would need to be cast-iron assurances from across Defence that they would spend it better, but we can no longer ignore our funding black hole. The idea that it ‘might increase spending to 2.5 per cent when economic conditions allow’ doesn’t cut it anymore. The US Secretary of the Navy agrees, and very politely told us to do better. We should listen.

Offensive breakthroughs do happen. But they typically require a combination of offensive skill and a permissive environment created by shallow, forward defensive deployments or unmotivated or logistically unsupported defenders or both. The German invasion of France in 1940 knocked France out of the war in a month, and the German invasion of the Soviet Unionin 1941 advanced to the gates of Moscow in a season, but both offensives were enabled by shallow, ill-prepared defenses that committed too much of their combat power forward where it could be pinned down, away from the point of attack. The American offensive in Operation Cobra in Normandy in 1944 broke through an atypically shallow, forward German defense. The Israeli offensive in the 1967 War broke through Egyptian defenses in the Sinai in less than six days, but this was enabled by poor Egyptian combat preparations and motivation.

The American offensive in Operation Desert Storm of 1991 reconquered Kuwait in 100 hours, but this was enabled by fatally flawed Iraqi fighting positions and the limited skills of Iraqi soldiers. Similarly, Ukrainian offensives at Kyiv and Kharkiv in 2022 broke through shallow, overextended Russian defenses, and the Ukrainian offensive at Kherson in 2022 overwhelmed a logistically unsustainable Russian defense that was isolated on the western side of the Dnipro River.

By 2023, however, the Russians had adapted and deployed a more orthodox defense in depth without the geographical vulnerability that had undermined them at Kherson. And these better-designed defenses were garrisoned by troops who fought. Russia’s poor performance and weak combat motivation in 2022 had led many to expect Russian incompetence or cowardice or both in 2023, but the Russians had learned enough from their failures to present a much tougher target by then. Perhaps an attacker with U.S.-level skills and training could have broken through, as those who emphasize training or operational decision-making tend to imply. But a large advantage in skill and motivation is needed to breach defenses like these. Ukraine did not enjoy this in 2023, and it is unclear whether even American troops would have the skill differential sufficient for a task this difficult

Some blame the United States for Ukraine’s failed offensive. Not all of Kyiv’s requests for assistance were granted. For example, if the United States had provided F-16 fighters, the long-range missiles known as ATACMS, or Abrams tanks sooner and in larger quantity, they argue, Ukraine could have broken through. More and better equipment always helps, so surely the offensive would have made more progress with more advanced weapons.But technology is rarely decisive in land warfare, and none of these weapons were likely to transform the 2023 offensive.

The F-16, for example, is a 46-year-old platform that would not be survivable in Ukraine’s air defense environment. The United States and NATO are replacing it with more advanced F-35 fighter jets precisely because it is too vulnerable. Although the F-16 has been modernized since its introduction in 1978 and it would be an upgrade to Ukraine’s even older and less survivable Soviet-era MIG-29s, a fleet of F-16s would not give Ukraine air superiority in any way that could create a breakthrough on the ground.

ATACMS missiles would have enabled Ukraine to strike deeper targets, especially in Russian-held Crimea, and this would have reduced the efficiency of the Russian logistical system in particular. But all weapons have countermeasures, and the Russians have already proved adept at countering the GPS guidance that ATACMS uses to hit its targets. The shorter-range HIMARS missile system was highly effective for Ukraine when first introduced to the war in 2022 but is now much less so, in part because the Russians have reduced their reliance on large supply nodes within the weapon’s reach but also because they have learned to jam the GPS signals that both missile systems use for guidance.

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If quality can ensure quick, decisive victories, the traditional U.S. approach is sound. But if the lesson of Ukraine’s 2023 offensive, in light of past experience, is that deep and well-prepared defenses remain robust, as they have been for the last century, then quality alone may not be enough to ensure the kind of short wars of quick decisive breakthroughs that U.S. defense planning has long tended to presuppose. Quality is necessary for opportunity but may be insufficient in itself for success. And if so, the United States may need to rethink its balance of quality and quantity in a world where permissive conditions happen sometimes but cannot be guaranteed.

LONDON — UK Royal Navy vessels are unable to attack Houthi positions in Yemen because they lack the necessary missiles, it has been revealed, in what one former defense chief called a "scandal."

Britain has joined America in conducting operations against the Houthis in a bid to halt attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, but the US Navy has had to carry out the majority of strikes on the Yemeni mainland, the Daily Telegraph reported.

A UK defense source told the newspaper that HMS Diamond, the Royal Navy destroyer stationed in the Red Sea, lacks "the capability to fire to land targets," meaning the UK's sole source of offensive capability comes from Royal Air Force jets stationed at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, around 1,500 miles away.

HMS Diamond, the source said, has instead been involved in downing " Houthi drones targeting shipping in the Red Sea," with the only functioning weapons systems on UK destroyers being fixed artillery guns.

US Navy destroyers, meanwhile, have the capacity to fire Tomahawk guided missiles, with a range of 1,500 miles.

A former senior defense chief told the Daily Telegraph: "It's clearly a scandal and completely unsatisfactory. This is what happens when the Royal Navy is forced to make crucial decisions which can affect capability.

"The UK is now having to fly RAF jets thousands of miles to do the job of what a surface-to-surface missile can do."

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, head of the UK Armed Forces, warned the government of the need to "speed up our acquisition processes" for "land attack missile systems" on British vessels five years ago when he was head of the Royal Navy.

Since then, a temporary system of Norwegian-made Naval Strike missiles has been installed on just one UK vessel, and has yet to be tested. A new cruise missile system for British warships is due to be introduced in 2028.

Conservative MP Mark Francois, a former armed forces minister, told the Daily Telegraph: "The lack of a land attack missile from the Royal Navy's surface fleet was specifically highlighted in a defence committee report some two years ago.

"It is encouraging that this missile is now on order but also disappointing that it is still not yet in operational service."

Earlier this year, US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro warned that Royal Navy investment is "significantly important" given "the near-term threats to the UK and US."

The former chair of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Tobias Ellwood, urged Defense Secretary Grant Shapps to review the situation.

"We can't continue to do this with a surface fleet that's too small and cannot fire on land at range," Ellwood said.

On Saturday, Shapps said: "It is our duty to protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and we remain as committed to that cause as ever."

A spokesman for the UK Ministry of Defence said in a statement: "As with all coalition operations, commanders select the best equipment for the job. HMS Diamond is an air defence destroyer, which has been directly involved in successfully destroying Houthi drones targeting shipping in the Red Sea.

"Equally, the Royal Air Force has the capability to strike land targets with high precision, which is why Typhoon aircraft strikes have reduced the Houthis ability to conduct these attacks."


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Leaders demand EU gets real about arming Ukraine

We’ve “fallen short” on 1M shells pledge but “our efforts must not wither,” 5 European leaders said. SHARE
Free article usually reserved for subscribershttps://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=1160,height=773,quality=80,onerror=redirect, format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/31/GettyImages-1248455663-scaled.jpgThe letter comes amid mounting calls from European leaders to ramp up military aid to Ukraine Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images
JANUARY 31, 2024 9:43 AM CET
BY NICOLAS CAMUTEurope needs a collective effort to arm Ukraine for the long term, five key EU leaders said Wednesday.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and four prime ministers — Denmark's Mette Frederiksen, the Czech Republic's Petr Fiala, Estonia's Kaja Kallas and the Netherlands' Mark Rutte — made the argument in an open letter published Wednesday by the Financial Times.

Acknowledging that the EU will have "fallen short" of its goal to send 1 million shells to Ukraine before March, the leaders said that "our efforts must not wither," as Kyiv's troops continue to fend off Russian President Vladimir Putin's full-scale invasion.

EU leaders will gather for a crucial summit in Brussels on Thursday, where they are expected to reaffirm the bloc's support to Ukraine, and discuss a €50 billion aid package to Kyiv.

Germany's Scholz has been the most vocal leader in calling on his European counterparts to do more to arm Ukraine.

"The arms deliveries for Ukraine planned so far by the majority of EU member states are by all means too small," the German chancellor said earlier this month. "We need higher contributions."

Germany has sent €17.1 billion in military commitments to Kyiv — more than any other European country, according to the Kiel Institute, which keeps track of aid commitments.

The U.K. comes in second at €6.6 billion, with Poland third at €3 billion.

France, which has been vocal about the need to reform European defense so the EU can support Ukraine even without the U.S., has so far sent Kyiv €500 million in military aid.

It isn’t “isolationism” to wonder if a single nation—even a very powerful one—can or should engage in this many conflicts, however indirectly, without inevitably neglecting the domestic foundations of its well-being. Ordinary Americans of both parties get this. It’s what they have in mind when they complain that America is “protecting other people’s borders when our own border is broken.” That might be a crude way to put it, but such statements contain a big kernel of truth. One hundred thousand Americans die from opioids annually. Working-class life expectancy is on a downward trajectory. Millions of working-age men have checked out of the labor force. Our industrial base, including, crucially, our military-industrial base, remains a shell of its former self. Against this backdrop, it’s reasonable to ask our leaders to at least prioritize among the various proxy conflicts and limited interventions.