Atlas pilots to get arbitrated contract.
09-06-2019, 08:20 PM
#121
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2007
Position: 747
Posts: 1,290
With all due respect Crusoe , asking other ( perhaps unemployed ) would-be pilots to “ take their talents elsewhere ...” is beyond disingenuous to the point of “ give your head a shake. “ If you’re not prepared to do what you ask of others , your self serving and “ see-right-through-it “ request is the sort of selfish versus selfless attitude that has created the mess you’re in. If the depth of your psychology is to have others sacrifice for your benefit , well let me just say politely that you need to rethink your strategy. Vote with YOUR feet. It is obvious that empathy for your colleagues is nonexistent and until that changes , management will bulldoze you into submission and you will continue to spin your wheels in the muck of misery and disdain. No ? Didn’t think so.
And what makes you think that Crusoe and the rest of us aren't voting with our feet? Getting hired is at the top of most Atlas pilots career plan right now.
09-06-2019, 11:14 PM
#122
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2017
Posts: 1,409
Reading through the posts above it looks like Crusoe is picking up on some hypocrisy. We can't, on one hand, talk about how easy it is to get a job anywhere else and also talk about how awful this company is while we still work here. I understand his point. Based on the information he has, we're all hypocrites.
What I think Crusoe misses is whether or not people are personally invested in a situation. I've been here almost 5 years. Others have been here a lot longer. Over time seniority builds and the cost of making significant moves increases (say by having kids, etc.). So for many of us, despite how bad this place is, there's only a few companies that justify a major move.
While we may be locked in, or nearly locked in, it is our responsibility to inform pilots who are thinking about coming here. Sometimes we don't go about doing this in the best way. Sometimes internal power struggles and conflict within the union dilute our message. Fundamentally, however, we're saying "Hey! We made a mistake. Why not avoid making the same mistake we did before you're locked into our situation?".
What I think Crusoe misses is whether or not people are personally invested in a situation. I've been here almost 5 years. Others have been here a lot longer. Over time seniority builds and the cost of making significant moves increases (say by having kids, etc.). So for many of us, despite how bad this place is, there's only a few companies that justify a major move.
While we may be locked in, or nearly locked in, it is our responsibility to inform pilots who are thinking about coming here. Sometimes we don't go about doing this in the best way. Sometimes internal power struggles and conflict within the union dilute our message. Fundamentally, however, we're saying "Hey! We made a mistake. Why not avoid making the same mistake we did before you're locked into our situation?".
09-06-2019, 11:45 PM
#123
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2017
Posts: 1,409
One more thing to add to the list of reasons not to come here: facts.
We're 4 times more likely than average to have accident on each departure. This hasn't changed much over the years, but our increased flying exposes us to much more risk each year. We can discuss the numbers behind this and some other depressing statistics like our mean time to next accident individually, if you like.
We were able to get by without AQP, LOSA, etc. when we flew 10k departures per year. We simply weren't exposing ourselves as much. Now that we're flying 50-60k departures per year, we're exposed to more risk. We're exposing ourselves with the same analyses we made a decade or more ago.
Not only have we failed to anticipate changes, we're failing to react to events. The communications we've received have had no significant information in them. Worse, we see people publicly disagree about whether or not we have a safety problem here (reference the Miami Herald article, BF's statements regarding safety, Union Statements, etc.). So we don't have a shared mental model of our own situation.
We haven't seen significant operational results outside of a few changes to call-outs and checklists. (Significant change would include new syllabi, new Safety programs consistent with other carriers, adoption of industry-accepted training practices, etc.). An investigation doesn't need to be complete for a result and change to be implemented. Companies react before final reports publish all the time (look at Boeing and Airbus advisories that get published well before final reports are out.). Our failure to generate a result further indication of systems that are fundamentally broken.
As it stands it seems like we can't adequately detect challenges, nor can we process information that we receive. That breaks both of the Os in our OODA loop, and we're essentially a sitting duck waiting for circumstance to wallop us.
For those of us here, it's our responsibility to defend and improve the operation. For those that are coming, it's your responsibility to know the facts and do your research.
We're 4 times more likely than average to have accident on each departure. This hasn't changed much over the years, but our increased flying exposes us to much more risk each year. We can discuss the numbers behind this and some other depressing statistics like our mean time to next accident individually, if you like.
We were able to get by without AQP, LOSA, etc. when we flew 10k departures per year. We simply weren't exposing ourselves as much. Now that we're flying 50-60k departures per year, we're exposed to more risk. We're exposing ourselves with the same analyses we made a decade or more ago.
Not only have we failed to anticipate changes, we're failing to react to events. The communications we've received have had no significant information in them. Worse, we see people publicly disagree about whether or not we have a safety problem here (reference the Miami Herald article, BF's statements regarding safety, Union Statements, etc.). So we don't have a shared mental model of our own situation.
We haven't seen significant operational results outside of a few changes to call-outs and checklists. (Significant change would include new syllabi, new Safety programs consistent with other carriers, adoption of industry-accepted training practices, etc.). An investigation doesn't need to be complete for a result and change to be implemented. Companies react before final reports publish all the time (look at Boeing and Airbus advisories that get published well before final reports are out.). Our failure to generate a result further indication of systems that are fundamentally broken.
As it stands it seems like we can't adequately detect challenges, nor can we process information that we receive. That breaks both of the Os in our OODA loop, and we're essentially a sitting duck waiting for circumstance to wallop us.
For those of us here, it's our responsibility to defend and improve the operation. For those that are coming, it's your responsibility to know the facts and do your research.
09-07-2019, 02:46 AM
#124
New Hire
Joined APC: Mar 2019
Posts: 7
09-07-2019, 06:29 AM
#125
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2014
Posts: 1,236
One more thing to add to the list of reasons not to come here: facts.
We're 4 times more likely than average to have accident on each departure. This hasn't changed much over the years, but our increased flying exposes us to much more risk each year. We can discuss the numbers behind this and some other depressing statistics like our mean time to next accident individually, if you like.
We were able to get by without AQP, LOSA, etc. when we flew 10k departures per year. We simply weren't exposing ourselves as much. Now that we're flying 50-60k departures per year, we're exposed to more risk. We're exposing ourselves with the same analyses we made a decade or more ago.
Not only have we failed to anticipate changes, we're failing to react to events. The communications we've received have had no significant information in them. Worse, we see people publicly disagree about whether or not we have a safety problem here (reference the Miami Herald article, BF's statements regarding safety, Union Statements, etc.). So we don't have a shared mental model of our own situation.
We haven't seen significant operational results outside of a few changes to call-outs and checklists. (Significant change would include new syllabi, new Safety programs consistent with other carriers, adoption of industry-accepted training practices, etc.). An investigation doesn't need to be complete for a result and change to be implemented. Companies react before final reports publish all the time (look at Boeing and Airbus advisories that get published well before final reports are out.). Our failure to generate a result further indication of systems that are fundamentally broken.
As it stands it seems like we can't adequately detect challenges, nor can we process information that we receive. That breaks both of the Os in our OODA loop, and we're essentially a sitting duck waiting for circumstance to wallop us.
For those of us here, it's our responsibility to defend and improve the operation. For those that are coming, it's your responsibility to know the facts and do your research.
We're 4 times more likely than average to have accident on each departure. This hasn't changed much over the years, but our increased flying exposes us to much more risk each year. We can discuss the numbers behind this and some other depressing statistics like our mean time to next accident individually, if you like.
We were able to get by without AQP, LOSA, etc. when we flew 10k departures per year. We simply weren't exposing ourselves as much. Now that we're flying 50-60k departures per year, we're exposed to more risk. We're exposing ourselves with the same analyses we made a decade or more ago.
Not only have we failed to anticipate changes, we're failing to react to events. The communications we've received have had no significant information in them. Worse, we see people publicly disagree about whether or not we have a safety problem here (reference the Miami Herald article, BF's statements regarding safety, Union Statements, etc.). So we don't have a shared mental model of our own situation.
We haven't seen significant operational results outside of a few changes to call-outs and checklists. (Significant change would include new syllabi, new Safety programs consistent with other carriers, adoption of industry-accepted training practices, etc.). An investigation doesn't need to be complete for a result and change to be implemented. Companies react before final reports publish all the time (look at Boeing and Airbus advisories that get published well before final reports are out.). Our failure to generate a result further indication of systems that are fundamentally broken.
As it stands it seems like we can't adequately detect challenges, nor can we process information that we receive. That breaks both of the Os in our OODA loop, and we're essentially a sitting duck waiting for circumstance to wallop us.
For those of us here, it's our responsibility to defend and improve the operation. For those that are coming, it's your responsibility to know the facts and do your research.
My new hire class consisted of Two C-17 Instructors, a C-17 Aircraft Commander, a 777 Captain, an RJ Instructor, an RJ Captain, and a corporate guy who left Atlas years before with a 747 Type. That was 2011. Is that what they're getting today?
I have no idea whether this has changed since February (or even going back to last Summer with the passenger incident), but I'm guessing nothing has changed with hiring standards. Atlas is probably even more likely to crash another jet than it was in February. That should scare applicants for a number of reasons.
09-07-2019, 06:32 AM
#126
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2016
Posts: 293
Atlas has always struggled with unity, mostly by design weather it was Choudry and his divide and conquer hiring tactics (I won't even go into the AACS experience) or the Polar/Atlas merger blame game. Lots of bad blood around here and plenty more to come with the Southern integration. As I said it's by design and management will continue to leverage our own egos and lack of focus against us.
PS. Enjoyed your post Elevation
09-11-2019, 06:07 AM
#127
Line Holder
Joined APC: Oct 2012
Posts: 43
09-11-2019, 02:05 PM
#129
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Position: Retired
Posts: 651
Looks like we had our chance with Amazon and blew it. The reality is bad enough, but we couldn't just stick to that.
Like a lot of the posts here on APC.
09-13-2019, 10:56 AM
#130
New Hire
Joined APC: Sep 2019
Posts: 4
Wow, came here to get some info for flying with Southern Air and surprised at some of these comments. This one blows me away. I’m sure you have a way you think you can justify this comment but can’t think any way it will be truly justifiable.
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