C Series Info
06-25-2019, 07:34 AM
#3632
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2016
Posts: 226
Airbus has however like the max had several sensor driven failures that resulted in fatal accidents including two aircraft stalled at high altitude with the crews unable to recover. In one of those crashes Airbus was very aware of the possibility of the pitot icing issue but chose to keep flying the aircraft with a slow roll of the fix. There is a third yet unexplained A320 accident in the Med. Both companies have plenty of warts.
Also at least in airbus world there was a known procedure to attempt to recover unlike just not telling anyone.
06-25-2019, 08:32 AM
#3633
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2008
Posts: 496
As a long time DL Connection pilot (decade +) and longer DL Connection commuter I could give easy half a dozen personal JS situations where I have had serious questions about the Skywest crews decision making. I do not know how long you have been gone, PM me and I would be happy to give anecdotes I won't post publicly.
06-25-2019, 08:45 AM
#3634
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 19,424
Quantum- https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...-incident.html
Lufthansa- https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/XL_A...ny_Flight_888T
06-25-2019, 08:57 AM
#3635
Da Hudge
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: Poodle Whisperer
Posts: 17,473
I also omitted the Qantas A330 that was saved only buy superb crew action but still resulted in a large number of critical injuries. There was also the Lufthansa test flight that crashed killing the crew after 2 AOA vanes malfunctioned.
MCAS was designed to make the MAX handle like the NG in one particular corner of the flight envelope never normally approached in airline operations. There is nothing inheritantly wrong with the airframe and the fix will take care of the malfunction. If you feel as you appear to by your post I would avoid the A330-900 since it has a similar problem corrected by software. Both designs moved the engines forward and up for ground clearance.
MCAS was designed to make the MAX handle like the NG in one particular corner of the flight envelope never normally approached in airline operations. There is nothing inheritantly wrong with the airframe and the fix will take care of the malfunction. If you feel as you appear to by your post I would avoid the A330-900 since it has a similar problem corrected by software. Both designs moved the engines forward and up for ground clearance.
Bad AOA vanes do not make an inherently unstable design- the ANZ accident was doing stall testing on an acceptance flight with frozen AOA vanes at 3000 feet. I’ll let you figure out the issue there.
The issue is that the MAX is inherently unstable in high alpha (like the 339), but it’s trying to do it with a traditional flight control system with a patch. Designs like that have to be FBW, otherwise they will continue to lawn dart.
06-25-2019, 11:23 AM
#3636
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2012
Posts: 1,142
I will post some links in a bit however the standard runaway trim procedure covers the MCAS problem. The accidents occurred when crews compounded the problem with other errors such as failing to reduce power.
Quantum- https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...-incident.html
Lufthansa- https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/XL_A...ny_Flight_888T
Quantum- https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...-incident.html
Lufthansa- https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/XL_A...ny_Flight_888T
06-25-2019, 01:22 PM
#3637
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 19,424
Not so fast... Cutting out the trim motor does stop things from getting WORSE. The problem is, the 737 already trims on its own on takeoff. Once you realize it’s not that system (been a while, don’t remember the name) and cut out the trim motor you have to hope and pray you got to it before the aero force on the jack screw makes it virtually impossible to manually trim out the forces. At altitude you can unload and take the altitude loss to counteract this. Close to the ground, not much room to work with.
06-25-2019, 01:25 PM
#3638
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 19,424
Again, you fail to begin to have even a basic understanding of what you’re talking about. You can repeat points but go off into the weeds very quickly to where you want to go.
Bad AOA vanes do not make an inherently unstable design- the ANZ accident was doing stall testing on an acceptance flight with frozen AOA vanes at 3000 feet. I’ll let you figure out the issue there.
The issue is that the MAX is inherently unstable in high alpha (like the 339), but it’s trying to do it with a traditional flight control system with a patch. Designs like that have to be FBW, otherwise they will continue to lawn dart.
Bad AOA vanes do not make an inherently unstable design- the ANZ accident was doing stall testing on an acceptance flight with frozen AOA vanes at 3000 feet. I’ll let you figure out the issue there.
The issue is that the MAX is inherently unstable in high alpha (like the 339), but it’s trying to do it with a traditional flight control system with a patch. Designs like that have to be FBW, otherwise they will continue to lawn dart.
https://rvs-bi.de/publications/compe...pdf_501275.pdf
06-25-2019, 01:39 PM
#3639
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 19,424
06-25-2019, 02:26 PM
#3640
In a land of unicorns
Joined APC: Apr 2014
Position: Whale FO
Posts: 6,526
The max is not inherently unstable at high AOA. It’s handling characteristics at high AOA and bank angles and control force required were different enough from the NG that MCAS was the solution to maintain a common type rating. Lots of things both software and hardware driven can produce unwanted outcomes. Here is another example that came close to being the worst disaster in aviation history yet received little press.
https://rvs-bi.de/publications/compe...pdf_501275.pdf
https://rvs-bi.de/publications/compe...pdf_501275.pdf
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post
