FDX Jumpseats
06-16-2013, 10:41 AM
#121
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2007
Position: protecting my license until I get the next job.
Posts: 122
Well if you want to keep thowing out the detailed FAR's how is it that animal handlers can ride in a 777 without a hardened cockpit door or company executives none of which have an FAA certificate they can ride where does it state that in the FAR's that it is legal?
Since I've been away its nice to see the conversation deviate into "dispatcher by any other name" conversation. It looks to me after a skimming that some (not all by any means) seem discount the GOC Specialists' (with their required dispatch licenses) efforts to keep their flight operating safe and legal. Even under supplemental rules, where the DO delegated the authority of operational control, the FDX GOC Specialists ive known over the years readily took on the responsibility aspect, though not legally required. I also know from personal experiences with a supplemental carrier that even though the DO is "responsible" the friendly folks at the FAA will also come after the dispatchers and take certificate action if they find it warranted. So TonyC's earlier statement that "I've completed thousands of flights under Part 121 without a dispatcher being involved in any capacity whatsoever" while is technically true since FDX employs "GOC Specialists" and not "dispatchers", I find it hard to believe that he showed up, worked up a flight plan with accurate fuel burns, taking into account winds and ISA deviations, checked for ATC holding and reroutes, ensured all applicable overfly permits are obtained and valid, checked all notams for destination, alternate, origin, and enroute areas or operations, and signets for various atmospheric phenomena, and then hand filed it with the ATS as applicable. That statement irks me for its arrogance and for discounting the efforts of those who's sole job is to keep you from doing something stupid.
FYI, did you know Delta doesn't employ a single dispatcher... But a boatload of Flight Superintendents. The name isn't important, but the function is.
Off the soapbox now... I digress
So, hypothetically speaking, if a GOC Specialist is covered by the CASS program, can they use their CASS status to book a jumpseat on the flight deck of a FDX aircraft for personal use?
As far as your mechanics are concerned, by issuing in writing that mechanics are allowed in company cockpits, FDX management has given blessing. I can't imagine that it wasn't run by the POI and the legal types, so the administrator has blessed it. The one person left to allow a mechanic to ride a flight deck seat is the PIC. So the PIC is the third leg in the tripod of those required to give blessing per 121.547(a)(4). I can imagine that FDX might go it of its way to **** off the pilot group, but not to adjutate the FAA. Seems like it's working. As mentioned earlier, however out of context it may have been, FDX doesnt have the best record in the industry. I'd hate to think your management would dumb enough invite more scrutiny by issuing bulletins that are blatantly illegal.
06-16-2013, 01:04 PM
#122
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2012
Posts: 260
?
They both are covered in the current rules...not sure what your point is...
The rules for mechanics is specific to on duty. Personal jumpseats isn't on duty...
The rules for mechanics is specific to on duty. Personal jumpseats isn't on duty...
Well if you want to keep thowing out the detailed FAR's how is it that animal handlers can ride in a 777 without a hardened cockpit door or company executives none of which have an FAA certificate they can ride where does it state that in the FAR's that it is legal?
06-16-2013, 05:50 PM
#123
Banned
Joined APC: Jun 2013
Posts: 57
Maybe you'll understand the "twist" FAA's Legal counsel puts on it.
On July 17, 2001, Donald P. Byrne, Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, responded to FedEx Pilots Association's request seeking an interpretation of Section 121.583(e) ("Carriage of persons without compliance with the passenger-carrying requirements of this part.")
About a year later, and after September 11, 2001, the Flight Standards branch published Flight Standards Information Bulletin for Air Transportation (FSAT) 02-06, "Restricted Access to the Flightdeck". This FSAT included at Annex 3 the July 17, 2001, legal interpretation by Assistant Chief Counsel Byrne.
FSAT 02-06 was updated and incorporated in FAA Notice 8000.356, Eff. 3/16/2007, SUBJ: Access to Air Carrier Flight Decks and Revision to OpSpec A048.
Finally, the original policy of FSAT 02-06, supported by the legal interpretation of FPA's October, 2000, inquiry became part of FSIMS where it is today, and from where I have cited above.
Allow me to quote from that legal interpretation, FAA twists and all:
As far as § 121.547(c), that's all I got. If you have any more argument, take it up with the FAA..
On July 17, 2001, Donald P. Byrne, Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, responded to FedEx Pilots Association's request seeking an interpretation of Section 121.583(e) ("Carriage of persons without compliance with the passenger-carrying requirements of this part.")
About a year later, and after September 11, 2001, the Flight Standards branch published Flight Standards Information Bulletin for Air Transportation (FSAT) 02-06, "Restricted Access to the Flightdeck". This FSAT included at Annex 3 the July 17, 2001, legal interpretation by Assistant Chief Counsel Byrne.
FSAT 02-06 was updated and incorporated in FAA Notice 8000.356, Eff. 3/16/2007, SUBJ: Access to Air Carrier Flight Decks and Revision to OpSpec A048.
Finally, the original policy of FSAT 02-06, supported by the legal interpretation of FPA's October, 2000, inquiry became part of FSIMS where it is today, and from where I have cited above.
Allow me to quote from that legal interpretation, FAA twists and all:
Section 121.547(c) applies only to passenger- carrying operations, not all-cargo operations because Section 121.583(a) excepts all-cargo operations[1] from the requirements pertaining to passengers in Section 121.547. But it is important to note that Section 121.583(a) does not except all-cargo operations from all of the requirements of Section 121.547, but instead only excuses compliance with the requirements pertaining to passengers. Section 121.547(a) is not a requirement pertaining to “passengers”. Instead section 121.547(a) is a regulation that deals with who may be admitted onto the flight deck and -- in the circumstances relevant to this interpretation -- who has the authority and the responsibility to grant or deny permission to a person seeking admission to the flight deck. Thus, in an all-cargo operation, nothing in Section 121.583(a) excepts the applicability of Section 121.547(a) (which pertains to flight deck admissions). Instead, for all-cargo operations, Section 121.583(a) excepts the air carrier from complying with the requirements pertaining to passengers in, among other rules, Section 121.547. The requirements pertaining to passengers in Section 121.547 are contained in the introductory text of paragraph (c). Thus, for all-cargo operations (i.e., those operations in which the only people aboard the aircraft are those listed in Section 121.583(a)), the air carrier is excused from complying with the passenger requirements in Section 121.547 (i.e., those contained in the introductory text of paragraph (c) of that section). But the air carrier and others must comply with the admission-to-the-flight-deck rules in Section 121.547(a). Thus, although Section 121.547(c) does not apply to cargo-only operations conducted under part 121, Sections 121.547(a) and 121.547(b) apply to both passenger-carrying operations and all-cargo operations.
In clarifying the interrelationship between section 121.547 and 121.583 and the applicability of 121.547 with respect to cargo airlines, the FAA states the following:
The general purpose for section 121.547 is to set forth who may be admitted to the flight deck of any aircraft used in part 121 operations. Section 121.547(a) identifies who may be admitted to the flight deck on any aircraft used under part 121 and the minimum requirements necessary for the admission of certain people to the flight deck of any aircraft used in operations conducted under part 121. The introductory text of paragraph (c) of Section 121.547 sets forth an additional flight-deck-admission requirement for certain visitors to the flight deck. That additional requirement is that a seat must be available in the passenger compartment for certain visitors. Those certain visitors are those who are not listed in the exceptions specified in subparagraphs (1) through (6) of Section 121.547(c). If the aircraft does not have a passenger compartment or if a seat is not available in an aircraft with a passenger compartment, then only those people listed in Section 121.547(c)(1) through (6) may be admitted to the flight deck provided that such admissions are not inconsistent with the requirements of Section 121.547(a). By contrast, 121.583(a) lists numerous passenger carrying requirements that the certificate holders need not comply with to carry the persons listed in 121.583(a)(1)-(8) aboard, and obviously is limited to all-cargo operations conducted under part 121. For an all-cargo operation, an air carrier need not comply with the passenger requirements in Section 121.547 (i.e., those contained in paragraph (c)), but no person or entity, including the air carrier, is excused from the flight deck admission requirements in Sections 121.547(a) and 121.547(b).
I know that was a lot of reading, so I took the liberty of highlighting a few of the more pertinent phrases.The general purpose for section 121.547 is to set forth who may be admitted to the flight deck of any aircraft used in part 121 operations. Section 121.547(a) identifies who may be admitted to the flight deck on any aircraft used under part 121 and the minimum requirements necessary for the admission of certain people to the flight deck of any aircraft used in operations conducted under part 121. The introductory text of paragraph (c) of Section 121.547 sets forth an additional flight-deck-admission requirement for certain visitors to the flight deck. That additional requirement is that a seat must be available in the passenger compartment for certain visitors. Those certain visitors are those who are not listed in the exceptions specified in subparagraphs (1) through (6) of Section 121.547(c). If the aircraft does not have a passenger compartment or if a seat is not available in an aircraft with a passenger compartment, then only those people listed in Section 121.547(c)(1) through (6) may be admitted to the flight deck provided that such admissions are not inconsistent with the requirements of Section 121.547(a). By contrast, 121.583(a) lists numerous passenger carrying requirements that the certificate holders need not comply with to carry the persons listed in 121.583(a)(1)-(8) aboard, and obviously is limited to all-cargo operations conducted under part 121. For an all-cargo operation, an air carrier need not comply with the passenger requirements in Section 121.547 (i.e., those contained in paragraph (c)), but no person or entity, including the air carrier, is excused from the flight deck admission requirements in Sections 121.547(a) and 121.547(b).
As far as § 121.547(c), that's all I got. If you have any more argument, take it up with the FAA..
06-16-2013, 06:59 PM
#124
Banned
Joined APC: Jun 2013
Posts: 57
Well if you want to keep thowing out the detailed FAR's how is it that animal handlers can ride in a 777 without a hardened cockpit door or company executives none of which have an FAA certificate they can ride where does it state that in the FAR's that it is legal?
06-16-2013, 07:52 PM
#126
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Oct 2009
Position: 777 Capt
Posts: 129
This is lengthy but worth reading. In the proposed rule making the PIC will now have to justify denying access to the cockpit.
https://www.federalregister.gov/arti...interpretation
In prior legal interpretations, we stated that the PIC permission provision provides the PIC unfettered discretion whether to admit certain individuals to the flight deck under a §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation. See Legal Interpretation from Joseph A. Conte to Brigitte Lakah (December 16, 2002); Legal Interpretation 2001-7. But see Legal Interpretation 2003-1 (distinguishing a “pure” §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation as the only time the PIC has unfettered discretion and stating that a “pure” §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation does not exist when an individual's presence on the flight deck is required by another rule (e.g.,§ 121.550 regarding secret service agents)). We based these interpretations on the rationale that a PIC's safety authority would be undermined if his or her decision to deny permission for certain people to enter the flight deck in a §§ 121.547 (a)(3) or (a)(4) situation was challenged by his or her employer. See Legal Interpretation 2003-1 (indicating that post flight disciplinary proceedings taken by an air carrier in a pure §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation interferes with the duties and responsibilities required of a PIC by regulation); Legal Interpretation from Joseph A. Conte to Brigitte Lakah (December 16, 2002) (stating that second-guessing a PIC's decision to deny permission for certain people to enter the flight deck would undermine “[T]he safety underpinning for having a `PIC-permission-provision' in the regulations.”); Legal Interpretation 2001-7.
The PIC bears the responsibility for the safety of the passengers, crew, cargo and aircraft during flight. See 14 CFR 91.3 and 121.535(e)-(f). To that end, it continues to be the PIC's decision as to whether there is a safety-related reason for excluding from the flight deck an individual eligible for admission under §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4). See e.g. Legal Interpretation 2001-7 (identifying numerous potential reasons for denying admission to the flight deck in a §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation such as rough weather, distraction to flightcrew, a complex operation requiring heightened attention by the flightcrew, all of which are safety-related).
However, to the extent that prior legal interpretations state or simply imply that air carriers have no ability to question a PIC in their employ regarding his or her decision to deny flight deck access to an individual for a reason that is not based on a safety concern, we believe the agency overstated its position. Accordingly, we propose to rescind the relevant portions of those prior legal interpretations. The FAA believes that at an appropriate time and venue, air carriers must be able to question why a PIC decided to exclude certain individuals from the flight deck when there was no apparent safety issue.[/COLOR]
While, as we have stated above, the PIC is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crew, cargo and aircraft during flight, we also hold air carriers responsible for the safe conduct of all aspects of their operations. See generally 14 CFR part 121. But, limiting air carriers' ability to manage their workforce, when there is no apparent risk to aviation safety, is outside the scope of the agency's safety oversight responsibilities.
The FAA's interest is in promoting safety and as such, we would be concerned with any action by the carrier that could reasonably impact the ability of the PIC to exercise his or her authority to make a determination that access to the flight deck needs to be denied for the safety of the operation. To that end, the agency presumption in any investigation will be that the PIC acted appropriately. The FAA expects, however, that the PIC will be able to articulate a safety-related reason for denying access to the flight deck in situations subject to §§ 121.547(a)(3) and (a)(4).
https://www.federalregister.gov/arti...interpretation
In prior legal interpretations, we stated that the PIC permission provision provides the PIC unfettered discretion whether to admit certain individuals to the flight deck under a §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation. See Legal Interpretation from Joseph A. Conte to Brigitte Lakah (December 16, 2002); Legal Interpretation 2001-7. But see Legal Interpretation 2003-1 (distinguishing a “pure” §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation as the only time the PIC has unfettered discretion and stating that a “pure” §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation does not exist when an individual's presence on the flight deck is required by another rule (e.g.,§ 121.550 regarding secret service agents)). We based these interpretations on the rationale that a PIC's safety authority would be undermined if his or her decision to deny permission for certain people to enter the flight deck in a §§ 121.547 (a)(3) or (a)(4) situation was challenged by his or her employer. See Legal Interpretation 2003-1 (indicating that post flight disciplinary proceedings taken by an air carrier in a pure §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation interferes with the duties and responsibilities required of a PIC by regulation); Legal Interpretation from Joseph A. Conte to Brigitte Lakah (December 16, 2002) (stating that second-guessing a PIC's decision to deny permission for certain people to enter the flight deck would undermine “[T]he safety underpinning for having a `PIC-permission-provision' in the regulations.”); Legal Interpretation 2001-7.
The PIC bears the responsibility for the safety of the passengers, crew, cargo and aircraft during flight. See 14 CFR 91.3 and 121.535(e)-(f). To that end, it continues to be the PIC's decision as to whether there is a safety-related reason for excluding from the flight deck an individual eligible for admission under §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4). See e.g. Legal Interpretation 2001-7 (identifying numerous potential reasons for denying admission to the flight deck in a §§ 121.547(a)(3) or (a)(4) situation such as rough weather, distraction to flightcrew, a complex operation requiring heightened attention by the flightcrew, all of which are safety-related).
However, to the extent that prior legal interpretations state or simply imply that air carriers have no ability to question a PIC in their employ regarding his or her decision to deny flight deck access to an individual for a reason that is not based on a safety concern, we believe the agency overstated its position. Accordingly, we propose to rescind the relevant portions of those prior legal interpretations. The FAA believes that at an appropriate time and venue, air carriers must be able to question why a PIC decided to exclude certain individuals from the flight deck when there was no apparent safety issue.[/COLOR]
While, as we have stated above, the PIC is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crew, cargo and aircraft during flight, we also hold air carriers responsible for the safe conduct of all aspects of their operations. See generally 14 CFR part 121. But, limiting air carriers' ability to manage their workforce, when there is no apparent risk to aviation safety, is outside the scope of the agency's safety oversight responsibilities.
The FAA's interest is in promoting safety and as such, we would be concerned with any action by the carrier that could reasonably impact the ability of the PIC to exercise his or her authority to make a determination that access to the flight deck needs to be denied for the safety of the operation. To that end, the agency presumption in any investigation will be that the PIC acted appropriately. The FAA expects, however, that the PIC will be able to articulate a safety-related reason for denying access to the flight deck in situations subject to §§ 121.547(a)(3) and (a)(4).
06-16-2013, 09:15 PM
#127
Banned
Joined APC: Jun 2013
Posts: 57
You think having a mechanic riding jumpseat could be detrimental to the safe operation of the aircraft? Think again. I recall riding jumpseat in a G159, I knew the aircraft quite well. The crew had missed a preflight checklist item and as the pilot was advancing the throttles for take off I asked if the windshield heat was supposed to be on. Pilot took his hand off the throttle reached up and turned on windshield heat and said yeah, thanks. Not long after that, this happened to the same captain:
THE ACFT WAS BEING OPERATED AS GENERAL AVIATION FLT 115 & WAS DEPTG ON A ROUTINE NIGHT FLT. DRG TAKEOFF/INITIAL CLIMB, THE LEFT ENG LOST PWR. THE FLT CREW ATTEMPTED TO CONT THE CLIMB-OUT, BUT FOLLOWING THE APPLICATION OF WATER-METHANOL, THE PLT LOST DRCTNL CONTROL. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ACFT BANKED TO THE LEFT, ENTERED A DSCNT & IMPACTED BETWEEN THE PARALLEL RWYS. AN INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED THAT THE LEFT PROPELLER'S BLADE ANGLE WAS 21 DEGS. NO PREIMPACT SYS MALFUNCTION OR FAILURE WAS FOUND. THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDING INDICATED THAT THE FLT CREW DID NOT COMPLETE ALL OF THE ITEMS ON THE BEFORE TAXI/TAKEOFF CHECKLIST. ONE OF THE ITEMS (PRESUMABLY NOT COMPLETED) WAS A CHECK OF THE H.P. **** LEVERS. THE CHECKLIST REQUIRED THAT THE H.P. **** LEVERS BE IN 'CRUISE LOCKOUT' FOR TAKEOFF. THE LEFT H.P. **** LEVER WAS FOUND BETWEEN THE 'FUEL OFF' & 'FEATHER' POSITIONS. MOVEMENT TO THIS POSITION WOULD HAVE DEACTIVATED THE AUTO-FEATHER SYS & SHUT DOWN THE LEFT ENG.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
PROPELLER FEATHERING..NOT PERFORMED..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
PREFLIGHT PLANNING/PREPARATION..INADEQUATE..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
CHECKLIST..NOT FOLLOWED
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
REMEDIAL ACTION..NOT ATTAINED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
AIRSPEED(VMC)..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
POWERPLANT CONTROLS..IMPROPER USE OF..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
FLUID,FUEL..STARVATION
Contributing Factors
LIGHT CONDITION..NIGHT
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
Had I been jumpseating, would I have caught their missed checklist item? Maybe. I sure as hell would have yelled NO! When he armed the water meth.
THE ACFT WAS BEING OPERATED AS GENERAL AVIATION FLT 115 & WAS DEPTG ON A ROUTINE NIGHT FLT. DRG TAKEOFF/INITIAL CLIMB, THE LEFT ENG LOST PWR. THE FLT CREW ATTEMPTED TO CONT THE CLIMB-OUT, BUT FOLLOWING THE APPLICATION OF WATER-METHANOL, THE PLT LOST DRCTNL CONTROL. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ACFT BANKED TO THE LEFT, ENTERED A DSCNT & IMPACTED BETWEEN THE PARALLEL RWYS. AN INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED THAT THE LEFT PROPELLER'S BLADE ANGLE WAS 21 DEGS. NO PREIMPACT SYS MALFUNCTION OR FAILURE WAS FOUND. THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDING INDICATED THAT THE FLT CREW DID NOT COMPLETE ALL OF THE ITEMS ON THE BEFORE TAXI/TAKEOFF CHECKLIST. ONE OF THE ITEMS (PRESUMABLY NOT COMPLETED) WAS A CHECK OF THE H.P. **** LEVERS. THE CHECKLIST REQUIRED THAT THE H.P. **** LEVERS BE IN 'CRUISE LOCKOUT' FOR TAKEOFF. THE LEFT H.P. **** LEVER WAS FOUND BETWEEN THE 'FUEL OFF' & 'FEATHER' POSITIONS. MOVEMENT TO THIS POSITION WOULD HAVE DEACTIVATED THE AUTO-FEATHER SYS & SHUT DOWN THE LEFT ENG.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
PROPELLER FEATHERING..NOT PERFORMED..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
PREFLIGHT PLANNING/PREPARATION..INADEQUATE..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
CHECKLIST..NOT FOLLOWED
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
REMEDIAL ACTION..NOT ATTAINED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
AIRSPEED(VMC)..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
POWERPLANT CONTROLS..IMPROPER USE OF..PILOT IN COMMAND
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
FLUID,FUEL..STARVATION
Contributing Factors
LIGHT CONDITION..NIGHT
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
Had I been jumpseating, would I have caught their missed checklist item? Maybe. I sure as hell would have yelled NO! When he armed the water meth.
06-17-2013, 07:28 AM
#129
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2012
Posts: 260
Your missing the point
You have no clue what this is really about.
It is about control and money, and intimidation.
If they cared about safety, we would have a new head of safety and schedule under the new flight time duty time regs, which most of the Cargo managements fought to carve us out of...
It is about control and money, and intimidation.
If they cared about safety, we would have a new head of safety and schedule under the new flight time duty time regs, which most of the Cargo managements fought to carve us out of...
06-17-2013, 07:41 AM
#130
Banned
Joined APC: Jun 2013
Posts: 57
You have no clue what this is really about.
It is about control and money, and intimidation.
If they cared about safety, we would have a new head of safety and schedule under the new flight time duty time regs, which most of the Cargo managements fought to carve us out of...
It is about control and money, and intimidation.
If they cared about safety, we would have a new head of safety and schedule under the new flight time duty time regs, which most of the Cargo managements fought to carve us out of...
Isn't the head of safety a retired pilot? I'd think he'd be on your side.
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