“Prime Air”
12-20-2019, 06:59 AM
#112
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Thread Starter
Joined APC: Jan 2016
Posts: 104
Absolutely nothing? So we’ll just pretend that the CVR doesnt exist, and that while applying an abrupt nose down input he wasnt yelling “WHERES MY SPEED” “WE’RE STALLING”...... and nobody else on the aircraft was able to immediately say “no we’re not, airspeed is fine”.
I guess we’ll also pretend that in the systems group chairman’s report, they didn’t include a picture from Collins showing how an EADI with a failed airspeed bus source would appear. Why go out of their way to include that if this whole thing was so cut and dry? Theres no concrete evidence of anything other than the control inputs made by the crew and the fact that the fo was under the impression the aircraft was stalling.
Last edited by WildBlue025; 12-20-2019 at 07:13 AM.
12-20-2019, 07:01 AM
#114
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Joined APC: Sep 2008
Position: B767
Posts: 1,901
Absolutely nothing? So we’ll just pretend that the CVR doesnt exist, and that while applying an abrupt nose down input he wasnt yelling “WHERES MY SPEED” “WE’RE STALLING”...... and nobody else on the aircraft was able to immediately say “no we’re not, airspeed is fine”.
I guess we’ll also pretend that in the systems group chairman’s report, they didn’t include a picture from Collins showing what an EADI with a failed airspeed bus source would appear. Why go out of their way to include that if this whole thing was so cut and dry? Theres no concrete evidence of anything other than the control inputs made by the crew and the fact that the fo was under the impression the aircraft was stalling.
I guess we’ll also pretend that in the systems group chairman’s report, they didn’t include a picture from Collins showing what an EADI with a failed airspeed bus source would appear. Why go out of their way to include that if this whole thing was so cut and dry? Theres no concrete evidence of anything other than the control inputs made by the crew and the fact that the fo was under the impression the aircraft was stalling.
12-20-2019, 07:14 AM
#116
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Joined APC: May 2014
Posts: 150
12-20-2019, 07:18 AM
#117
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Joined APC: Feb 2019
Position: ATL FO
Posts: 189
This.
Aska was an accident waiting to happen. How many of you would’ve gotten into a flight deck knowing this guys past history? Do you think the CA would have? How about Sean? Atlas should be just as much on the hook for this as the FO. Did he wake up that morning and say to himself ‘Iwant to die today?’ Probably not. But that ‘pilot’ should’ve never been allowed anywhere near the front of a Cessna, let alone a heavy transport category aircraft.
Aska was an accident waiting to happen. How many of you would’ve gotten into a flight deck knowing this guys past history? Do you think the CA would have? How about Sean? Atlas should be just as much on the hook for this as the FO. Did he wake up that morning and say to himself ‘Iwant to die today?’ Probably not. But that ‘pilot’ should’ve never been allowed anywhere near the front of a Cessna, let alone a heavy transport category aircraft.
12-20-2019, 07:21 AM
#118
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Joined APC: Jan 2016
Posts: 104
This.
Aska was an accident waiting to happen. How many of you would’ve gotten into a flight deck knowing this guys past history? Do you think the CA would have? How about Sean? Atlas should be just as much on the hook for this as the FO. Did he wake up that morning and say to himself ‘Iwant to die today?’ Probably not. But that ‘pilot’ should’ve never been allowed anywhere near the front of a Cessna, let alone a heavy transport category aircraft.
Aska was an accident waiting to happen. How many of you would’ve gotten into a flight deck knowing this guys past history? Do you think the CA would have? How about Sean? Atlas should be just as much on the hook for this as the FO. Did he wake up that morning and say to himself ‘Iwant to die today?’ Probably not. But that ‘pilot’ should’ve never been allowed anywhere near the front of a Cessna, let alone a heavy transport category aircraft.
Agreed. Hopefully something comes of this but as of right now i’m still flying with guys who come out of training with multiple failures after 20 sim sessions, and over 40 hours of IOE. And i’m sure it’s not just my airline. Its unacceptable.
12-20-2019, 07:43 AM
#120
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Joined APC: Jan 2016
Posts: 104
Really? 
There's dozens of red flags in Conrad's past that flag this:
Training Incompetency and Failures
Past Training Notes (directly quoted from the NTSB Docket)
The quote that stands out the most to me in this second Mesa instructor interview is, "When asked if Conrad would get startled in the simulator, he said that during one stall recovery, Conrad pitched down about 40 degrees for recovery, then a pitch up about 20 degrees. His flight path was all over the place."
There's dozens of red flags in Conrad's past that flag this:Training Incompetency and Failures
- 6/27/11 - Resigned from CommutAir for failing DHC-8 initial
- 8/13/12 - Resigned from Air Wisconsin for failing CRJ initial
- 4/22/14 - Failed EMB-145 Oral at Trans State Airlines
- 5/11/14 - Failed EMB-145 Type Rating at Trans States Airlines
- 5/17 - Failed EMB-175 Upgrade Attempt at Mesa Airlines
- 5/17 - Nearly failed FO Requal after failing upgrade attempt at Mesa Airlines
- 7/27/17 - Failed B-767 Oral at Atlas Air
- 8/1/17 - Unsat Judgement/Situational Awareness during FBS-1 at Atlas Air
- 8/5/17 - Failed DBS-5 at Atlas Air
- 8/11/17 - Almost Failed FFSI-1 at Atlas Air
- 8/31/17 - "Regression of Situational Awareness" during FFSI-3 at Atlas Air
- 9/22/17 - Failed B-767 Type Rating for "Very Low Situational Awareness", incomplete procedures, and exceeding limitations at Atlas Air
Past Training Notes (directly quoted from the NTSB Docket)
- Air Wisconsin CRJ Initial Failure - "They were conducting the emergency procedure cabin altitude ... where they are at FL350 or so, and he gives the students a cabin altitude message requiring an emergency descent to 10,000 feet" ... "Conrad then goes to descend the simulator. He was not sure of Conrad's background, but instead of descending on the autopilot, Conrad disengaged the autopilot and abruptly pitched down well below horizon. They got stick shaker and overspeed alert together. He was not sure if it was an extreme nose down, but remembered that it was abrupt input on the controls"
- Mesa Airlines ERJ-175 Upgrade Failure (Instructor 1) - "He had previously failed simulator lesson 2 with different instructor, and he had requested a different instructor. She was conducting his retraining for lesson 2. She said his performance was a "train wreck" and he performed very poorly in this lesson. In the briefing room he did well, and explained things well. However, in the simulator and something he wasn't expecting happened he got extremely flustered and could not respond appropriately to the situation." ... "When asked about her comment in her notes about Conrad's "lack of understanding of how unsafe he was," she said he was making very frantic mistakes, lots and lots of mistakes, and did a lot of things wrong but did not recognize this was a problem. He thought he was a good pilot never had any problems and thought he should be a captain. he could not evaluate himself and see that he did not have the right stuff."
- Mesa Airlines ERJ-175 Upgrade Failure (Instructor 2) - "He first met Conrad Aska during a recurrent checking event in March 2016. That session went ok and nothing stood out. He did have some trouble with the stall series. The problems were with his attitude control, and he had a hard time getting the airplane back to level flight" ... "He said when Conrad would make a mistake in training he had an excuse for everything"
The quote that stands out the most to me in this second Mesa instructor interview is, "When asked if Conrad would get startled in the simulator, he said that during one stall recovery, Conrad pitched down about 40 degrees for recovery, then a pitch up about 20 degrees. His flight path was all over the place."
If anything, this backs up what i’m saying. Especially the last paragraph. In the past he showed drastic control inputs in response to a STALL situation. Which is clearly what he thought was happening. My point is NOT that he responded correctly to the situation. It’s that for some reason he thought the airplane was losing speed and stalling, and that was the basis for his inputs. There’s more evidence that points to that than there is that somebody hit the TOGA button and he responded by immediately pitching 60 degrees nose down. Why did he think he was losing airspeed and about to stall? Idk. Should a professional pilot be able to recognize unreliable airspeed data and know that you do not need to pitch 60 degrees nose down to recover from a low airspeed situation? Yes.
But anyone who thinks the “he got startled by TOGA” theory is the only possibility here is not looking at the facts.
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