Atlas Air Hiring
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Sep 2009
Posts: 611
Rereading my post, I realize now how it could be taken wrong. "Good luck, you'll need it" was not meant as a negative comment towards the pilot asking about Atlas. Unfortunately, I failed to adequately convey that.
My intent was to wish this pilot, and all new hires for that matter, the best of luck navigating the Atlas Air training program. The program is designed to take pilots with thousands of hours flying international heavy aircraft and teach them how to fly our specific aircraft. The program is not designed to successfully train pilots with minimal time or little to no jet time and successfully train them. We have pilots with those backgrounds that make it but we also have many who do not.
Atlas Air new hire failure rate 30%
Southern Air new hire failure rate 60%
Without a redesign of the training program, we are really doing a major disservice to the careers of those who pass through the front door.
My intent was to wish this pilot, and all new hires for that matter, the best of luck navigating the Atlas Air training program. The program is designed to take pilots with thousands of hours flying international heavy aircraft and teach them how to fly our specific aircraft. The program is not designed to successfully train pilots with minimal time or little to no jet time and successfully train them. We have pilots with those backgrounds that make it but we also have many who do not.
Atlas Air new hire failure rate 30%
Southern Air new hire failure rate 60%
Without a redesign of the training program, we are really doing a major disservice to the careers of those who pass through the front door.
How bad is it currently at Atlas? I understand management is horrible and refuses to negotiate -likely stretching a new agreement out 3 years at least (and that's hopeful). Schedule is grueling 17+ days and pay is worse than a regional. By the time a new contract comes it'll be industry low in no time. That or with ACMI Atlas contracts business out and Furloughs pilots or just up and starts another company -perks of parent company + multiple holdings. Someone told me Frank Lorenzo is behind the scenes.
Western Global is still fairly new, benefits aren't the best, but pay is fair and upgrade time is quick. Schedule is better from my understanding.
For someone looking for pay and QOL over 3-4 years, Western Global or Atlas? Atlas 747 / WG MD-11. Anticipate offers with both. Highly qualified. Time sensitive, thank you all very much in advance. Please honest and informative posts..
Western Global is still fairly new, benefits aren't the best, but pay is fair and upgrade time is quick. Schedule is better from my understanding.
For someone looking for pay and QOL over 3-4 years, Western Global or Atlas? Atlas 747 / WG MD-11. Anticipate offers with both. Highly qualified. Time sensitive, thank you all very much in advance. Please honest and informative posts..
Pretty damn bad. I’m one of the many hoping to move on ASAP...
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2017
Posts: 1,409
Since the crash we've announced no causal factors, announced no changes to operations or training other than an uptick in new-hire failure rates. In fact we have congratulated ourselves several times. An employee survey was sent out shortly after the accident. Since then the only thing we've seen was a hearty "good job!" to those in charge. Moreover successive layers of oversight and safety are being eroded across both organizations by developing what I believe are targeted conflicts of interest. Call me a cynic, but I've seen this play out before in two previous lives.
Folks with a background in stan-eval, safety, management, etc. will see all the hallmarks of an organization maneuvering to cover itself rather an an organization maneuvering to correct fatal faults.
People read these forums. So here's what we need:
Admit fault at all levels of command and in all departments. We all failed and people are dead. There's no dodging this.
1.) Admit multi-level failure of our flight ops, training and safety departments. People are dead. We failed. Pay the families.
2.) Announce an organizational recovery plan. Move incentives away from defense to improvement.
3.) Tie career progression to measured improvements. The specific metrics can be worked out by bigger brains than mine, but we need hard data to support this rather than subjective evaluations. We've proven that our judgement is lacking.
Until we're on the mend we're in decline.
Folks with a background in stan-eval, safety, management, etc. will see all the hallmarks of an organization maneuvering to cover itself rather an an organization maneuvering to correct fatal faults.
People read these forums. So here's what we need:
Admit fault at all levels of command and in all departments. We all failed and people are dead. There's no dodging this.
1.) Admit multi-level failure of our flight ops, training and safety departments. People are dead. We failed. Pay the families.
2.) Announce an organizational recovery plan. Move incentives away from defense to improvement.
3.) Tie career progression to measured improvements. The specific metrics can be worked out by bigger brains than mine, but we need hard data to support this rather than subjective evaluations. We've proven that our judgement is lacking.
Until we're on the mend we're in decline.
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2014
Posts: 265
Since the crash we've announced no causal factors, announced no changes to operations or training other than an uptick in new-hire failure rates. In fact we have congratulated ourselves several times. An employee survey was sent out shortly after the accident. Since then the only thing we've seen was a hearty "good job!" to those in charge. Moreover successive layers of oversight and safety are being eroded across both organizations by developing what I believe are targeted conflicts of interest. Call me a cynic, but I've seen this play out before in two previous lives.
Folks with a background in stan-eval, safety, management, etc. will see all the hallmarks of an organization maneuvering to cover itself rather an an organization maneuvering to correct fatal faults.
People read these forums. So here's what we need:
Admit fault at all levels of command and in all departments. We all failed and people are dead. There's no dodging this.
1.) Admit multi-level failure of our flight ops, training and safety departments. People are dead. We failed. Pay the families.
2.) Announce an organizational recovery plan. Move incentives away from defense to improvement.
3.) Tie career progression to measured improvements. The specific metrics can be worked out by bigger brains than mine, but we need hard data to support this rather than subjective evaluations. We've proven that our judgement is lacking.
Until we're on the mend we're in decline.
Folks with a background in stan-eval, safety, management, etc. will see all the hallmarks of an organization maneuvering to cover itself rather an an organization maneuvering to correct fatal faults.
People read these forums. So here's what we need:
Admit fault at all levels of command and in all departments. We all failed and people are dead. There's no dodging this.
1.) Admit multi-level failure of our flight ops, training and safety departments. People are dead. We failed. Pay the families.
2.) Announce an organizational recovery plan. Move incentives away from defense to improvement.
3.) Tie career progression to measured improvements. The specific metrics can be worked out by bigger brains than mine, but we need hard data to support this rather than subjective evaluations. We've proven that our judgement is lacking.
Until we're on the mend we're in decline.
Just had a conversation with a friend of mine in the training department. (We are on the SAI side of the fence). He said that he thought there was going to be a big change in things in 2020, he was thinking positive. I think so too, but I see it as negative.
What I see is that the Atlas operating certificate is going to be yanked by the Feds. What you are saying is exactly the same pattern that I saw at another airline that lost their operating certificate after a fatal accident - also a cargo airline. That airline's management behavior was EXACTLY as what you have outlined about Atlas.
With everything that is going on in the industry safety wise, there is a good possibility that Atlas will be the sacrificial goat, being that the overall economic impact of their shutdown will be minimal compared to that of a major passenger airline.
Takes about a year, before the FAA takes definitive action. Give it a little time.
Atlas management sees themselves as being impervious, their actions are hubristic. Right now they don't see the jeopardy, it might be right around the corner.
Banned
Joined APC: Oct 2008
Position: Window Seat
Posts: 1,430
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2014
Posts: 1,236
Rereading my post, I realize now how it could be taken wrong. "Good luck, you'll need it" was not meant as a negative comment towards the pilot asking about Atlas. Unfortunately, I failed to adequately convey that.
My intent was to wish this pilot, and all new hires for that matter, the best of luck navigating the Atlas Air training program. The program is designed to take pilots with thousands of hours flying international heavy aircraft and teach them how to fly our specific aircraft. The program is not designed to successfully train pilots with minimal time or little to no jet time and successfully train them. We have pilots with those backgrounds that make it but we also have many who do not.
Atlas Air new hire failure rate 30%
Southern Air new hire failure rate 60%
Without a redesign of the training program, we are really doing a major disservice to the careers of those who pass through the front door.
My intent was to wish this pilot, and all new hires for that matter, the best of luck navigating the Atlas Air training program. The program is designed to take pilots with thousands of hours flying international heavy aircraft and teach them how to fly our specific aircraft. The program is not designed to successfully train pilots with minimal time or little to no jet time and successfully train them. We have pilots with those backgrounds that make it but we also have many who do not.
Atlas Air new hire failure rate 30%
Southern Air new hire failure rate 60%
Without a redesign of the training program, we are really doing a major disservice to the careers of those who pass through the front door.
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2014
Posts: 1,236
If they keep totaling airframes (the 767 incident from last year might have been a hull loss) then they won't need to worry about the FAA. They won't be able to insure their fleet.
Banned
Joined APC: Oct 2008
Position: Window Seat
Posts: 1,430
That is marginally more believable than the other pipe dream but still just as unlikely - unless it turns into a monthly thing.
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2014
Posts: 1,236
We'll wait and see the final report from the NTSB on the Anahuac crash. Then we'll see what the widow of the jumpseater gets. I know what my wife would be asking for.... Atlas won't have a problem as long as the incidents stop.
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