Batch Sizes Eliminated; Council Comm attached
06-27-2023, 10:45 AM
#1
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Mar 2014
Position: Cirrus CA
Posts: 224
Batch Sizes Eliminated; Council Comm attached
Who agreed to these changes!?! The MEC Chairman and reps that agreed to this are completely “out of touch!”
June 26, 2023
The following is a joint product developed and distributed by LECs 1, 16, 48, and 54.
As you have read in Contract Awareness Bulletin 23-03, the MEC chair settled an MEC grievance regarding the improper use of PWA Section 23.M.7 (herein, 23.M.7). In return for the Company’s promise not to invoke 23.M.7 outside of eight hours to trip report (unless approved by the Scheduling Committee chair), and another promise to properly pay the pilot harmed by any use of23.M.7, the MEC chair conceded to the elimination of ARCOS batches and associated batch size penalties. We find this to be an ill-advised, rushed, and strategically flawed concessionary settlement that will be detrimental to line pilots.
Recall that on April 30 and May 1 of 2022, the Company abandoned long-standing scheduling practices by egregiously violating the intent of 23.M.7. Historically, it had been used only for individual flights or rotations subject to cancellation because Delta Scheduling could not find a pilot in time—not simply as a shortcut to ease their trip-coverage workload. However, on April 30 and May 1, the Company invoked 23.M.7 for next-day trip coverage, abrogating seniority and violating the contractual rights of pilots with valid green slips and white slips in place.
At the time, ALPA rightly responded by sending the Company a “cease and desist” letter and distributing MEC Brief 22-07, Flight Ops Staffing Plan: Abrogate Seniority. Additionally, ALPA published MEC Brief 22-08, History and Past Practice 23.M.7, a document signed by eight former Scheduling Committee chairs and a former Negotiating Committee chair discussing 23.M.7established practice. That document also made it clear that the Company had admitted to their “mistake” and had promised to refrain from abusing 23.M.7 in the future.
To no one’s surprise, management reneged on that promise. In fact, management has willfully and systematically violated our new contract before the ink has even dried in multiple ways. For example:
Management handles trivialities like lanyard and hat rules as if they are solemnly enshrined laws, while simultaneously treating our legally binding contractual protections as mere suggestions to be followed only when convenient for them. While management’s lack of integrity is nothing new, it is only getting worse as they become ever more brazen in their blatant disregard for our PWA. With the summer operational pressures building, we expect that management will continue to violate their own Rules of the Road whenever it suits them, as they have so often done in the past. With that in mind, let’s address the 23.M.7 grievance settlement.
The MEC chair is authorized per the Delta MEC policy manual to settle grievances on behalf of the MEC. However, when the stakes are high (such as with group grievances that affect all pilots), the MEC is almost always consulted for direction prior to ALPA entering into a grievance settlement agreement. That practice is consistent with bottom-up governance and ensures that no important and necessary provisions are overlooked.
In this case, the topic was only briefly touched upon at the March MEC meeting, and the MEC expressed a willingness to consider a settlement, provided it adequately limited the Company’s use of 23.M.7 and had no concessions. Instead, and without further MEC input, the MEC chair produced a final settlement that diverged from the MEC’s original vision to an alarming degree. This kind of top-down governance has caused significant problems for Delta pilots in the past, and we are concerned that abandoning bottom-up governance is once again harming Delta pilots by taking their elected union representatives out of the decision-making process until it is too late to viably change course.
We’d like to emphasize that 23.M.7 was never intended to be used indiscriminately. Following repeated Company abuses of this PWA clause (contrary to their promises to stop the behavior), the MEC filed a grievance to limit its use to unusual circumstances, as originally intended. Subsequently, the MEC chair entered into settlement talks and agreed to the following grievance settlement:
Make no mistake, the Company has been contractually compelled to identify and pay the bypassed23.M.7 pilot this entire time but has repeatedly failed to comply. Consequently, the MEC chair’s settlement has resulted in Delta pilots essentially renegotiating for a right we already had! In so doing, the MEC chair has immediately put the Company into compliance, rewarding them for failing to do what they had been obligated to do all along.
In theory, this agreement places new restrictions on the Company’s use of 23.M.7 as a scheduling tool and provides ALPA with new visibility on the process to ensure that affected pilots are properly paid. However, we see several problems with this theoretical solution, which is why we argued against it in session, and remain opposed.
In broad terms, the MEC granted an immediate and sizable concession to the Company (eliminating batch sizes), in exchange for nothing more than a few promises. Batch sizes will effectively be set at Company discretion; “at Company discretion” never works out well for us. Based upon management’s historic and well-documented inability to keep its deals, we have no confidence that they will uphold their end of the bargain. Furthermore, this settlement does nothing to address the Company’s practice of running concurrent steps of coverage (GS & IA), which is also contrary to our PWA. More specifically, our concerns are:
While there was room to negotiate increased batch sizes in this settlement, eliminating them altogether was a poor strategic decision with lasting, if not permanent, consequences. There is always risk involved when filing grievances; we have found that arbitration is not as clear-cut as we would like. There were certainly legitimate differences of opinion about our chances of prevailing in the 23.M.7 grievance, and our ability to improve the terms of this settlement. (The best opportunity to improve it, of course, would have been prior to the MEC chair agreeing to it and backing the MEC into a corner.)
For us, the most disappointing aspect of this settlement is that it did not need to happen this way, and it highlights a major flaw in our internal processes. While the policy manual gives the MEC chair latitude to negotiate settlements, it also opens the door to risks, such as the Company inducing artificial time pressure to get a deal done, and the potential for the MEC chair to act outside the MEC’s guidance. There can be no doubt that pilots are better served when the MEC is fully involved from the beginning of the process, rather than getting a settlement dropped in our laps as a “take it or leave it” proposition only after settlement negotiations are complete.
PWA revisions of this magnitude are typically the result of a letter of agreement negotiation, and then subject to membership ratification. However, in this case, the MEC chair settled the grievance outside of the parameters agreed to by the MEC, took aclosed session MEC vote to move forward with the settlement without seeking improvements, and refused to send it to the pilots for approval. This lack of transparency and accountability is an unwelcome and ominous throwback to the “bad ol’ days” of top-down DALPA governance. In any case, PWA Section 23.Z.1 has been functionally eliminated.
Fundamentally, this settlement gives a green light to management to continue running the airline at redline, to violate the PWA at will—and be rewarded for doing so—while further eroding pilot quality of life. As ugly as this summer is shaping up to be, our concern is that this settlement will only exacerbate the problem. The settlement does nothing to improve our QOL; however, it does help solve management’s self-induced problems heading into the busy summer season and beyond.
In summary, we believe that this rushed, ill-advised grievance settlement will be detrimental to the pilot group. Work rules, once given away, are extremely difficult to reacquire. Had the MEC chair sought MEC direction prior to agreeing to settlement terms, as has happened in the past, the decision-making authority would have stayed with the MEC, where it belongs. This agreement sets the stage for management to further employ abusive scheduling practices just as summer flying heats up. We ask you to stay safe and be vigilant. If you see the Company violating scheduling rules, call and ask them to fix the problem. If it’s not fixed, that call will stop the 120-day grievance clock—and report it via the ACE app. Continually evaluate your fitness for duty.
As always, please reach out to us with any questions or feedback.
In unity,
June 26, 2023
The following is a joint product developed and distributed by LECs 1, 16, 48, and 54.
As you have read in Contract Awareness Bulletin 23-03, the MEC chair settled an MEC grievance regarding the improper use of PWA Section 23.M.7 (herein, 23.M.7). In return for the Company’s promise not to invoke 23.M.7 outside of eight hours to trip report (unless approved by the Scheduling Committee chair), and another promise to properly pay the pilot harmed by any use of23.M.7, the MEC chair conceded to the elimination of ARCOS batches and associated batch size penalties. We find this to be an ill-advised, rushed, and strategically flawed concessionary settlement that will be detrimental to line pilots.
Recall that on April 30 and May 1 of 2022, the Company abandoned long-standing scheduling practices by egregiously violating the intent of 23.M.7. Historically, it had been used only for individual flights or rotations subject to cancellation because Delta Scheduling could not find a pilot in time—not simply as a shortcut to ease their trip-coverage workload. However, on April 30 and May 1, the Company invoked 23.M.7 for next-day trip coverage, abrogating seniority and violating the contractual rights of pilots with valid green slips and white slips in place.
At the time, ALPA rightly responded by sending the Company a “cease and desist” letter and distributing MEC Brief 22-07, Flight Ops Staffing Plan: Abrogate Seniority. Additionally, ALPA published MEC Brief 22-08, History and Past Practice 23.M.7, a document signed by eight former Scheduling Committee chairs and a former Negotiating Committee chair discussing 23.M.7established practice. That document also made it clear that the Company had admitted to their “mistake” and had promised to refrain from abusing 23.M.7 in the future.
To no one’s surprise, management reneged on that promise. In fact, management has willfully and systematically violated our new contract before the ink has even dried in multiple ways. For example:
- The Company has failed to consistently provide bid packages to ALPA for review five days prior to bids opening, as required (23.B)
- The Company is refusing to provide positive space following reroute, as negotiated (23.L.15)
- The Company is systematically not paying the proper pilot when abrogating the trip-coverage ladder (23.M.7)
Management handles trivialities like lanyard and hat rules as if they are solemnly enshrined laws, while simultaneously treating our legally binding contractual protections as mere suggestions to be followed only when convenient for them. While management’s lack of integrity is nothing new, it is only getting worse as they become ever more brazen in their blatant disregard for our PWA. With the summer operational pressures building, we expect that management will continue to violate their own Rules of the Road whenever it suits them, as they have so often done in the past. With that in mind, let’s address the 23.M.7 grievance settlement.
The MEC chair is authorized per the Delta MEC policy manual to settle grievances on behalf of the MEC. However, when the stakes are high (such as with group grievances that affect all pilots), the MEC is almost always consulted for direction prior to ALPA entering into a grievance settlement agreement. That practice is consistent with bottom-up governance and ensures that no important and necessary provisions are overlooked.
In this case, the topic was only briefly touched upon at the March MEC meeting, and the MEC expressed a willingness to consider a settlement, provided it adequately limited the Company’s use of 23.M.7 and had no concessions. Instead, and without further MEC input, the MEC chair produced a final settlement that diverged from the MEC’s original vision to an alarming degree. This kind of top-down governance has caused significant problems for Delta pilots in the past, and we are concerned that abandoning bottom-up governance is once again harming Delta pilots by taking their elected union representatives out of the decision-making process until it is too late to viably change course.
We’d like to emphasize that 23.M.7 was never intended to be used indiscriminately. Following repeated Company abuses of this PWA clause (contrary to their promises to stop the behavior), the MEC filed a grievance to limit its use to unusual circumstances, as originally intended. Subsequently, the MEC chair entered into settlement talks and agreed to the following grievance settlement:
- Immediate elimination of ARCOS batch sizes
- Unlimited use of 23.M.7 inside of eight hours to report
- Management promises not to invoke 23.M.7 beyond eight hours to trip report unless receiving prior written approval from the Delta MEC Scheduling chair
- Management promises to produce a manually generated list showing every instance of23.M.7 use, and list the bypassed pilot who was paid
- Management promises to automate the 23.M.7 report and payment process by June 2024
Make no mistake, the Company has been contractually compelled to identify and pay the bypassed23.M.7 pilot this entire time but has repeatedly failed to comply. Consequently, the MEC chair’s settlement has resulted in Delta pilots essentially renegotiating for a right we already had! In so doing, the MEC chair has immediately put the Company into compliance, rewarding them for failing to do what they had been obligated to do all along.
In theory, this agreement places new restrictions on the Company’s use of 23.M.7 as a scheduling tool and provides ALPA with new visibility on the process to ensure that affected pilots are properly paid. However, we see several problems with this theoretical solution, which is why we argued against it in session, and remain opposed.
In broad terms, the MEC granted an immediate and sizable concession to the Company (eliminating batch sizes), in exchange for nothing more than a few promises. Batch sizes will effectively be set at Company discretion; “at Company discretion” never works out well for us. Based upon management’s historic and well-documented inability to keep its deals, we have no confidence that they will uphold their end of the bargain. Furthermore, this settlement does nothing to address the Company’s practice of running concurrent steps of coverage (GS & IA), which is also contrary to our PWA. More specifically, our concerns are:
- The complete and immediate elimination of batch sizes during ARCOS callouts is a major win for management, and a major concession for Delta pilots; this was not a win/win outcome. It is extremely disappointing that the MEC conceded batch sizes after spending considerable negotiating capital to secure batch size restrictions and contractual remediation in both LOA 20-04 and C2019. With this restriction gone, the Company will be able to shotgun ARCOS calls to every eligible pilot with a qualifying white slip or green slip request—every single time the Company deploys ARCOS. “Auto Accept” and “Auto Acknowledge” features may reduce the number of ARCOS calls a pilot receives. However, these options have their own limitations and risks, and will require significantly more time for pilots to properly input their parameters, compared to blanket slip requests. In short, we have conceded substantial flexibility to management, to the detriment of our own QOL and convenience.
- With ARCOS batch sizes for all intents and purposes eliminated, so too is the 2:00 batch size exceedance penalty. If management delays implementation of automated 23.M.7 coverage reports, or disregards them completely, then there is no recourse for us aside from filing another time-consuming grievance (opening pilots to the risk of another concessionary MEC chair–directed settlement like this one). In short, based on hard-earned experience, we know the Company cannot always be trusted to keep its deals.
- Neither guardrails, a pulldown provision, nor remediation (penalties for noncompliance) were negotiated in this settlement. Of particular concern, this settlement does nothing to define “schedule integrity;” therefore, management can continue to apply it without restraint.
- This settlement codifies unlimited use of 23.M.7 within eight hours of report, and therefore pilots are effectively precluded from grieving any use of 23.M.7 within eight hours of report in the future. If management holds every open trip until eight hours to report, they could cover every trip using 23.M.7, and we would have no recourse. This is significant, because the MEC chair conducted zero analysis of pertinent data concerning 23.M.7 abuse prior to reaching this agreement. If (hypothetically) 90% of current 23.M.7 abuse occurs within eight hours, then the value of this settlement to the pilot group is minimal. Without this basic data, we are flying blind. The MEC chair approved this settlement without taking the time and effort to perform the research necessary to evaluate the impact it will have on Delta pilots now and in the future despite being in the “time” bucket. Would the new trip coverage timeline that started on June 2 have provided a solution to the problem? We’ll never know. There was no need to skip the most basic level of due diligence to rush this settlement.
While there was room to negotiate increased batch sizes in this settlement, eliminating them altogether was a poor strategic decision with lasting, if not permanent, consequences. There is always risk involved when filing grievances; we have found that arbitration is not as clear-cut as we would like. There were certainly legitimate differences of opinion about our chances of prevailing in the 23.M.7 grievance, and our ability to improve the terms of this settlement. (The best opportunity to improve it, of course, would have been prior to the MEC chair agreeing to it and backing the MEC into a corner.)
For us, the most disappointing aspect of this settlement is that it did not need to happen this way, and it highlights a major flaw in our internal processes. While the policy manual gives the MEC chair latitude to negotiate settlements, it also opens the door to risks, such as the Company inducing artificial time pressure to get a deal done, and the potential for the MEC chair to act outside the MEC’s guidance. There can be no doubt that pilots are better served when the MEC is fully involved from the beginning of the process, rather than getting a settlement dropped in our laps as a “take it or leave it” proposition only after settlement negotiations are complete.
PWA revisions of this magnitude are typically the result of a letter of agreement negotiation, and then subject to membership ratification. However, in this case, the MEC chair settled the grievance outside of the parameters agreed to by the MEC, took aclosed session MEC vote to move forward with the settlement without seeking improvements, and refused to send it to the pilots for approval. This lack of transparency and accountability is an unwelcome and ominous throwback to the “bad ol’ days” of top-down DALPA governance. In any case, PWA Section 23.Z.1 has been functionally eliminated.
Fundamentally, this settlement gives a green light to management to continue running the airline at redline, to violate the PWA at will—and be rewarded for doing so—while further eroding pilot quality of life. As ugly as this summer is shaping up to be, our concern is that this settlement will only exacerbate the problem. The settlement does nothing to improve our QOL; however, it does help solve management’s self-induced problems heading into the busy summer season and beyond.
In summary, we believe that this rushed, ill-advised grievance settlement will be detrimental to the pilot group. Work rules, once given away, are extremely difficult to reacquire. Had the MEC chair sought MEC direction prior to agreeing to settlement terms, as has happened in the past, the decision-making authority would have stayed with the MEC, where it belongs. This agreement sets the stage for management to further employ abusive scheduling practices just as summer flying heats up. We ask you to stay safe and be vigilant. If you see the Company violating scheduling rules, call and ask them to fix the problem. If it’s not fixed, that call will stop the 120-day grievance clock—and report it via the ACE app. Continually evaluate your fitness for duty.
As always, please reach out to us with any questions or feedback.
In unity,
06-27-2023, 10:54 AM
#2
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2013
Posts: 10,518
Who agreed to these changes!?! The MEC Chairman and reps that agreed to this are completely “out of touch!”
June 26, 2023
The following is a joint product developed and distributed by LECs 1, 16, 48, and 54.
As you have read in Contract Awareness Bulletin 23-03, the MEC chair settled an MEC grievance regarding the improper use of PWA Section 23.M.7 (herein, 23.M.7). In return for the Company’s promise not to invoke 23.M.7 outside of eight hours to trip report (unless approved by the Scheduling Committee chair), and another promise to properly pay the pilot harmed by any use of23.M.7, the MEC chair conceded to the elimination of ARCOS batches and associated batch size penalties. We find this to be an ill-advised, rushed, and strategically flawed concessionary settlement that will be detrimental to line pilots.
Recall that on April 30 and May 1 of 2022, the Company abandoned long-standing scheduling practices by egregiously violating the intent of 23.M.7. Historically, it had been used only for individual flights or rotations subject to cancellation because Delta Scheduling could not find a pilot in time—not simply as a shortcut to ease their trip-coverage workload. However, on April 30 and May 1, the Company invoked 23.M.7 for next-day trip coverage, abrogating seniority and violating the contractual rights of pilots with valid green slips and white slips in place.
At the time, ALPA rightly responded by sending the Company a “cease and desist” letter and distributing MEC Brief 22-07, Flight Ops Staffing Plan: Abrogate Seniority. Additionally, ALPA published MEC Brief 22-08, History and Past Practice 23.M.7, a document signed by eight former Scheduling Committee chairs and a former Negotiating Committee chair discussing 23.M.7established practice. That document also made it clear that the Company had admitted to their “mistake” and had promised to refrain from abusing 23.M.7 in the future.
To no one’s surprise, management reneged on that promise. In fact, management has willfully and systematically violated our new contract before the ink has even dried in multiple ways. For example:
Management handles trivialities like lanyard and hat rules as if they are solemnly enshrined laws, while simultaneously treating our legally binding contractual protections as mere suggestions to be followed only when convenient for them. While management’s lack of integrity is nothing new, it is only getting worse as they become ever more brazen in their blatant disregard for our PWA. With the summer operational pressures building, we expect that management will continue to violate their own Rules of the Road whenever it suits them, as they have so often done in the past. With that in mind, let’s address the 23.M.7 grievance settlement.
The MEC chair is authorized per the Delta MEC policy manual to settle grievances on behalf of the MEC. However, when the stakes are high (such as with group grievances that affect all pilots), the MEC is almost always consulted for direction prior to ALPA entering into a grievance settlement agreement. That practice is consistent with bottom-up governance and ensures that no important and necessary provisions are overlooked.
In this case, the topic was only briefly touched upon at the March MEC meeting, and the MEC expressed a willingness to consider a settlement, provided it adequately limited the Company’s use of 23.M.7 and had no concessions. Instead, and without further MEC input, the MEC chair produced a final settlement that diverged from the MEC’s original vision to an alarming degree. This kind of top-down governance has caused significant problems for Delta pilots in the past, and we are concerned that abandoning bottom-up governance is once again harming Delta pilots by taking their elected union representatives out of the decision-making process until it is too late to viably change course.
We’d like to emphasize that 23.M.7 was never intended to be used indiscriminately. Following repeated Company abuses of this PWA clause (contrary to their promises to stop the behavior), the MEC filed a grievance to limit its use to unusual circumstances, as originally intended. Subsequently, the MEC chair entered into settlement talks and agreed to the following grievance settlement:
Make no mistake, the Company has been contractually compelled to identify and pay the bypassed23.M.7 pilot this entire time but has repeatedly failed to comply. Consequently, the MEC chair’s settlement has resulted in Delta pilots essentially renegotiating for a right we already had! In so doing, the MEC chair has immediately put the Company into compliance, rewarding them for failing to do what they had been obligated to do all along.
In theory, this agreement places new restrictions on the Company’s use of 23.M.7 as a scheduling tool and provides ALPA with new visibility on the process to ensure that affected pilots are properly paid. However, we see several problems with this theoretical solution, which is why we argued against it in session, and remain opposed.
In broad terms, the MEC granted an immediate and sizable concession to the Company (eliminating batch sizes), in exchange for nothing more than a few promises. Batch sizes will effectively be set at Company discretion; “at Company discretion” never works out well for us. Based upon management’s historic and well-documented inability to keep its deals, we have no confidence that they will uphold their end of the bargain. Furthermore, this settlement does nothing to address the Company’s practice of running concurrent steps of coverage (GS & IA), which is also contrary to our PWA. More specifically, our concerns are:
While there was room to negotiate increased batch sizes in this settlement, eliminating them altogether was a poor strategic decision with lasting, if not permanent, consequences. There is always risk involved when filing grievances; we have found that arbitration is not as clear-cut as we would like. There were certainly legitimate differences of opinion about our chances of prevailing in the 23.M.7 grievance, and our ability to improve the terms of this settlement. (The best opportunity to improve it, of course, would have been prior to the MEC chair agreeing to it and backing the MEC into a corner.)
For us, the most disappointing aspect of this settlement is that it did not need to happen this way, and it highlights a major flaw in our internal processes. While the policy manual gives the MEC chair latitude to negotiate settlements, it also opens the door to risks, such as the Company inducing artificial time pressure to get a deal done, and the potential for the MEC chair to act outside the MEC’s guidance. There can be no doubt that pilots are better served when the MEC is fully involved from the beginning of the process, rather than getting a settlement dropped in our laps as a “take it or leave it” proposition only after settlement negotiations are complete.
PWA revisions of this magnitude are typically the result of a letter of agreement negotiation, and then subject to membership ratification. However, in this case, the MEC chair settled the grievance outside of the parameters agreed to by the MEC, took aclosed session MEC vote to move forward with the settlement without seeking improvements, and refused to send it to the pilots for approval. This lack of transparency and accountability is an unwelcome and ominous throwback to the “bad ol’ days” of top-down DALPA governance. In any case, PWA Section 23.Z.1 has been functionally eliminated.
Fundamentally, this settlement gives a green light to management to continue running the airline at redline, to violate the PWA at will—and be rewarded for doing so—while further eroding pilot quality of life. As ugly as this summer is shaping up to be, our concern is that this settlement will only exacerbate the problem. The settlement does nothing to improve our QOL; however, it does help solve management’s self-induced problems heading into the busy summer season and beyond.
In summary, we believe that this rushed, ill-advised grievance settlement will be detrimental to the pilot group. Work rules, once given away, are extremely difficult to reacquire. Had the MEC chair sought MEC direction prior to agreeing to settlement terms, as has happened in the past, the decision-making authority would have stayed with the MEC, where it belongs. This agreement sets the stage for management to further employ abusive scheduling practices just as summer flying heats up. We ask you to stay safe and be vigilant. If you see the Company violating scheduling rules, call and ask them to fix the problem. If it’s not fixed, that call will stop the 120-day grievance clock—and report it via the ACE app. Continually evaluate your fitness for duty.
As always, please reach out to us with any questions or feedback.
In unity,
June 26, 2023
The following is a joint product developed and distributed by LECs 1, 16, 48, and 54.
As you have read in Contract Awareness Bulletin 23-03, the MEC chair settled an MEC grievance regarding the improper use of PWA Section 23.M.7 (herein, 23.M.7). In return for the Company’s promise not to invoke 23.M.7 outside of eight hours to trip report (unless approved by the Scheduling Committee chair), and another promise to properly pay the pilot harmed by any use of23.M.7, the MEC chair conceded to the elimination of ARCOS batches and associated batch size penalties. We find this to be an ill-advised, rushed, and strategically flawed concessionary settlement that will be detrimental to line pilots.
Recall that on April 30 and May 1 of 2022, the Company abandoned long-standing scheduling practices by egregiously violating the intent of 23.M.7. Historically, it had been used only for individual flights or rotations subject to cancellation because Delta Scheduling could not find a pilot in time—not simply as a shortcut to ease their trip-coverage workload. However, on April 30 and May 1, the Company invoked 23.M.7 for next-day trip coverage, abrogating seniority and violating the contractual rights of pilots with valid green slips and white slips in place.
At the time, ALPA rightly responded by sending the Company a “cease and desist” letter and distributing MEC Brief 22-07, Flight Ops Staffing Plan: Abrogate Seniority. Additionally, ALPA published MEC Brief 22-08, History and Past Practice 23.M.7, a document signed by eight former Scheduling Committee chairs and a former Negotiating Committee chair discussing 23.M.7established practice. That document also made it clear that the Company had admitted to their “mistake” and had promised to refrain from abusing 23.M.7 in the future.
To no one’s surprise, management reneged on that promise. In fact, management has willfully and systematically violated our new contract before the ink has even dried in multiple ways. For example:
- The Company has failed to consistently provide bid packages to ALPA for review five days prior to bids opening, as required (23.B)
- The Company is refusing to provide positive space following reroute, as negotiated (23.L.15)
- The Company is systematically not paying the proper pilot when abrogating the trip-coverage ladder (23.M.7)
Management handles trivialities like lanyard and hat rules as if they are solemnly enshrined laws, while simultaneously treating our legally binding contractual protections as mere suggestions to be followed only when convenient for them. While management’s lack of integrity is nothing new, it is only getting worse as they become ever more brazen in their blatant disregard for our PWA. With the summer operational pressures building, we expect that management will continue to violate their own Rules of the Road whenever it suits them, as they have so often done in the past. With that in mind, let’s address the 23.M.7 grievance settlement.
The MEC chair is authorized per the Delta MEC policy manual to settle grievances on behalf of the MEC. However, when the stakes are high (such as with group grievances that affect all pilots), the MEC is almost always consulted for direction prior to ALPA entering into a grievance settlement agreement. That practice is consistent with bottom-up governance and ensures that no important and necessary provisions are overlooked.
In this case, the topic was only briefly touched upon at the March MEC meeting, and the MEC expressed a willingness to consider a settlement, provided it adequately limited the Company’s use of 23.M.7 and had no concessions. Instead, and without further MEC input, the MEC chair produced a final settlement that diverged from the MEC’s original vision to an alarming degree. This kind of top-down governance has caused significant problems for Delta pilots in the past, and we are concerned that abandoning bottom-up governance is once again harming Delta pilots by taking their elected union representatives out of the decision-making process until it is too late to viably change course.
We’d like to emphasize that 23.M.7 was never intended to be used indiscriminately. Following repeated Company abuses of this PWA clause (contrary to their promises to stop the behavior), the MEC filed a grievance to limit its use to unusual circumstances, as originally intended. Subsequently, the MEC chair entered into settlement talks and agreed to the following grievance settlement:
- Immediate elimination of ARCOS batch sizes
- Unlimited use of 23.M.7 inside of eight hours to report
- Management promises not to invoke 23.M.7 beyond eight hours to trip report unless receiving prior written approval from the Delta MEC Scheduling chair
- Management promises to produce a manually generated list showing every instance of23.M.7 use, and list the bypassed pilot who was paid
- Management promises to automate the 23.M.7 report and payment process by June 2024
Make no mistake, the Company has been contractually compelled to identify and pay the bypassed23.M.7 pilot this entire time but has repeatedly failed to comply. Consequently, the MEC chair’s settlement has resulted in Delta pilots essentially renegotiating for a right we already had! In so doing, the MEC chair has immediately put the Company into compliance, rewarding them for failing to do what they had been obligated to do all along.
In theory, this agreement places new restrictions on the Company’s use of 23.M.7 as a scheduling tool and provides ALPA with new visibility on the process to ensure that affected pilots are properly paid. However, we see several problems with this theoretical solution, which is why we argued against it in session, and remain opposed.
In broad terms, the MEC granted an immediate and sizable concession to the Company (eliminating batch sizes), in exchange for nothing more than a few promises. Batch sizes will effectively be set at Company discretion; “at Company discretion” never works out well for us. Based upon management’s historic and well-documented inability to keep its deals, we have no confidence that they will uphold their end of the bargain. Furthermore, this settlement does nothing to address the Company’s practice of running concurrent steps of coverage (GS & IA), which is also contrary to our PWA. More specifically, our concerns are:
- The complete and immediate elimination of batch sizes during ARCOS callouts is a major win for management, and a major concession for Delta pilots; this was not a win/win outcome. It is extremely disappointing that the MEC conceded batch sizes after spending considerable negotiating capital to secure batch size restrictions and contractual remediation in both LOA 20-04 and C2019. With this restriction gone, the Company will be able to shotgun ARCOS calls to every eligible pilot with a qualifying white slip or green slip request—every single time the Company deploys ARCOS. “Auto Accept” and “Auto Acknowledge” features may reduce the number of ARCOS calls a pilot receives. However, these options have their own limitations and risks, and will require significantly more time for pilots to properly input their parameters, compared to blanket slip requests. In short, we have conceded substantial flexibility to management, to the detriment of our own QOL and convenience.
- With ARCOS batch sizes for all intents and purposes eliminated, so too is the 2:00 batch size exceedance penalty. If management delays implementation of automated 23.M.7 coverage reports, or disregards them completely, then there is no recourse for us aside from filing another time-consuming grievance (opening pilots to the risk of another concessionary MEC chair–directed settlement like this one). In short, based on hard-earned experience, we know the Company cannot always be trusted to keep its deals.
- Neither guardrails, a pulldown provision, nor remediation (penalties for noncompliance) were negotiated in this settlement. Of particular concern, this settlement does nothing to define “schedule integrity;” therefore, management can continue to apply it without restraint.
- This settlement codifies unlimited use of 23.M.7 within eight hours of report, and therefore pilots are effectively precluded from grieving any use of 23.M.7 within eight hours of report in the future. If management holds every open trip until eight hours to report, they could cover every trip using 23.M.7, and we would have no recourse. This is significant, because the MEC chair conducted zero analysis of pertinent data concerning 23.M.7 abuse prior to reaching this agreement. If (hypothetically) 90% of current 23.M.7 abuse occurs within eight hours, then the value of this settlement to the pilot group is minimal. Without this basic data, we are flying blind. The MEC chair approved this settlement without taking the time and effort to perform the research necessary to evaluate the impact it will have on Delta pilots now and in the future despite being in the “time” bucket. Would the new trip coverage timeline that started on June 2 have provided a solution to the problem? We’ll never know. There was no need to skip the most basic level of due diligence to rush this settlement.
While there was room to negotiate increased batch sizes in this settlement, eliminating them altogether was a poor strategic decision with lasting, if not permanent, consequences. There is always risk involved when filing grievances; we have found that arbitration is not as clear-cut as we would like. There were certainly legitimate differences of opinion about our chances of prevailing in the 23.M.7 grievance, and our ability to improve the terms of this settlement. (The best opportunity to improve it, of course, would have been prior to the MEC chair agreeing to it and backing the MEC into a corner.)
For us, the most disappointing aspect of this settlement is that it did not need to happen this way, and it highlights a major flaw in our internal processes. While the policy manual gives the MEC chair latitude to negotiate settlements, it also opens the door to risks, such as the Company inducing artificial time pressure to get a deal done, and the potential for the MEC chair to act outside the MEC’s guidance. There can be no doubt that pilots are better served when the MEC is fully involved from the beginning of the process, rather than getting a settlement dropped in our laps as a “take it or leave it” proposition only after settlement negotiations are complete.
PWA revisions of this magnitude are typically the result of a letter of agreement negotiation, and then subject to membership ratification. However, in this case, the MEC chair settled the grievance outside of the parameters agreed to by the MEC, took aclosed session MEC vote to move forward with the settlement without seeking improvements, and refused to send it to the pilots for approval. This lack of transparency and accountability is an unwelcome and ominous throwback to the “bad ol’ days” of top-down DALPA governance. In any case, PWA Section 23.Z.1 has been functionally eliminated.
Fundamentally, this settlement gives a green light to management to continue running the airline at redline, to violate the PWA at will—and be rewarded for doing so—while further eroding pilot quality of life. As ugly as this summer is shaping up to be, our concern is that this settlement will only exacerbate the problem. The settlement does nothing to improve our QOL; however, it does help solve management’s self-induced problems heading into the busy summer season and beyond.
In summary, we believe that this rushed, ill-advised grievance settlement will be detrimental to the pilot group. Work rules, once given away, are extremely difficult to reacquire. Had the MEC chair sought MEC direction prior to agreeing to settlement terms, as has happened in the past, the decision-making authority would have stayed with the MEC, where it belongs. This agreement sets the stage for management to further employ abusive scheduling practices just as summer flying heats up. We ask you to stay safe and be vigilant. If you see the Company violating scheduling rules, call and ask them to fix the problem. If it’s not fixed, that call will stop the 120-day grievance clock—and report it via the ACE app. Continually evaluate your fitness for duty.
As always, please reach out to us with any questions or feedback.
In unity,
06-27-2023, 12:39 PM
#7
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2022
Posts: 337
That they were for the change. Slightly concerned about no limits, but not enough to not be against limiting 23m7 to only 8 hours. Which changes almost nothing with how the company has been using it.
I bet we will get em next time though..... Unless C44 and C66 have a say in it that is.
I bet we will get em next time though..... Unless C44 and C66 have a say in it that is.
06-27-2023, 12:41 PM
#8
Bus driver
Joined APC: Aug 2007
Posts: 838
That they were for the change. Slightly concerned about no limits, but not enough to not be against limiting 23m7 to only 8 hours. Which changes almost nothing with how the company has been using it.
I bet we will get em next time though..... Unless C44 and C66 have a say in it that is.
I bet we will get em next time though..... Unless C44 and C66 have a say in it that is.
06-27-2023, 12:57 PM
#9
Can't abide NAI
Joined APC: Jun 2007
Position: Douglas Aerospace post production Flight Test & Work Around Engineering bulletin dissembler
Posts: 12,037
Councils that contribute more to the OOBWS problem complaining about more senior bases having to concede to fix the problems created by the OOBWS step of trip coverage. ...
Ref. Crew Resources Update for April 23 which specifically calls out the OOBWS coverage issue and drivers of 23 M. 7. use.
Ref. Crew Resources Update for April 23 which specifically calls out the OOBWS coverage issue and drivers of 23 M. 7. use.
06-27-2023, 01:20 PM
#10
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2013
Posts: 10,518
That's dumb. Why would scheduling do that? To stick it to the pilot group? They certainly take liberties with the contract but that's because their job is to ensure flights are covered. Waiting hours or days to run coverage makes their job significantly harder. Why would you suggest that's even a possibility?
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post
