KC10 FATboy

Yo Mark;

Perhaps you should read the article posted by the OP and then read my post(s) AGAIN. I think you are out of bounds man.

#1. The article references landing gear problems in both DC-10s and MD-11s, one of which I fly.

#2. The article was written BEFORE the MD-11 Narita accident which is why the OP posted it for us to comment on.

#3. I never once said how to fly your MD-11.

Not sure if you're misdirecting some bad feelings my way or perhaps this is just your normal self. Regardless, that wasn't appreciated.

-Fatty

Albief15

Fatty,

Everyone here, especially those of us on the MD10/MD11, are all probably a bit stung right now and still pretty tender at the loss of our fellow pilots.

I didn't think your points were out of bounds, and I read them with interest. At this point I have a whopping 22 landings in the beast so I am reading, listening, and discussing these points with every captain I fly with. I have wondered myself about how the KC-10 guys worked, and obviously while the MD11 is different I enjoy hearing the perspective.

I'm not here to apologize for anyone else, but all the purple team are probably a bit out of sorts right now. Give us the benefit of the doubt, but thanks for contributing.

KC10 FATboy

Thanks Abief15. I too was shocked when I saw what happened and I feel for you guys.

I just want to make it clear that I'm not sitting here preaching or saying that I know it all, especially for the MD-11. I've not flown it -- but I did have a flight on two of them thanks to World.

I was just trying to pass on some of the things I learned while flying the KC-10.

LivingInMEM

I don't think the MD-11 having the same wing as the DC-10-30 relates to the gear problems, but I think it may relate to the increased danger of developing increased AOA, increased drag, and subsequently excessive descent rates at slow speeds and higher gross weights resulting in a quicker arrival to a point of no-return.

Having a smaller horizontal stab most certainly does play a factor in having decreased nose authority (relative to the DC-10-30) when at those slower speeds - despite the flight control system. A stab can only create so much downward lift a given airspeed, regardless of how it is scheduled.

Given that, there may be circumstances that the DC-10-30 and other airplanes may be able to fly themselves out of where the MD-11 can't.

In a complete analysis of the MD-11 as a whole, there is value in comparing it to the DC-10-30. When you have increased weights with the similar size wings and landing gear and a smaller (not larger) horizontal stab, the comparison can give you a quick idea of the potential handling characteristics of the MD-11 in comparison to the DC-10-30.

In light of this tragedy, we need to finally seriously address what has been happening and look at every possible factor that has led to record of mishaps and address them as completely as possible. The time for thin-skins and us-vs-them is gone. At some point you have to stop felling sorry and start feeling angry and let's get this problem fixed once and for all. No more excuses.

Albief15

LivinginMem,

It seems to me that although counter-intuitive, the MD-11 with a smaller tail is more pitch sensitive and has MORE pitch control than the MD-10.

Again...I'm a novice at this plane, just off consolidation. But with the MD-11 in the flare I think "T-38, F-15" pitch sensitivity. With the MD-10 it feels more "T-37, or 727". I find I bring the yoke back about "that" much more to "squeeze" a bit more flare or round out than the MD11. Remember hunting for that "sweet spot" in the F-15 just out of wing rock in scissors? That is sort of what it reminds me of...while the MD11 is a more mechanical round out to arrest the descent then a slight reduction of back pressure somewhere below 10 feet RA. That same technique in the MD10 produces a firmer landing as it seems to need a squeeze more of flare. (There are some divots on RWY 32 at Indy as I boofed this once last month...)

To my MD10/MD11 brothers...consider the source...a FNG. If this seems out to lunch or all wrong I certainly don't consider myself the font of MD knowledge...this is just my impressions...

LivingInMEM

Albie,

What you are saying is not counter-intuitive. When in the heart of the envelope with normal conditions, the flight control system is the entire source of the feel of the aircraft, just like CAS in the Eagle. While you may feel as if you are making the same control-stick inputs and getting much more precise control, the reality is that the flight control system is making the stab adjustments to make that happen - i.e. the elevator/stab may be doing a lot more work than it feels like it is.

The problem is that at some point the size of the stab comes into play as the airspeed and/or descent rates and/or whatever start to become excessive. At normal speeds, that little wing on the Viper can do some amazing turns because the computer makes it happen. The little wing seems like it is so much more precise than the Eagle. But at slow airspeeds and/or high AOA - there is only so much the computer can do. All of a sudden, even the computer can't make that nose move. At AOA's where the big wing Eagle is still turning, the Viper is developing some pretty good sink rates.

Ever consider how much energy a firm touchdown dissipates, ever consider what happens to the airspeed when that happens, ever consider how much authority is left in that small horizontal stab when the airspeed indicator is moving towards zero...? (All rhetorical questions)

My point is not to start guessing what happened in NRT. And I don't want to start a conversation on the stab of the MD-11. My point is that ALL of these discussions are good, especially when they are occurring in the offices of safety, training, etc. But, I am tired of all of the excuses that I have heard over the years on why certain areas of investigation were taboo. What if the MD-11 needs to have a different mindset with regard to approach and landing then any other airplane? What if there are points during a bad landing where the go-around is no longer possible? You need to know that and train the crews to go-around before they ever get there. You may need to train guys that, contrary to all of your flying experience that says you can get out of this situation in any other airplane, in this one you can't. Just like there were areas in the final turn in the T-38 where if you got to this sink-rate, you were not recovering - so you stayed away and called it early to avoid getting there.

My whole point is that there is a problem, somewhere - and I don't claim to know where. But, everytime something happens we say it isn't our pilots, it isn't the airplane, it isn't our training, it isn't fatigue, it isn't our "get there" mentality, it isn't...you add your's here. Eventually you come up with no more reasons left.

We can't say "Wow, we were lucky on that last one" anymore. We need to start asking the tough questions. By the way, my going in assumption is that: put in the same situation, I would most likely have done the same thing. These two fellow pilots as well as the rest of those in the other incidents (with rare exception) were highly experienced (military/civilian) in both overall experience and in this particular aircraft and because they were current and flying on the line I assume that they had a history of decision-making that was at least as good as the rest of us. Given the cumulative experience levels of all of the cumulative mishaps in the last 15 years, we need a full-court honest assessment to try to change the course.

We lost 2 people too many, and it needs to stop. And we need to critically assess why it is that this trend has continued. Just the facts, that's all I want.

HazCan

LivingInMem,

Great post. I agree, there is something different about this machine that we are not quite "getting". We need to figure it out before more people die.

Fly safe,
Haz

LivingInMEM

It is sad that liability and other concerns take a priority to safety in many ways. There is no mechanism that equates to the old "There I was" stories (and the FSR's don't come close). I am talking about those "holy cr$p" experiences that seemed to sneak up at the last minute - hairy weather, approaches, etc. In the old flying squadrons, when someone experienced something that caught there attention or did something that nearly ended poorly, they got up in front of everyone and forthrightly spoke about the facts - no harm/no foul. I once had to stand in front of the wing and re-live an incident that I was involved in, not as punishment (there was no retribution at all - none) but as a way to increase the collective experience of the wing as a whole. We don't have that any more.

Even the training departments don't have a formal process of getting the lessons learned from the line. There is no process for people to write a quick non-retribution "There I was" story and have it at least transmitted to the instructors to be passed down in the CMV 1's and 2's. The only stories the instructors know are the ones heard through rumor, the ones that happened to be passed from one instructor to another, or the ones that a student will throw out there if it aligns with the topic of discussion. There is no page on the website to get a summary of all of these. I remember that (in the very early 90's) every UPT student was issued a book called something along the lines of "Road to Wings" that summarized every single T-37/T-38 accident individually prior to the published date of the book.

I don't want to malign an aircraft, a group of pilots, a particular dept within the company, or the company. But, I think it is becoming painfully obvious that something different needs to be tried and new attitudes of safety vs liability / safety vs. discipline / etc need to be adopted. Companies have dealt with proprietary information for hundreds of years, given today's technology there should be workable solutions to increasing the wealth of knowledge and cumulative experience available to the professional line pilot.

NoHaz

Why not start some "there I was" threads here?

Zapata

Point of order; Speculating that the design of the airplane is at fault any more than, i.e. the pilots being at fault, before the final report, is just as bad.