Any "Latest & Greatest" about Delta?
07-05-2011, 08:07 AM
Happy to be here
Joined APC: Jun 2006
Position: A-320A
Posts: 18,563
Yep I got rerouted do to mtc and lost over two hrs on a rotation. Even better is I went from four duty periods to three.
07-05-2011, 08:09 AM
veut gagner à la loterie
Joined APC: Apr 2008
Position: Light Chop
Posts: 23,286
The report is 34 pages. Here's the first one:
April 8, 1998
Background
In December of 1996, the MEC passed a resolution forming a Negotiations Review Committee. The MEC’s direction to the Committee was clear—they wanted a comprehensive, full-disclosure report of the most recent Delta Pilot Contract Negotiations concluded in May of 1996. MEC Chairman (redacted) appointed a three pilot committee. Acting as a confirmed member of the Negotiations Review Committee, I was thereby empowered by the MEC to perform this review. Following 9 months of effort, the Committee Chairman issued a verbal report during the October 1997 MEC meeting which, I believe, fell short of fulfilling the Committee’s obligation to the MEC, and ultimately, the Delta Pilots. After presenting the report the Committee resigned.
In this report, information and analysis is tied together through a historical review. My research included extensive written documentation and 128 interviews throughout all levels of the ALPA structure, from National officers to Line Pilots. Conclusions derive from the preponderance of circumstantial evidence and testimony. Hopefully, individual readers will weigh the information and develop their own perspective. I urge special attention to the series of recommendations at the end of the report.
Many interviewees were extremely candid and deserve our thanks for their willingness to selflessly give their time. In this report, I upheld the Committee’s promise to hold confidential sources of information. Perhaps at a later date, a fully supported investigation will interview participants under oath. I believe we can best move forward as a Union by honestly confronting our past, learning the lessons, and making changes where necessary.
Executive Summary
The Delta Pilots concluded the 1996 Negotiations arguably possessing the most favorable negotiating leverage presented any Pilot group post-Deregulation. Five consecutive quarters of record corporate profits, Management raises, upbeat analyst’s projections, a Democrat in the White House and an Atlanta Summer Olympics all pointed toward a truly progressive Agreement. Many industry observers expected the Delta Contract to lead the Piloting profession toward substantial gains. In the aftermath, the Amended Contract is clearly the most concessionary witnessed on the Delta property–this report addresses why.
Overwhelming circumstantial evidence and testimony indicates that the Delta Pilots were ill-served by specific individuals, in positions to control the negotiating process, for philosophical and personal financial reason. The MEC Chairman, Negotiating Committee Chairman, Retirement & Insurance Chairman and a senior Negotiating Committee Member had a significant Conflict of Interest, which they substantially withheld from the MEC and Pilot Group for the duration of the Negotiations. Management joined the Pilot Negotiator’s in severely limiting public understanding and discussion of the Negotiation’s dominant focus.
The MEC Chairman was allowed to define standard negotiating procedures and used distinctive methodologies to conceal concessions and personal gains. Standard analysis was denied to the MEC and staff reports were directed toward supporting concessionary bargaining. Neither the Pilots nor the MEC was provided accurate data showing the Amendment’s cost in jobs, working conditions and wages.
The structure, magnitude and negotiability of retirement provisions associated with the Pre-72 Minimum Benefit were misrepresented and withheld from the MEC. The Amended Contract substantially enhanced the retirement benefits of a few Pilots, who subsequently retired, at enormous cost to those who remained. Protection of key individual’s retirement benefits underlies virtually all aspects of the 1996 Negotiations.
The MEC failed to exercise its responsibility to ensure a balanced and equitable Contract. While the corporation was able to achieve specific concessions with rapid implementation, promised contractual improvements went largely unrealized. The majority of the contract language dealing with pilot issues was unwritten at the time of ratification. After contract ratification and during the crafting of the final language, disagreements and dissatisfaction with the final product reflected the MEC’s shallow understanding of what had been negotiated, while bringing into question the accuracy of details provided to the MEC and the pilot group by the negotiators and MEC officers.
The pilot group as a whole failed in their responsibility to make an informed ratification decision and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Early and repeated alarms from members who questioned the direction of Negotiations went unheeded. Members who persisted in questioning the MEC Leadership and Negotiators at Local Council meetings were rebuffed by their Leadership and ignored by their fellow council members. The lack of contractual language prior to ratification gave little cause for concern. Only during the implementation stage did the rank and file members recognize the impact of what they had ratified.
The report concludes with a series of Findings and Recommendations.
------------------
In fairness, this report was highly controversial. There are those who disagreed.
There is also at least 2 "rebuttals" to Ryan that defend the DALPA administration.
April 8, 1998
Background
In December of 1996, the MEC passed a resolution forming a Negotiations Review Committee. The MEC’s direction to the Committee was clear—they wanted a comprehensive, full-disclosure report of the most recent Delta Pilot Contract Negotiations concluded in May of 1996. MEC Chairman (redacted) appointed a three pilot committee. Acting as a confirmed member of the Negotiations Review Committee, I was thereby empowered by the MEC to perform this review. Following 9 months of effort, the Committee Chairman issued a verbal report during the October 1997 MEC meeting which, I believe, fell short of fulfilling the Committee’s obligation to the MEC, and ultimately, the Delta Pilots. After presenting the report the Committee resigned.
In this report, information and analysis is tied together through a historical review. My research included extensive written documentation and 128 interviews throughout all levels of the ALPA structure, from National officers to Line Pilots. Conclusions derive from the preponderance of circumstantial evidence and testimony. Hopefully, individual readers will weigh the information and develop their own perspective. I urge special attention to the series of recommendations at the end of the report.
Many interviewees were extremely candid and deserve our thanks for their willingness to selflessly give their time. In this report, I upheld the Committee’s promise to hold confidential sources of information. Perhaps at a later date, a fully supported investigation will interview participants under oath. I believe we can best move forward as a Union by honestly confronting our past, learning the lessons, and making changes where necessary.
Executive Summary
The Delta Pilots concluded the 1996 Negotiations arguably possessing the most favorable negotiating leverage presented any Pilot group post-Deregulation. Five consecutive quarters of record corporate profits, Management raises, upbeat analyst’s projections, a Democrat in the White House and an Atlanta Summer Olympics all pointed toward a truly progressive Agreement. Many industry observers expected the Delta Contract to lead the Piloting profession toward substantial gains. In the aftermath, the Amended Contract is clearly the most concessionary witnessed on the Delta property–this report addresses why.
Overwhelming circumstantial evidence and testimony indicates that the Delta Pilots were ill-served by specific individuals, in positions to control the negotiating process, for philosophical and personal financial reason. The MEC Chairman, Negotiating Committee Chairman, Retirement & Insurance Chairman and a senior Negotiating Committee Member had a significant Conflict of Interest, which they substantially withheld from the MEC and Pilot Group for the duration of the Negotiations. Management joined the Pilot Negotiator’s in severely limiting public understanding and discussion of the Negotiation’s dominant focus.
The MEC Chairman was allowed to define standard negotiating procedures and used distinctive methodologies to conceal concessions and personal gains. Standard analysis was denied to the MEC and staff reports were directed toward supporting concessionary bargaining. Neither the Pilots nor the MEC was provided accurate data showing the Amendment’s cost in jobs, working conditions and wages.
The structure, magnitude and negotiability of retirement provisions associated with the Pre-72 Minimum Benefit were misrepresented and withheld from the MEC. The Amended Contract substantially enhanced the retirement benefits of a few Pilots, who subsequently retired, at enormous cost to those who remained. Protection of key individual’s retirement benefits underlies virtually all aspects of the 1996 Negotiations.
The MEC failed to exercise its responsibility to ensure a balanced and equitable Contract. While the corporation was able to achieve specific concessions with rapid implementation, promised contractual improvements went largely unrealized. The majority of the contract language dealing with pilot issues was unwritten at the time of ratification. After contract ratification and during the crafting of the final language, disagreements and dissatisfaction with the final product reflected the MEC’s shallow understanding of what had been negotiated, while bringing into question the accuracy of details provided to the MEC and the pilot group by the negotiators and MEC officers.
The pilot group as a whole failed in their responsibility to make an informed ratification decision and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Early and repeated alarms from members who questioned the direction of Negotiations went unheeded. Members who persisted in questioning the MEC Leadership and Negotiators at Local Council meetings were rebuffed by their Leadership and ignored by their fellow council members. The lack of contractual language prior to ratification gave little cause for concern. Only during the implementation stage did the rank and file members recognize the impact of what they had ratified.
The report concludes with a series of Findings and Recommendations.
------------------
In fairness, this report was highly controversial. There are those who disagreed.
There is also at least 2 "rebuttals" to Ryan that defend the DALPA administration.
07-05-2011, 08:10 AM
Happy to be here
Joined APC: Jun 2006
Position: A-320A
Posts: 18,563
Publish a bunch of articles to make joe public believe the hope, have them invest and then get out. Commodity goes down, they just back in.
Wash, Rinse, repeat.
07-05-2011, 08:10 AM
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 2,539
Even in the preamble Ryan talks about the MEC Chairman's personal gain...yet the MEC Chairman didn't take the early retirement that supposedly was to his advantage. He retired at age 60. Also, one of the negotiating committee members was extremely junior (BG), and he was in front of the MEC during the whole process.
POS96 had more to do with bad management and a divided union (remember PPA, the large group of non-members and the 10% of our pilots that took voluntary wage cuts) than any malfeasance.
07-05-2011, 08:13 AM
Moderator
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: B757/767
Posts: 13,088
07-05-2011, 08:15 AM
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 2,539
Only one problem with your theory...the USA probably won't be the driving force in oil consumption going forward. China, India, and other developing countries without their own internal supply will skew pricing, especially as the US continues to devalue our currency.
07-05-2011, 08:25 AM
Line Holder
Joined APC: Feb 2011
Posts: 64
Unless I missed something, it appears SWA uses pre-published line of time bidding.
I think a lot of Delta pilots like the level of control PBS bidding has given them.
I don't think there's a way to bid your schedule with PBS and not have your vacation also in the PBS system.
So I don't understand what you mean when you say "non-PBS vacation". How would that work?
For me personally, I'm a simple guy. I'd like to get more hours per day on my vacation and I'd like to have more days of vaction per year. But if you have some other idea, I'm always ready to hear how I can get more time off and more money!
07-05-2011, 08:56 AM
Senior by choice
Joined APC: Mar 2008
Posts: 427
That and the fact that over 90% of the barrels of oil traded daily is due to speculation now!
07-05-2011, 08:57 AM
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2010
Posts: 2,530
Schumer urges quick review of Delta deal to boost air service from Syracuse to NYC
Schumer promotes deal to boost upstate flights - Yahoo! Finance
On Tuesday July 5, 2011, 11:48 am
SYRACUSE, N.Y. (AP) -- Sen. Charles Schumer is urging Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood to quickly review a deal between U.S. Airways Group Inc. and Delta Air Lines Inc. that could greatly boost air service from Syracuse to New York City.
Schumer says Delta is seeking to take over the U.S. Airways regional hub at LaGuardia and the 132 pairs of flight slots that come along with it. The deal is subject to approval by regulators at the Department of Transportation and review by the Department of Justice.
If the deal is approved, Syracuse passengers could have access to more seats on bigger Delta jets.
Schumer was expected to be at Hancock International Airport Tuesday morning with Syracuse Mayor Stephanie Miner to talk about the Delta deal.
Schumer promotes deal to boost upstate flights - Yahoo! Finance
On Tuesday July 5, 2011, 11:48 am
SYRACUSE, N.Y. (AP) -- Sen. Charles Schumer is urging Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood to quickly review a deal between U.S. Airways Group Inc. and Delta Air Lines Inc. that could greatly boost air service from Syracuse to New York City.
Schumer says Delta is seeking to take over the U.S. Airways regional hub at LaGuardia and the 132 pairs of flight slots that come along with it. The deal is subject to approval by regulators at the Department of Transportation and review by the Department of Justice.
If the deal is approved, Syracuse passengers could have access to more seats on bigger Delta jets.
Schumer was expected to be at Hancock International Airport Tuesday morning with Syracuse Mayor Stephanie Miner to talk about the Delta deal.
07-05-2011, 09:18 AM
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2009
Position: 320B
Posts: 781
The report is 34 pages. Here's the first one:
April 8, 1998
Background
In December of 1996, the MEC passed a resolution forming a Negotiations Review Committee. The MEC’s direction to the Committee was clear—they wanted a comprehensive, full-disclosure report of the most recent Delta Pilot Contract Negotiations concluded in May of 1996. MEC Chairman (redacted) appointed a three pilot committee. Acting as a confirmed member of the Negotiations Review Committee, I was thereby empowered by the MEC to perform this review. Following 9 months of effort, the Committee Chairman issued a verbal report during the October 1997 MEC meeting which, I believe, fell short of fulfilling the Committee’s obligation to the MEC, and ultimately, the Delta Pilots. After presenting the report the Committee resigned.
In this report, information and analysis is tied together through a historical review. My research included extensive written documentation and 128 interviews throughout all levels of the ALPA structure, from National officers to Line Pilots. Conclusions derive from the preponderance of circumstantial evidence and testimony. Hopefully, individual readers will weigh the information and develop their own perspective. I urge special attention to the series of recommendations at the end of the report.
Many interviewees were extremely candid and deserve our thanks for their willingness to selflessly give their time. In this report, I upheld the Committee’s promise to hold confidential sources of information. Perhaps at a later date, a fully supported investigation will interview participants under oath. I believe we can best move forward as a Union by honestly confronting our past, learning the lessons, and making changes where necessary.
Executive Summary
The Delta Pilots concluded the 1996 Negotiations arguably possessing the most favorable negotiating leverage presented any Pilot group post-Deregulation. Five consecutive quarters of record corporate profits, Management raises, upbeat analyst’s projections, a Democrat in the White House and an Atlanta Summer Olympics all pointed toward a truly progressive Agreement. Many industry observers expected the Delta Contract to lead the Piloting profession toward substantial gains. In the aftermath, the Amended Contract is clearly the most concessionary witnessed on the Delta property–this report addresses why.
Overwhelming circumstantial evidence and testimony indicates that the Delta Pilots were ill-served by specific individuals, in positions to control the negotiating process, for philosophical and personal financial reason. The MEC Chairman, Negotiating Committee Chairman, Retirement & Insurance Chairman and a senior Negotiating Committee Member had a significant Conflict of Interest, which they substantially withheld from the MEC and Pilot Group for the duration of the Negotiations. Management joined the Pilot Negotiator’s in severely limiting public understanding and discussion of the Negotiation’s dominant focus.
The MEC Chairman was allowed to define standard negotiating procedures and used distinctive methodologies to conceal concessions and personal gains. Standard analysis was denied to the MEC and staff reports were directed toward supporting concessionary bargaining. Neither the Pilots nor the MEC was provided accurate data showing the Amendment’s cost in jobs, working conditions and wages.
The structure, magnitude and negotiability of retirement provisions associated with the Pre-72 Minimum Benefit were misrepresented and withheld from the MEC. The Amended Contract substantially enhanced the retirement benefits of a few Pilots, who subsequently retired, at enormous cost to those who remained. Protection of key individual’s retirement benefits underlies virtually all aspects of the 1996 Negotiations.
The MEC failed to exercise its responsibility to ensure a balanced and equitable Contract. While the corporation was able to achieve specific concessions with rapid implementation, promised contractual improvements went largely unrealized. The majority of the contract language dealing with pilot issues was unwritten at the time of ratification. After contract ratification and during the crafting of the final language, disagreements and dissatisfaction with the final product reflected the MEC’s shallow understanding of what had been negotiated, while bringing into question the accuracy of details provided to the MEC and the pilot group by the negotiators and MEC officers.
The pilot group as a whole failed in their responsibility to make an informed ratification decision and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Early and repeated alarms from members who questioned the direction of Negotiations went unheeded. Members who persisted in questioning the MEC Leadership and Negotiators at Local Council meetings were rebuffed by their Leadership and ignored by their fellow council members. The lack of contractual language prior to ratification gave little cause for concern. Only during the implementation stage did the rank and file members recognize the impact of what they had ratified.
The report concludes with a series of Findings and Recommendations.
------------------
In fairness, this report was highly controversial. There are those who disagreed.
There is also at least 2 "rebuttals" to Ryan that defend the DALPA administration.
April 8, 1998
Background
In December of 1996, the MEC passed a resolution forming a Negotiations Review Committee. The MEC’s direction to the Committee was clear—they wanted a comprehensive, full-disclosure report of the most recent Delta Pilot Contract Negotiations concluded in May of 1996. MEC Chairman (redacted) appointed a three pilot committee. Acting as a confirmed member of the Negotiations Review Committee, I was thereby empowered by the MEC to perform this review. Following 9 months of effort, the Committee Chairman issued a verbal report during the October 1997 MEC meeting which, I believe, fell short of fulfilling the Committee’s obligation to the MEC, and ultimately, the Delta Pilots. After presenting the report the Committee resigned.
In this report, information and analysis is tied together through a historical review. My research included extensive written documentation and 128 interviews throughout all levels of the ALPA structure, from National officers to Line Pilots. Conclusions derive from the preponderance of circumstantial evidence and testimony. Hopefully, individual readers will weigh the information and develop their own perspective. I urge special attention to the series of recommendations at the end of the report.
Many interviewees were extremely candid and deserve our thanks for their willingness to selflessly give their time. In this report, I upheld the Committee’s promise to hold confidential sources of information. Perhaps at a later date, a fully supported investigation will interview participants under oath. I believe we can best move forward as a Union by honestly confronting our past, learning the lessons, and making changes where necessary.
Executive Summary
The Delta Pilots concluded the 1996 Negotiations arguably possessing the most favorable negotiating leverage presented any Pilot group post-Deregulation. Five consecutive quarters of record corporate profits, Management raises, upbeat analyst’s projections, a Democrat in the White House and an Atlanta Summer Olympics all pointed toward a truly progressive Agreement. Many industry observers expected the Delta Contract to lead the Piloting profession toward substantial gains. In the aftermath, the Amended Contract is clearly the most concessionary witnessed on the Delta property–this report addresses why.
Overwhelming circumstantial evidence and testimony indicates that the Delta Pilots were ill-served by specific individuals, in positions to control the negotiating process, for philosophical and personal financial reason. The MEC Chairman, Negotiating Committee Chairman, Retirement & Insurance Chairman and a senior Negotiating Committee Member had a significant Conflict of Interest, which they substantially withheld from the MEC and Pilot Group for the duration of the Negotiations. Management joined the Pilot Negotiator’s in severely limiting public understanding and discussion of the Negotiation’s dominant focus.
The MEC Chairman was allowed to define standard negotiating procedures and used distinctive methodologies to conceal concessions and personal gains. Standard analysis was denied to the MEC and staff reports were directed toward supporting concessionary bargaining. Neither the Pilots nor the MEC was provided accurate data showing the Amendment’s cost in jobs, working conditions and wages.
The structure, magnitude and negotiability of retirement provisions associated with the Pre-72 Minimum Benefit were misrepresented and withheld from the MEC. The Amended Contract substantially enhanced the retirement benefits of a few Pilots, who subsequently retired, at enormous cost to those who remained. Protection of key individual’s retirement benefits underlies virtually all aspects of the 1996 Negotiations.
The MEC failed to exercise its responsibility to ensure a balanced and equitable Contract. While the corporation was able to achieve specific concessions with rapid implementation, promised contractual improvements went largely unrealized. The majority of the contract language dealing with pilot issues was unwritten at the time of ratification. After contract ratification and during the crafting of the final language, disagreements and dissatisfaction with the final product reflected the MEC’s shallow understanding of what had been negotiated, while bringing into question the accuracy of details provided to the MEC and the pilot group by the negotiators and MEC officers.
The pilot group as a whole failed in their responsibility to make an informed ratification decision and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Early and repeated alarms from members who questioned the direction of Negotiations went unheeded. Members who persisted in questioning the MEC Leadership and Negotiators at Local Council meetings were rebuffed by their Leadership and ignored by their fellow council members. The lack of contractual language prior to ratification gave little cause for concern. Only during the implementation stage did the rank and file members recognize the impact of what they had ratified.
The report concludes with a series of Findings and Recommendations.
------------------
In fairness, this report was highly controversial. There are those who disagreed.
There is also at least 2 "rebuttals" to Ryan that defend the DALPA administration.
The MEC failed to exercise its responsibility to ensure a balanced and equitable Contract. While the corporation was able to achieve specific concessions with rapid implementation, promised contractual improvements went largely unrealized. The majority of the contract language dealing with pilot issues was unwritten at the time of ratification. After contract ratification and during the crafting of the final language, disagreements and dissatisfaction with the final product reflected the MEC’s shallow understanding of what had been negotiated, while bringing into question the accuracy of details provided to the MEC and the pilot group by the negotiators and MEC officers.
The pilot group as a whole failed in their responsibility to make an informed ratification decision and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Early and repeated alarms from members who questioned the direction of Negotiations went unheeded. Members who persisted in questioning the MEC Leadership and Negotiators at Local Council meetings were rebuffed by their Leadership and ignored by their fellow council members. The lack of contractual language prior to ratification gave little cause for concern. Only during the implementation stage did the rank and file members recognize the impact of what they had ratified.
The pilot group as a whole failed in their responsibility to make an informed ratification decision and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Early and repeated alarms from members who questioned the direction of Negotiations went unheeded. Members who persisted in questioning the MEC Leadership and Negotiators at Local Council meetings were rebuffed by their Leadership and ignored by their fellow council members. The lack of contractual language prior to ratification gave little cause for concern. Only during the implementation stage did the rank and file members recognize the impact of what they had ratified.
Also, after reading this summary, initially I think I have a better understanding of why Moak ran his MEC the way he did. My take is that maybe he wanted to be in complete understanding of what was going on and not be like the MEC during this time period. Would that be accurate?
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