Any "Latest & Greatest" about Delta?
10-01-2011, 08:04 PM
Happy to be here
Joined APC: Jun 2006
Position: A-320A
Posts: 18,563
Maybe, but the fact is that something got passed. When a Drafting Committee passes something, they package it with all of their other resolutions and then bring them to the MEC as a whole where the entire MEC votes up or down on their recommendations.
If a resolution warrants and drafting committee can bring a specific resolution to the floor for a debate and vote by all the reps. This normally does not happen, but can if needed.
The 8-1 vote was in a nine member drafting committee, but the entire voting MEC (21 members) affirmed this drafting committees position.
10-01-2011, 08:08 PM
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2010
Position: 7ERA
Posts: 269
This?
The S/T piece?
The 5% I have commented in previous Updates that our MEC is working well together to enhance the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots. This is still the case, and we are marching steadily toward our Section 6 openers with a unified sense of purpose, if not unanimity. This sense of purpose has been further solidified in the recent unanimous reelection of our Negotiating Committee and was further articulated in MEC resolution A11-145, which was passed unanimously at the last MEC meeting.
WHEREAS the goal of the Delta MEC in upcoming Section 6 negotiations is to achieve our pilots' goals in respect to improvements to the pay, benefits, working condi-tions, retirement, and job security for the Delta pilots, and
WHEREAS unity of purpose and solidarity of both the MEC and of the Delta pilots is essential to achieving these goals,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOL VED that the MEC pledges and commits to maximize and maintain unity and solidarity in pursuit of these goals both within the MEC and the pilot group.
This resolution has some interesting subtexts. It has often been said that we agree on 95 percent of the issues and that we should focus on what we have in common and disregard the 5 percent. I mostly agree, and this is exactly what we do on a daily basis. That said, while united in common purpose, we can still disagree and vigorously debate the remain-ing 5 percent, and that 5 percent can contain some very significant issues. (For example, the Delta pilots' PWA has 28 sections and is approaching 29 LOAs—5 percent could be almost three PWA sections.)
The 5 percent where we don't see eye to eye often has to do with deep philosophical differences over the organizational structure that our MEC embodies, its processes, and the manner in which it governs itself within the confines and latitude of the ALPA Constitution and By-Laws. The ALPA C&BL (like many governing directives) has been described as a circle of rules to operate within. An organization can be at the center of the circle, on the edges, or just touch it tangentially , and still claim to be within policy guidance. Obviously where you are in that circle provides for considerable latitude in the flavor of an organization.
Within our MEC there are two distinct schools of thought on how to function. For discus-sion purposes they are portrayed as opposites—the reality is a bit more blurred, in large measure in order to compromise in the areas where we do agree.
One school, and the prevailing sentiment, is that of our MEC as a BOD (board of directors) voting on the decisions of the CEO (chairman, officers), or as the commanding officer of a military unit with the reps as subordinate department heads, following the chain of command. The other view, which is more prevalent within the Association, is that the MEC reps are a legislative body, with the MEC chairman and officers as a support council (as articulated in the ALPA C&BL) for the voting body of the MEC.
The former school argues that we elect an MEC chairman and officers to lead and repre-sent us, that we must place our trust in them and ratify their decisions and priorities, and that this “ratification” must be unanimous. This perspective also believes that non-unan-imous votes should not be explained by the dissenters, since it might “harm unity”—even if those in the minority express their support of the majority after the explanation. This has been expressed as “we are a one-party system”; we are like a football team, with the MEC chairman as the “coach” and the Com-pany the other team.
In this world, public discussion of differing views on issues has variously been described as destroying unity, mischaracterizations, undermining our organization, and, lately, has even been suggested as advocating for or strengthening those who seek alternative representation.* Discussion of differing views has also been described as useless “underbrush” and generally viewed as not moving us forward toward our articulated goals, where previously decided issues (in the favor of the prevailing structure) can never be revisited. Basically, public debate or disagreement is treated as “unpatriotic.”
The other school of thought believes, per the C&BL, that the ~12,600 Delta pilots demo-cratically elect 21 LEC status (and 10 nonstatus) representatives to make the decisions as directed by the membership, and the MEC chairman is more akin to the Speaker of the House. While we function under one system of ALPA governance, we are not always going to be unanimous, even though we may have unity of purpose. We may not be exactly like Republicans and Democrats relative to the national debate, but we do have differ-ing views of issues: Our pilots expect and deserve to hear both sides of a debate, and not simply be presented with option “A” or ordered to obey. This school also believes that all portions of the contract, from the most significant to the most mundane, are important, and must be fought for and protected equally. No portion of our representative duties are useless “underbrush,” and we shouldn't minimize lesser aspects of routine MEC business, nor accept that they detract from the goal of improving the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots in Section 6.
Additional aspects of the 5 percent involve the MEC committee structure, its election process, and the chain of command relative to the committees and the MEC. Currently, only the Negotiating and Merger Committees are elected, with all other standing com-mittee chairman appointed by the MEC chairman and ratified by the MEC. In the past we have usually been informed of the chairman's choices after they are made, shortly before or during an MEC meeting.
The committee chairmen are, by internal policy, strongly discouraged from initiating con-tacts with LEC representatives and must report all contact with the LEC representatives to the (unelected) executive administrators (EAs). The committee chairmen and members must adhere to a very linear , vertical structure that hinders free exchange of communica-tions with the duly elected representatives of the Delta pilots. This is ostensibly due to the size and complexity of the MEC and the theory that only the MEC administration can logistically direct a committee for action. The reality is that an EA can essentially act as a “super” committee chairman, with veto powers on every committee, and can almost unilaterally decide what material or information makes it out of a committee to manage-ment, the reps, or the MEC chairman. Objections to this system recently contributed to the resignation of a committee vice chairman, as well as a previous P2P chairman.
The current committees consist of very capable, smart volunteers who do an outstanding job. The problem with this governance structure is not who is doing the work, but the im-pediments to open communication and information flow among the committee chairmen/ members, the MEC, and the pilot membership in general.
Also, while I'm not suggesting that the current committee membership is not capable of exemplary performance, when vacancies become available this restrictive system also has the disadvantage of cutting out a huge pool of available volunteer talent. The MEC chairmen historically have neither advertised for nor solicited input from subject-matter experts for standing committee chairmen and members. With a pilot group of our size, we have pilots with varied backgrounds and educational and professional experience that represent the full spectrum of our committees' areas of expertise. We have permitted the concentration of power , in making these key appointment decisions for the entire Delta pilot group, to be placed in one individual. And there is a natural tendency for him to draw this talent from the narrow pool of previous volunteers he has personally experi-enced and is comfortable with, potentially excluding from consideration 12,600 possible sources of expertise. While the MEC still has the ability to not ratify appointments, they do not have the ability to have any initiative regarding who the appointees are. Having the best person selected for a committee position in the first place is much more impor-tant than not ratifying someone who is very capable but not the best choice.
Our current system of MEC governance is weighted toward this top-down system, and, to date, attempts to transform it via resolutions to change the DAL MEC Policy Manual (requiring a two-thirds vote) have failed. I believe this system allows the “MEC administration”—a term never heard before this MEC, and in and of itself im-plying a separate status—far too much authority and latitude. It has created, through previous policy manual revisions ratified during the preceding MEC chairman's term of office, a self-propagating and -perpetuating executive branch of government of the MEC, with the inherent powers thereof, consisting of volunteers who are largely appointed by and, most importantly, responsible to a single individual, as opposed to those elected by and responsible to the pilot group's LEC repre-sentatives as members of the MEC.
This system, in my view, is not consistent with the democratic prin-ciples upon which ALPA was founded.
While appearing on the surface to be a pure representative de-mocracy, in practice our MEC administration functions more like an oligarchy that, again in my opinion, due to the lack of diversity in personnel and strict command and control, does not exploit the maximum potential of the Delta pilot group in order to yield the best product for the Delta pilots. It may be very disciplined and effec-tive at control and “winning,” but it is narrow in its flexibility and thinking.
As the old HR question of “define diversity in your own terms” goes, my answer is that, while it makes some of us uncomfortable and is annoying to others, our differences make us a stronger organization at the end of the day.
It is important to be emphasize that despite these philosophical and cultural differences, all our volunteers, regardless of where we stand on an issue, are unified in purpose, and all want the best represen-tation and contract for the Delta pilots. We do, and will continue to, get the pilots' work done. We simply differ on the road to get there and who gives the directions.
While these differences may appear significant, the 95 percent where we work well together is even more so.
The S/T piece?
The 5% I have commented in previous Updates that our MEC is working well together to enhance the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots. This is still the case, and we are marching steadily toward our Section 6 openers with a unified sense of purpose, if not unanimity. This sense of purpose has been further solidified in the recent unanimous reelection of our Negotiating Committee and was further articulated in MEC resolution A11-145, which was passed unanimously at the last MEC meeting.
WHEREAS the goal of the Delta MEC in upcoming Section 6 negotiations is to achieve our pilots' goals in respect to improvements to the pay, benefits, working condi-tions, retirement, and job security for the Delta pilots, and
WHEREAS unity of purpose and solidarity of both the MEC and of the Delta pilots is essential to achieving these goals,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOL VED that the MEC pledges and commits to maximize and maintain unity and solidarity in pursuit of these goals both within the MEC and the pilot group.
This resolution has some interesting subtexts. It has often been said that we agree on 95 percent of the issues and that we should focus on what we have in common and disregard the 5 percent. I mostly agree, and this is exactly what we do on a daily basis. That said, while united in common purpose, we can still disagree and vigorously debate the remain-ing 5 percent, and that 5 percent can contain some very significant issues. (For example, the Delta pilots' PWA has 28 sections and is approaching 29 LOAs—5 percent could be almost three PWA sections.)
The 5 percent where we don't see eye to eye often has to do with deep philosophical differences over the organizational structure that our MEC embodies, its processes, and the manner in which it governs itself within the confines and latitude of the ALPA Constitution and By-Laws. The ALPA C&BL (like many governing directives) has been described as a circle of rules to operate within. An organization can be at the center of the circle, on the edges, or just touch it tangentially , and still claim to be within policy guidance. Obviously where you are in that circle provides for considerable latitude in the flavor of an organization.
Within our MEC there are two distinct schools of thought on how to function. For discus-sion purposes they are portrayed as opposites—the reality is a bit more blurred, in large measure in order to compromise in the areas where we do agree.
One school, and the prevailing sentiment, is that of our MEC as a BOD (board of directors) voting on the decisions of the CEO (chairman, officers), or as the commanding officer of a military unit with the reps as subordinate department heads, following the chain of command. The other view, which is more prevalent within the Association, is that the MEC reps are a legislative body, with the MEC chairman and officers as a support council (as articulated in the ALPA C&BL) for the voting body of the MEC.
The former school argues that we elect an MEC chairman and officers to lead and repre-sent us, that we must place our trust in them and ratify their decisions and priorities, and that this “ratification” must be unanimous. This perspective also believes that non-unan-imous votes should not be explained by the dissenters, since it might “harm unity”—even if those in the minority express their support of the majority after the explanation. This has been expressed as “we are a one-party system”; we are like a football team, with the MEC chairman as the “coach” and the Com-pany the other team.
In this world, public discussion of differing views on issues has variously been described as destroying unity, mischaracterizations, undermining our organization, and, lately, has even been suggested as advocating for or strengthening those who seek alternative representation.* Discussion of differing views has also been described as useless “underbrush” and generally viewed as not moving us forward toward our articulated goals, where previously decided issues (in the favor of the prevailing structure) can never be revisited. Basically, public debate or disagreement is treated as “unpatriotic.”
The other school of thought believes, per the C&BL, that the ~12,600 Delta pilots demo-cratically elect 21 LEC status (and 10 nonstatus) representatives to make the decisions as directed by the membership, and the MEC chairman is more akin to the Speaker of the House. While we function under one system of ALPA governance, we are not always going to be unanimous, even though we may have unity of purpose. We may not be exactly like Republicans and Democrats relative to the national debate, but we do have differ-ing views of issues: Our pilots expect and deserve to hear both sides of a debate, and not simply be presented with option “A” or ordered to obey. This school also believes that all portions of the contract, from the most significant to the most mundane, are important, and must be fought for and protected equally. No portion of our representative duties are useless “underbrush,” and we shouldn't minimize lesser aspects of routine MEC business, nor accept that they detract from the goal of improving the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots in Section 6.
Additional aspects of the 5 percent involve the MEC committee structure, its election process, and the chain of command relative to the committees and the MEC. Currently, only the Negotiating and Merger Committees are elected, with all other standing com-mittee chairman appointed by the MEC chairman and ratified by the MEC. In the past we have usually been informed of the chairman's choices after they are made, shortly before or during an MEC meeting.
The committee chairmen are, by internal policy, strongly discouraged from initiating con-tacts with LEC representatives and must report all contact with the LEC representatives to the (unelected) executive administrators (EAs). The committee chairmen and members must adhere to a very linear , vertical structure that hinders free exchange of communica-tions with the duly elected representatives of the Delta pilots. This is ostensibly due to the size and complexity of the MEC and the theory that only the MEC administration can logistically direct a committee for action. The reality is that an EA can essentially act as a “super” committee chairman, with veto powers on every committee, and can almost unilaterally decide what material or information makes it out of a committee to manage-ment, the reps, or the MEC chairman. Objections to this system recently contributed to the resignation of a committee vice chairman, as well as a previous P2P chairman.
The current committees consist of very capable, smart volunteers who do an outstanding job. The problem with this governance structure is not who is doing the work, but the im-pediments to open communication and information flow among the committee chairmen/ members, the MEC, and the pilot membership in general.
Also, while I'm not suggesting that the current committee membership is not capable of exemplary performance, when vacancies become available this restrictive system also has the disadvantage of cutting out a huge pool of available volunteer talent. The MEC chairmen historically have neither advertised for nor solicited input from subject-matter experts for standing committee chairmen and members. With a pilot group of our size, we have pilots with varied backgrounds and educational and professional experience that represent the full spectrum of our committees' areas of expertise. We have permitted the concentration of power , in making these key appointment decisions for the entire Delta pilot group, to be placed in one individual. And there is a natural tendency for him to draw this talent from the narrow pool of previous volunteers he has personally experi-enced and is comfortable with, potentially excluding from consideration 12,600 possible sources of expertise. While the MEC still has the ability to not ratify appointments, they do not have the ability to have any initiative regarding who the appointees are. Having the best person selected for a committee position in the first place is much more impor-tant than not ratifying someone who is very capable but not the best choice.
Our current system of MEC governance is weighted toward this top-down system, and, to date, attempts to transform it via resolutions to change the DAL MEC Policy Manual (requiring a two-thirds vote) have failed. I believe this system allows the “MEC administration”—a term never heard before this MEC, and in and of itself im-plying a separate status—far too much authority and latitude. It has created, through previous policy manual revisions ratified during the preceding MEC chairman's term of office, a self-propagating and -perpetuating executive branch of government of the MEC, with the inherent powers thereof, consisting of volunteers who are largely appointed by and, most importantly, responsible to a single individual, as opposed to those elected by and responsible to the pilot group's LEC repre-sentatives as members of the MEC.
This system, in my view, is not consistent with the democratic prin-ciples upon which ALPA was founded.
While appearing on the surface to be a pure representative de-mocracy, in practice our MEC administration functions more like an oligarchy that, again in my opinion, due to the lack of diversity in personnel and strict command and control, does not exploit the maximum potential of the Delta pilot group in order to yield the best product for the Delta pilots. It may be very disciplined and effec-tive at control and “winning,” but it is narrow in its flexibility and thinking.
As the old HR question of “define diversity in your own terms” goes, my answer is that, while it makes some of us uncomfortable and is annoying to others, our differences make us a stronger organization at the end of the day.
It is important to be emphasize that despite these philosophical and cultural differences, all our volunteers, regardless of where we stand on an issue, are unified in purpose, and all want the best represen-tation and contract for the Delta pilots. We do, and will continue to, get the pilots' work done. We simply differ on the road to get there and who gives the directions.
While these differences may appear significant, the 95 percent where we work well together is even more so.
10-01-2011, 09:01 PM
Da Hudge
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: Poodle Whisperer
Posts: 17,473
I say someone submit a resolution that we change our hats:
In honor of October, of course.
In honor of October, of course.
Last edited by 80ktsClamp; 10-01-2011 at 09:31 PM.
10-01-2011, 09:29 PM
Inventory survival kit ..
Joined APC: Jul 2008
Position: Seeking no jacket required rotations
Posts: 1,069
This?
The S/T piece?
The 5% I have commented in previous Updates that our MEC is working well together to enhance the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots. This is still the case, and we are marching steadily toward our Section 6 openers with a unified sense of purpose, if not unanimity. This sense of purpose has been further solidified in the recent unanimous reelection of our Negotiating Committee and was further articulated in MEC resolution A11-145, which was passed unanimously at the last MEC meeting.
WHEREAS the goal of the Delta MEC in upcoming Section 6 negotiations is to achieve our pilots' goals in respect to improvements to the pay, benefits, working condi-tions, retirement, and job security for the Delta pilots, and
WHEREAS unity of purpose and solidarity of both the MEC and of the Delta pilots is essential to achieving these goals,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOL VED that the MEC pledges and commits to maximize and maintain unity and solidarity in pursuit of these goals both within the MEC and the pilot group.
This resolution has some interesting subtexts. It has often been said that we agree on 95 percent of the issues and that we should focus on what we have in common and disregard the 5 percent. I mostly agree, and this is exactly what we do on a daily basis. That said, while united in common purpose, we can still disagree and vigorously debate the remain-ing 5 percent, and that 5 percent can contain some very significant issues. (For example, the Delta pilots' PWA has 28 sections and is approaching 29 LOAs—5 percent could be almost three PWA sections.)
The 5 percent where we don't see eye to eye often has to do with deep philosophical differences over the organizational structure that our MEC embodies, its processes, and the manner in which it governs itself within the confines and latitude of the ALPA Constitution and By-Laws. The ALPA C&BL (like many governing directives) has been described as a circle of rules to operate within. An organization can be at the center of the circle, on the edges, or just touch it tangentially , and still claim to be within policy guidance. Obviously where you are in that circle provides for considerable latitude in the flavor of an organization.
Within our MEC there are two distinct schools of thought on how to function. For discus-sion purposes they are portrayed as opposites—the reality is a bit more blurred, in large measure in order to compromise in the areas where we do agree.
One school, and the prevailing sentiment, is that of our MEC as a BOD (board of directors) voting on the decisions of the CEO (chairman, officers), or as the commanding officer of a military unit with the reps as subordinate department heads, following the chain of command. The other view, which is more prevalent within the Association, is that the MEC reps are a legislative body, with the MEC chairman and officers as a support council (as articulated in the ALPA C&BL) for the voting body of the MEC.
The former school argues that we elect an MEC chairman and officers to lead and repre-sent us, that we must place our trust in them and ratify their decisions and priorities, and that this “ratification” must be unanimous. This perspective also believes that non-unan-imous votes should not be explained by the dissenters, since it might “harm unity”—even if those in the minority express their support of the majority after the explanation. This has been expressed as “we are a one-party system”; we are like a football team, with the MEC chairman as the “coach” and the Com-pany the other team.
In this world, public discussion of differing views on issues has variously been described as destroying unity, mischaracterizations, undermining our organization, and, lately, has even been suggested as advocating for or strengthening those who seek alternative representation.* Discussion of differing views has also been described as useless “underbrush” and generally viewed as not moving us forward toward our articulated goals, where previously decided issues (in the favor of the prevailing structure) can never be revisited. Basically, public debate or disagreement is treated as “unpatriotic.”
The other school of thought believes, per the C&BL, that the ~12,600 Delta pilots demo-cratically elect 21 LEC status (and 10 nonstatus) representatives to make the decisions as directed by the membership, and the MEC chairman is more akin to the Speaker of the House. While we function under one system of ALPA governance, we are not always going to be unanimous, even though we may have unity of purpose. We may not be exactly like Republicans and Democrats relative to the national debate, but we do have differ-ing views of issues: Our pilots expect and deserve to hear both sides of a debate, and not simply be presented with option “A” or ordered to obey. This school also believes that all portions of the contract, from the most significant to the most mundane, are important, and must be fought for and protected equally. No portion of our representative duties are useless “underbrush,” and we shouldn't minimize lesser aspects of routine MEC business, nor accept that they detract from the goal of improving the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots in Section 6.
Additional aspects of the 5 percent involve the MEC committee structure, its election process, and the chain of command relative to the committees and the MEC. Currently, only the Negotiating and Merger Committees are elected, with all other standing com-mittee chairman appointed by the MEC chairman and ratified by the MEC. In the past we have usually been informed of the chairman's choices after they are made, shortly before or during an MEC meeting.
The committee chairmen are, by internal policy, strongly discouraged from initiating con-tacts with LEC representatives and must report all contact with the LEC representatives to the (unelected) executive administrators (EAs). The committee chairmen and members must adhere to a very linear , vertical structure that hinders free exchange of communica-tions with the duly elected representatives of the Delta pilots. This is ostensibly due to the size and complexity of the MEC and the theory that only the MEC administration can logistically direct a committee for action. The reality is that an EA can essentially act as a “super” committee chairman, with veto powers on every committee, and can almost unilaterally decide what material or information makes it out of a committee to manage-ment, the reps, or the MEC chairman. Objections to this system recently contributed to the resignation of a committee vice chairman, as well as a previous P2P chairman.
The current committees consist of very capable, smart volunteers who do an outstanding job. The problem with this governance structure is not who is doing the work, but the im-pediments to open communication and information flow among the committee chairmen/ members, the MEC, and the pilot membership in general.
Also, while I'm not suggesting that the current committee membership is not capable of exemplary performance, when vacancies become available this restrictive system also has the disadvantage of cutting out a huge pool of available volunteer talent. The MEC chairmen historically have neither advertised for nor solicited input from subject-matter experts for standing committee chairmen and members. With a pilot group of our size, we have pilots with varied backgrounds and educational and professional experience that represent the full spectrum of our committees' areas of expertise. We have permitted the concentration of power , in making these key appointment decisions for the entire Delta pilot group, to be placed in one individual. And there is a natural tendency for him to draw this talent from the narrow pool of previous volunteers he has personally experi-enced and is comfortable with, potentially excluding from consideration 12,600 possible sources of expertise. While the MEC still has the ability to not ratify appointments, they do not have the ability to have any initiative regarding who the appointees are. Having the best person selected for a committee position in the first place is much more impor-tant than not ratifying someone who is very capable but not the best choice.
Our current system of MEC governance is weighted toward this top-down system, and, to date, attempts to transform it via resolutions to change the DAL MEC Policy Manual (requiring a two-thirds vote) have failed. I believe this system allows the “MEC administration”—a term never heard before this MEC, and in and of itself im-plying a separate status—far too much authority and latitude. It has created, through previous policy manual revisions ratified during the preceding MEC chairman's term of office, a self-propagating and -perpetuating executive branch of government of the MEC, with the inherent powers thereof, consisting of volunteers who are largely appointed by and, most importantly, responsible to a single individual, as opposed to those elected by and responsible to the pilot group's LEC repre-sentatives as members of the MEC.
This system, in my view, is not consistent with the democratic prin-ciples upon which ALPA was founded.
While appearing on the surface to be a pure representative de-mocracy, in practice our MEC administration functions more like an oligarchy that, again in my opinion, due to the lack of diversity in personnel and strict command and control, does not exploit the maximum potential of the Delta pilot group in order to yield the best product for the Delta pilots. It may be very disciplined and effec-tive at control and “winning,” but it is narrow in its flexibility and thinking.
As the old HR question of “define diversity in your own terms” goes, my answer is that, while it makes some of us uncomfortable and is annoying to others, our differences make us a stronger organization at the end of the day.
It is important to be emphasize that despite these philosophical and cultural differences, all our volunteers, regardless of where we stand on an issue, are unified in purpose, and all want the best represen-tation and contract for the Delta pilots. We do, and will continue to, get the pilots' work done. We simply differ on the road to get there and who gives the directions.
While these differences may appear significant, the 95 percent where we work well together is even more so.
The S/T piece?
The 5% I have commented in previous Updates that our MEC is working well together to enhance the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots. This is still the case, and we are marching steadily toward our Section 6 openers with a unified sense of purpose, if not unanimity. This sense of purpose has been further solidified in the recent unanimous reelection of our Negotiating Committee and was further articulated in MEC resolution A11-145, which was passed unanimously at the last MEC meeting.
WHEREAS the goal of the Delta MEC in upcoming Section 6 negotiations is to achieve our pilots' goals in respect to improvements to the pay, benefits, working condi-tions, retirement, and job security for the Delta pilots, and
WHEREAS unity of purpose and solidarity of both the MEC and of the Delta pilots is essential to achieving these goals,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOL VED that the MEC pledges and commits to maximize and maintain unity and solidarity in pursuit of these goals both within the MEC and the pilot group.
This resolution has some interesting subtexts. It has often been said that we agree on 95 percent of the issues and that we should focus on what we have in common and disregard the 5 percent. I mostly agree, and this is exactly what we do on a daily basis. That said, while united in common purpose, we can still disagree and vigorously debate the remain-ing 5 percent, and that 5 percent can contain some very significant issues. (For example, the Delta pilots' PWA has 28 sections and is approaching 29 LOAs—5 percent could be almost three PWA sections.)
The 5 percent where we don't see eye to eye often has to do with deep philosophical differences over the organizational structure that our MEC embodies, its processes, and the manner in which it governs itself within the confines and latitude of the ALPA Constitution and By-Laws. The ALPA C&BL (like many governing directives) has been described as a circle of rules to operate within. An organization can be at the center of the circle, on the edges, or just touch it tangentially , and still claim to be within policy guidance. Obviously where you are in that circle provides for considerable latitude in the flavor of an organization.
Within our MEC there are two distinct schools of thought on how to function. For discus-sion purposes they are portrayed as opposites—the reality is a bit more blurred, in large measure in order to compromise in the areas where we do agree.
One school, and the prevailing sentiment, is that of our MEC as a BOD (board of directors) voting on the decisions of the CEO (chairman, officers), or as the commanding officer of a military unit with the reps as subordinate department heads, following the chain of command. The other view, which is more prevalent within the Association, is that the MEC reps are a legislative body, with the MEC chairman and officers as a support council (as articulated in the ALPA C&BL) for the voting body of the MEC.
The former school argues that we elect an MEC chairman and officers to lead and repre-sent us, that we must place our trust in them and ratify their decisions and priorities, and that this “ratification” must be unanimous. This perspective also believes that non-unan-imous votes should not be explained by the dissenters, since it might “harm unity”—even if those in the minority express their support of the majority after the explanation. This has been expressed as “we are a one-party system”; we are like a football team, with the MEC chairman as the “coach” and the Com-pany the other team.
In this world, public discussion of differing views on issues has variously been described as destroying unity, mischaracterizations, undermining our organization, and, lately, has even been suggested as advocating for or strengthening those who seek alternative representation.* Discussion of differing views has also been described as useless “underbrush” and generally viewed as not moving us forward toward our articulated goals, where previously decided issues (in the favor of the prevailing structure) can never be revisited. Basically, public debate or disagreement is treated as “unpatriotic.”
The other school of thought believes, per the C&BL, that the ~12,600 Delta pilots demo-cratically elect 21 LEC status (and 10 nonstatus) representatives to make the decisions as directed by the membership, and the MEC chairman is more akin to the Speaker of the House. While we function under one system of ALPA governance, we are not always going to be unanimous, even though we may have unity of purpose. We may not be exactly like Republicans and Democrats relative to the national debate, but we do have differ-ing views of issues: Our pilots expect and deserve to hear both sides of a debate, and not simply be presented with option “A” or ordered to obey. This school also believes that all portions of the contract, from the most significant to the most mundane, are important, and must be fought for and protected equally. No portion of our representative duties are useless “underbrush,” and we shouldn't minimize lesser aspects of routine MEC business, nor accept that they detract from the goal of improving the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Delta pilots in Section 6.
Additional aspects of the 5 percent involve the MEC committee structure, its election process, and the chain of command relative to the committees and the MEC. Currently, only the Negotiating and Merger Committees are elected, with all other standing com-mittee chairman appointed by the MEC chairman and ratified by the MEC. In the past we have usually been informed of the chairman's choices after they are made, shortly before or during an MEC meeting.
The committee chairmen are, by internal policy, strongly discouraged from initiating con-tacts with LEC representatives and must report all contact with the LEC representatives to the (unelected) executive administrators (EAs). The committee chairmen and members must adhere to a very linear , vertical structure that hinders free exchange of communica-tions with the duly elected representatives of the Delta pilots. This is ostensibly due to the size and complexity of the MEC and the theory that only the MEC administration can logistically direct a committee for action. The reality is that an EA can essentially act as a “super” committee chairman, with veto powers on every committee, and can almost unilaterally decide what material or information makes it out of a committee to manage-ment, the reps, or the MEC chairman. Objections to this system recently contributed to the resignation of a committee vice chairman, as well as a previous P2P chairman.
The current committees consist of very capable, smart volunteers who do an outstanding job. The problem with this governance structure is not who is doing the work, but the im-pediments to open communication and information flow among the committee chairmen/ members, the MEC, and the pilot membership in general.
Also, while I'm not suggesting that the current committee membership is not capable of exemplary performance, when vacancies become available this restrictive system also has the disadvantage of cutting out a huge pool of available volunteer talent. The MEC chairmen historically have neither advertised for nor solicited input from subject-matter experts for standing committee chairmen and members. With a pilot group of our size, we have pilots with varied backgrounds and educational and professional experience that represent the full spectrum of our committees' areas of expertise. We have permitted the concentration of power , in making these key appointment decisions for the entire Delta pilot group, to be placed in one individual. And there is a natural tendency for him to draw this talent from the narrow pool of previous volunteers he has personally experi-enced and is comfortable with, potentially excluding from consideration 12,600 possible sources of expertise. While the MEC still has the ability to not ratify appointments, they do not have the ability to have any initiative regarding who the appointees are. Having the best person selected for a committee position in the first place is much more impor-tant than not ratifying someone who is very capable but not the best choice.
Our current system of MEC governance is weighted toward this top-down system, and, to date, attempts to transform it via resolutions to change the DAL MEC Policy Manual (requiring a two-thirds vote) have failed. I believe this system allows the “MEC administration”—a term never heard before this MEC, and in and of itself im-plying a separate status—far too much authority and latitude. It has created, through previous policy manual revisions ratified during the preceding MEC chairman's term of office, a self-propagating and -perpetuating executive branch of government of the MEC, with the inherent powers thereof, consisting of volunteers who are largely appointed by and, most importantly, responsible to a single individual, as opposed to those elected by and responsible to the pilot group's LEC repre-sentatives as members of the MEC.
This system, in my view, is not consistent with the democratic prin-ciples upon which ALPA was founded.
While appearing on the surface to be a pure representative de-mocracy, in practice our MEC administration functions more like an oligarchy that, again in my opinion, due to the lack of diversity in personnel and strict command and control, does not exploit the maximum potential of the Delta pilot group in order to yield the best product for the Delta pilots. It may be very disciplined and effec-tive at control and “winning,” but it is narrow in its flexibility and thinking.
As the old HR question of “define diversity in your own terms” goes, my answer is that, while it makes some of us uncomfortable and is annoying to others, our differences make us a stronger organization at the end of the day.
It is important to be emphasize that despite these philosophical and cultural differences, all our volunteers, regardless of where we stand on an issue, are unified in purpose, and all want the best represen-tation and contract for the Delta pilots. We do, and will continue to, get the pilots' work done. We simply differ on the road to get there and who gives the directions.
While these differences may appear significant, the 95 percent where we work well together is even more so.
This post is absolutely awesome re: Current DALPA structure and why it is FAIL. If I, as a line pilot, didn't get to elect the MEC Chairman he shouldn't get so much authority. Ditto for EA's.
Comment about next DALPA Treasurer redacted...
10-01-2011, 10:20 PM
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This?
Also, while I'm not suggesting that the current committee membership is not capable of exemplary performance, when vacancies become available this restrictive system also has the disadvantage of cutting out a huge pool of available volunteer talent. The MEC chairmen historically have neither advertised for nor solicited input from subject-matter experts for standing committee chairmen and members. With a pilot group of our size, we have pilots with varied backgrounds and educational and professional experience that represent the full spectrum of our committees' areas of expertise. We have permitted the concentration of power , in making these key appointment decisions for the entire Delta pilot group, to be placed in one individual. And there is a natural tendency for him to draw this talent from the narrow pool of previous volunteers he has personally experienced and is comfortable with, potentially excluding from consideration 12,600 possible sources of expertise. While the MEC still has the ability to not ratify appointments, they do not have the ability to have any initiative regarding who the appointees are. Having the best person selected for a committee position in the first place is much more impor-tant than not ratifying someone who is very capable but not the best choice.
Also, while I'm not suggesting that the current committee membership is not capable of exemplary performance, when vacancies become available this restrictive system also has the disadvantage of cutting out a huge pool of available volunteer talent. The MEC chairmen historically have neither advertised for nor solicited input from subject-matter experts for standing committee chairmen and members. With a pilot group of our size, we have pilots with varied backgrounds and educational and professional experience that represent the full spectrum of our committees' areas of expertise. We have permitted the concentration of power , in making these key appointment decisions for the entire Delta pilot group, to be placed in one individual. And there is a natural tendency for him to draw this talent from the narrow pool of previous volunteers he has personally experienced and is comfortable with, potentially excluding from consideration 12,600 possible sources of expertise. While the MEC still has the ability to not ratify appointments, they do not have the ability to have any initiative regarding who the appointees are. Having the best person selected for a committee position in the first place is much more impor-tant than not ratifying someone who is very capable but not the best choice.
The previous two A330-200 CROTs were staffed without any solicitation sent out to the pilot group at large. The current MEC Chairman was a member of the final A330-200 CROT.
Did you know there is currently an A330-300 CROT? Do you know who is on that commitee so you can send your input? Did you see anything from DALPA asking if you were interested in serving or what the qualifications were?
Note: CROT is covered in the PWA and as such is administered by the MEC Chairman on the DALPA side.
10-01-2011, 10:27 PM
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Example du Jour
The previous two A330-200 CROTs were staffed without any solicitation sent out to the pilot group at large. The current MEC Chairman was a member of the final A330-200 CROT.
Did you know there is currently an A330-300 CROT? Do you know who is on that commitee so you can send your input? Did you see anything from DALPA asking if you were interested in serving or what the qualifications were?
Note: CROT is covered in the PWA and as such is administered by the MEC Chairman on the DALPA side.
The previous two A330-200 CROTs were staffed without any solicitation sent out to the pilot group at large. The current MEC Chairman was a member of the final A330-200 CROT.
Did you know there is currently an A330-300 CROT? Do you know who is on that commitee so you can send your input? Did you see anything from DALPA asking if you were interested in serving or what the qualifications were?
Note: CROT is covered in the PWA and as such is administered by the MEC Chairman on the DALPA side.
10-01-2011, 11:35 PM
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10-01-2011, 11:51 PM
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10-02-2011, 01:17 AM
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Last edited by Fly4hire; 10-02-2011 at 01:46 AM.
10-02-2011, 01:23 AM
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Example du Jour
The previous two A330-200 CROTs were staffed without any solicitation sent out to the pilot group at large. The current MEC Chairman was a member of the final A330-200 CROT.
Did you know there is currently an A330-300 CROT? Do you know who is on that commitee so you can send your input? Did you see anything from DALPA asking if you were interested in serving or what the qualifications were?
Note: CROT is covered in the PWA and as such is administered by the MEC Chairman on the DALPA side.
The previous two A330-200 CROTs were staffed without any solicitation sent out to the pilot group at large. The current MEC Chairman was a member of the final A330-200 CROT.
Did you know there is currently an A330-300 CROT? Do you know who is on that commitee so you can send your input? Did you see anything from DALPA asking if you were interested in serving or what the qualifications were?
Note: CROT is covered in the PWA and as such is administered by the MEC Chairman on the DALPA side.
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